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This thesis contends from the time of September 1940 to the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States and Japan offered 
each no workable concessions that might have deterred war. A stalemate 
was finnly established between the two countries. The position ,of the 
Japanese nation was to expand and control "Greater East-Asia," while the 
position the United States held was one that claimed all nations should 
uphold certain basic principles of democracy, that all nations should 
honor the sanctity of treaties," and that they should treat neighboring 
countries in a friendly fashion. 
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This thesis also contends that Yosuke Matsuoka used his position 
as Foreign Minister of Japan to detennine policy for the entire ;nation. 
:;I' 
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Matsuoka led Japan in such a way that a settlement of differences between 
the United States and his country was not attainable through diplomatic 
talks. Even after Matsuoka had been removed from his position, the 
Supreme Connnand was determined to prepare for war and at the same time 
carry on diplomatic discussions with the United States. The only pos-
sible way that war could have been avoided was if one of the two nations 
had.been willing to break the stalemate by giving in to the demands of 
the other. Neither was willing to compromise. 
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CHAPTER I 
A DRAW IN THE OFFING 
In looking back at the years prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, 
one sees several aggressive moves by the Japanese. One can also see 
the handicaps (successful diplomacy} encountered. In the last few 
months before Pearl Harbor several Japanese cabinets and cabinet 
members, were faced with "expansionist-pressures", to change the "status 
quo" in the Far East and eventually the world. Upon the conclusion of 
a successful war against China in 1895, Japan annexed Formosa, which at 
that time was interpreted by viewers as nothing more than a foothold 
for further strides inwardo Following the Russo-Japanese War, Japan in 
1905 effected a foothold in Manchuria through acquisition of a lease 
of the Kwantung territory and ownership of the South Manchurian Railway. 
At this same time they were able to acquire the southern portion of 
Sakhalin. In 1904 Japan guaranteed Korea's independence. In 1910 she 
annexed Korea. During World War I in an opportune moment, Japan 
presented China with "Twenty-one Demands" that encroached much on 
China's sovereignty that there was American fear of the "Open Door" 
being shut by Japan.I 
In 1918 Japan became a part of a non-binding inter-ally plan 
whereby several countries would send troops not exceeding 7000 members 
from any one country to guard the military stores in Siberia which 
eventually would be needed by the Russians to aid in their self-defense 
against the Bolsheviks, and also to aid in evacuating Czechoslovakian 
forces. Japan took this opportunity to envision annexing eastern 
Siberia. She sent 72,000 soldiers to Siberia which made up a military 
force that had more than aid for the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia 
in mind. The United States sent 9000 men and the British and the 
French sent a few somewhat more in the bounds of the plan.
2 
Japan took part in the Washington Conferences of 1921-22 and 
eventually signed the agreements that came from them. One of these 
agreements was the Nine Power Treaty which was designed to provide 
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for China full opportunity to develop and maintain a stable government. 
Japan pledged herself to the policies of self-restraint entailed in this 
treaty. She also agreed to respect the sovereignty, independence and 
territorial and administrative integrity of China. She also agreed to 
use her influence to establish the principle of equal opportunity in 
that country. General Tanaka's Cabinet in 1927 adopted such a policy 
towards China, and with success attempted to "influence" Chinese 
internal affairs.
3 
In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria where the government of Manchukuo 
was established. This was a violation of the agreements made in the 
Washington Conferences of 1921-22 and her adherance to the Kellogg-
Briand Pact. Following the attack a Japanese delegate to the League of 
Nations proclaimed on November 21, 1931: ''We want no more territory."4 
Following the Lytton Committee Report on its investigation of the 
Manchurian situation Japan walked out of the League. By the end of 
1936, Japan made formal announcement of their withdrawal from the Naval 
Limitations' agreement signed in the Washington Conferences.
5 
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The Japanese people came to believe that the area of their control 
should be all of East Asia and the Western Pacific. The people of Asia 
needed Japan to give them '~eace, justice and partnership for all •• 
The bayonets were merely to expel the devil who would not understand 
their 'true intentions.'"
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The "Holy War" with China began in 1937. The results of the Boxer 
rebellion had given all countries involved the right of stationing 
troops in the Chinese capital of Peking, and also the right to station 
them along the railway which provided communication with the sea. This 
was done to prevent another such rebellion from happening. There had 
also been an agreement made stating that foreign troops had the right 
to engage in field exercises and rifle practice, ·"without informing the 
Chinese authorities."7 After thirty years of this protection from 
rebellion, the French had somewhere between 1700 and 2000 troops, the 
British had just a few more than a 1000, and the Japanese were sup-
porting a force of at least 7000 soldiers and possibly as many as 15,000, 
" 
a number far in excess of that needed for the purposes envisaged 
in the Boxer Protocol."8 
In June of 1937, these Japanese troops were engaged in nighttime 
maneuvers in the area of the Marco Polo Bridge close to the city limits· 
of Peking. It had appeared to the Chinese that the Japanese were 
attempting to secure a better position for her troops in Peking. Since 
1931 it should be remembered that the Chinese were quite experienced 
with the encroaching tactics of the Japanese in their country. The 
Chinese had taken some precautions in this area to make sure the 
Japanese were not doing anything that would give them claim to more 
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territory. They had requested from the Japanese that any nighttime 
maneuvering by her troops should be announced ahead of time so that any 
of the Chinese people in the area could be warned and kept safe. 
On the night of July 7, the Japanese conducted nighttime maneuvers 
without giving any notice. General Chin Teh-chun, Commander of the 
Chinese Military in the Hopei-Chahar area, was informed by the Commis-
sioner of Foreign Affairs of the Hopei-Chahar Council that Colonel 
Matsui, Commander of the Japanese Army in this area, had complained that 
a company of Japanese soldiers on night maneuvers near Lukouchiao had 
been fired upon, that one Japanese soldier was missing, and that they 
wanted to enter Wanping in search of him. The General refused to 
sanction Japanese entry into the town. He told the local Chinese 
commander to hold Wanping against any Japanese attack. The general 
took the view that these nighttime maneuvers were illegal and that the 
Chinese could not be held responsible for the missing soldier. He in 
turn offered the Japanese a search, utilizing the Chinese forces, in 
Wanping for the missing soldier. A joint investigation was agreed upon 
during the course of the night, but in the meantime, the Japanese brought 
their troops within range of the city of Wanping and opened fire.9 The 
following day on July 8, the Chinese were told that if they did not 
surrender they would be attacked. The Chinese refused to bow to sur-
render and fighting followed. The Japanese suffered numerous casual-
ties. IO On the next day July 9, the Chinese were informed that the 
missing soldier had been found and they suggested terms for an immediate 
truce which the Chinese accepted.
1
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The "incident" would have ended had the Japanese on their with-
drawal not left a detachment of approximately one hundred men behind. 
This hard-to-explain event probably can be blamed for the continuing of 
the "incident." At midnight on July 9, these soldiers began firing on 
the town of Wanping. Japanese troops began pouring into this area. 
Within three days the total number of Japanese troops leveled off at 
20,000 men with air cover provided by 100 planes.12 The Kwantung army 
(the Continental Japanese Army) had moved in several units into the 
Wanping area. The danger of an increase in hostilities had been created 
by this action and movement of Japanese troops. 
The cabinet in Tokyo on hearing of this "China Incident" decided 
that it should be limited immediately so as to obtain a speedy local 
settlement. This was on July 8. The Japanese army's actions made this 
settlement-business very difficult. One authority compares a "local 
settlement" to that of Texas settling a boundary dispute with Mexico 
without notifying the federal government of the United States.13 
By July 20, following the Army's recommendations, the Konoye 
Cabinet authorized the mobilization of three divisions of the Japanese 
forces. One week later the commander of Kwantung's forces informed 
Tokyo that he had attempted every way possible to settle the differences 
through negotiations and he was now recommending force. This recom-
mendation was approved by the military authorities in Tokyo without any 
recorded objection or questioning by the cabinet.14 The basic rationale 
in Tokyo for sending more troops to China was to guarantee the safety 
of Japanese nationals and Japanese property.15 
Fighting continued off and on. Nanking offered to negotiate. 
The United States "tendered its good offices." Japan would not have 
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anything to do with a middle nation. 
What in fact was Japan doing? Some people in Japan saw their 
country as the ''Messiah" for the Asian countries. They saw their Asian 
counterparts divided between the Colonial Empires of Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, France, Portugal, and the United States. They overlooked 
the fact that these colonial powers ruled over a divergent population 
and maintained peace and order. 
Part of Japan's expansionism came about because of jealousy. 
There was a conflict over prestige and power between the armies sta-
tioned on the Asian mainlands and that of the armies in Japan. During 
the period of two years in 1931-33, the Kwantung (the Continental 
Japanese Army) had taken Manchuria and Jehol from the Chinese and had 
organized the puppet-state Manchukuo. A direct result from the for-
mation of the puppet-state Manchukuo was an increase in favorable 
Japanese public opinion toward the Arrny.16 
As a result of the newly acquired possession, two schools of 
thought appeared in Japan. One was to get the most possible_ out of 
Manchuria and that was all. The other was to get the most possible out 
of Manchuria and go a step further into China and create a buffer zone. 
It was even suggested that this was an extremely good opportunity to go 
into Inner Mongolia and undermine Soviet influence in Outer Mongolia. 
The object of this move would be to establish a corridor between China 
and the U.SoS.R. that Japan controlled.17 
The Cabinet in sensing the different views of what should be 
done on August 11, 1936 attempted to write a policy that appears to be 
a compromise between Japan's military leaders of Japan and the foreign 
policy-makers. This compromise, called "Basic Principles of National 
Policy" stated: 
1.) Japan must strive to correct the aggressive policies 
of the greater powers and to realize the spirit of the Imperial 
Way by a consistent policy of overseas expansion. 
2.) Japan must complete her defensive armament to secure the 
position of her empire as the stabilizing power in East Asia. 
3.) Japan should strive to eradicate the menace of the 
U.S.S.R. in the north in order to stabilize Japan's Manchukuo 
national defense and to promote sound economic development. 
Japan should also be prepared against Britain and the United 
States, and attempt to bring about economic development by 
close collaboration between Japan, Manchukuo and China. How-
ever, in achieving these objects Japan should pay due attention 
to friendly relations with other powers. 
4.) To further her plan to promote social and economic 
development in the South Seas, and without .rousing other powers, 
Japan should attempt to extend her strength by moderate and 
peaceful means. Thus with the establishment of Manchukuo Japan 
might expect full development of her national resources and her 
national defense.18 
The Kwantung Army was more_ aggressive-minded than this policy 
allowed for. In fact, they were not at all receptive to the moderate 
peaceful policy Tokyo was attempting to indoctrinate them with. This 
nonacceptance of policy was based on the Kwantung's belief that a 
united front was being formed against Japan in China by the forces of 
the Koumintang-Communists. Hideki Tojo sent a telegram to the General 
7 
Staff of the Japanese Army in June warning them of this possibility and 
he suggested that Japan should be the first to strike against Nanking.
1
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The War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff in Tokyo did not 
agree with Tojo's advice. There were evidently many in the lower 
echelons of the Army both home and abroad who thought as he did. The 
danger, of course, was that the Army was not willing to give up its idea 
of a buffer zone between Manchuria and China. The Army of the mainland 
was not interested in the new "Basic Principles of National Policy." 
8 
The Kwantung Army, faced with the choices of withdrawal of its 
troops and reliance on peaceful problem~.s.alving methods or expansion of 
the buffer zone, that was to keep the Japanese-claimed territories in 
Manchuria safe from the Koumintang-Communists, by use of military force, 
chose to ignore the policy of peace and to use the Marco Polo Bridge 
"incident" to expand Japan's buffer zone. It should be emphasized that 
the Marco Polo Bridge "incident" was not a Japanese premeditated long-
range plan, but rather a spontaneous outburst of violence between small 
numbers of Chinese and Japanese soldiers. The Kwantung's decision to 
enlarge the zone through force, chose to take a narrow militaristic 
look at the "incident" which reveals the army's inability to face the 
facts of the outcome of such expansionist goals. 
This inability to size up the situation realistically is shown by 
Hideki Tojo in his estimation of the "China Incident" as being nothing 
more than a "family quarrel." In the post-war interrogations he stated: 
There was real fighting to be sure, but it was considered to 
be a family quarrel, in which the younger brother, China, 
was being made to reconsider its various illegal acts typi-
fied by such anti-Japanese phrases as konichi (oppose the 
Japs) and hainichi (expel the Japs). The basic purpose was 
always the fostering of good neighborliness and friendship 
and for that reason the thinB was never called a war nor was 
there a declaration of war.2 
Not only the Kwantung's leaders but one of Japan's future Foreign 
Ministers, Yosuke Mastuoka, told the Associated Press about the "broth-
erly quarrel," a few months after the "incident." 
China and Japan are two brothers who have inherited a 
great mansion called Eastern Asia. Adversity sent them 
both down to the depth of poverty. The ne'er-do well 
elder brother turned a dope fiend and a rogue, but the 
younger, lean, but rugged and ambitious, ever dreamed of 
bringing back past glories to the old House. He sold 
newspapers at a street corner and worked hard to support the 
house. The elder flim-flanuned the younger out of his meager 
savings and sold him out to their conunon enemy. The younger 
in a towering rage beat up the elder--trying to beat into 
him some sense of shame and awaken some pride in the noble 
traditions of the great house. After many scraps, the 
younger finally made up his mind to stage a show-down fight. 
And that is the fight now raging along the North China and 
Shanghai fronts.21 
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Matsuoka's analogy of the conflict, to say the least, is overstated 
in that he takes the spontaneous action at the Marco Polo Bridge and 
makes it into a "show-down fight." The "show-down" fight emerged after 
the "incident" not as a premeditated move on the part of the Japanese 
military in China. 
The action taken in China by the Japanese was reported to the 
American public. One who would read the papers of America during the 
months following the "China Incident" would find that, in most cases, 
the news bulletins, the reporting, and the editorials portrayed a nega-
tive view of the Japanese. The fact that the papers were reporting this 
view does not necessarily mean that the reader was accepting it. But 
again in most cases, other than magazines, radio, and "word of mouth," 
the newspapers' opinions and views were all the public would learn about 
the intent of the Japanese in China. 
From pursuing through the back files of the Oregonian, the Oregon 
Journal, and the New York Times, it is noted when the "China Incident" 
continued on into more acts of conflict instead of ending in peaceful 
negotiations, the reporters, the political cartoonists, and the editors 
all put the blame on a "greedy-expansionist-nation" called Japan. 'Ihe 
public was told that the Japanese were not to be trusted, that "mass 
10 
murder" was in the offing, that the Japanese were being led by a "blood-
thirsty, power-hungry, expansionist" group of military leaders.
22 
Some examples of this type of reporting and editorializing follow. 
TI-le New York Times on July 11, headlined: "PEACE MOVE FAILS, 
JAPAN IS SUSPECTED OF PLAN TO INCREASE HOLD ON NORTH CHINA," and 
"JAPAN SEES A BIG CHANCE." The comments in this article ranged from 
" • • 
• another Mukden promise," to "Japan is on the march to her mani-
fest destiny."
23 
Four days later the Oregonian presented this editorial which 
helps illustrate the prevalent attitude portrayed in the papers of 
distrust and suspicion of Japan. 
On all fronts Japan is particularly aggressive these days. 
It is uncompromising in its defense of the Japanese fisher-
men who frequent Bristol Bay, Alaska; it bombards Russians 
who have "invaded" a sandbar or two in the Amur River on the 
Manchurian border; probably its troops are fighting on the 
Mongolian frontier--they usually are; and now there is out-
right war, though undeclared war around Peiping. • • • Ever 
since the Manchurian invasion in 1931, the Japanese army has 
either controlled the cabinet directly or overawed it. In 
any case, the Anny is not responsible to the Cabinet. It is 
responsible only to the Emperor. If the Army wants to start 
a war in Asia, it does so and lets the civilian goverrunent 
do the worrying about explaining the affair to the world and 
about the funds needed. It seems determined to bring about 
foreign complications which will frighten the Japanese voters 
into granting everything the army desires in the way of 
appropriations and war preparations.24 
An edition of the New York Times later in the month asked through 
a headline this question. "NINE POWER TREATY NOT WORKING--WHAT DOES 
JAPAN SEEK?" In reply to the question the paper responded: 
Incidents there are always. Sometimes Japan has used them to 
take over further advantages in North China; sometimes they 
have been forgotten. It all depends on what use is made of 
the incident • • • the big question is whether Tokyo intends 
to use the situation to take formal control of Peiping and 
Tientsin thus cementing her hold on Hopei Province and on 
North China • • • on the other hand bluff always plays a 
part in Oriental diplomacy.25 
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The views of these papers hardly suggested any form of discipline 
toward Japan. More or less, the papers pointed out that what Japan was 
doing in China was unfair. 
The realization that public opinion would be against action of 
any kind on the part of the United States was made evident by Cordell 
Hull when, due to a confrontation on the part of France and Great 
Britain wanting the United States to enter into a joint-action to stop 
the Japanese-Chinese crisis, he reacted in fear of what the public would 
do. The influence of public opinion upon his reasoning was obvious when 
he stated, "• •• that anything resembling joint action with Britain 
inevitably aroused the fears and animosity of the isolationist elements 
in the United States~25 
President Roosevelt in one of his more famous speeches, which 
incidentally was prepared by the State Department, inserted his self-
initiated and self-worded "quarantine clause." The prepared portion by 
the State Department had been worded much more carefully.
2
6 The clause 
inserted by the President that upset many was thus worded. 
The peace, the freedom, and the security of 90 percent of 
the population of the world is being jeopardized by the re-
maining 10 percent, who are threatening a break down of 
international order and law. Surely the 90 percent who want 
to live in peace under law and in accordance with moral 
standards that have received almost universal acceptance 
through the centuries, can and must find a way to make their 
will prevail. • • • It seems to be unfortunately true that 
the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading. When an 
epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community 
approves and joins in a quarantine of the patient in order to 
protect the health of the community against the spread of the 
disease.27 
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In the United States the suggestion of sanctions caused an uproar of 
adverse comments within the legislative branches of the government. 
Roosevelt who was the "extreme suave politician," promptly drew back and 
tried to explain his unfortunate language. Obviously this pointed out 
to the politicians and statesmen that any kind of activities that would 
cuase the United States to be a part of a conflict in the world would 
be accepted with great amounts of ill feeling on the part of public 
opinion.
2
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Secretary of State Hull was extremely upset by the "clause" and 
wrote in his diary: 
The reaction against the quarantine idea was quick and 
violent. As I saw it, this had the effect of setting back 
for at least six months our constant educational campaign 
intended to create and strengthen public opinion toward 
international cooperation • • • we were always careful not 
to go too far lest a serious attack by the isolationist 
element throw us farther back than we were before. If we 
proceeded gradually and did not excite undue opposition, 
our words and actions although not so dynamic or far 
reaching as we might wish had more effect on the world at 
large than if we made startling statements or took precip-
itate action and then, because of the bitter reaction we 
aroused, presented the world with the spectacle of a nation 
divided against itself .29 
The "quick and violent" reaction came in the form of a declaration 
issued by six organizations that could be categorized as pacifist. The 
declaration stated that the President "points the American people down 
the road that led to the World War." The American Federation of Labor 
issued the resolution that "American labor does not wish to be involved 
in European or Asiatic wars." Members of the House of Representatives 
threatened to have the President impeached. A poll of Congress taken 
by the Philadelphia Inquirer showed its membership was more than two to 
13 
one against common action with the League in the Far East. A campaign 
was launched by the six organizations to secure some 25,000,000 signa-
tures to a "Keep America Out of War" petition.30 
From this point in history, American public opinion can be inter-
preted to have said that it was not in favor of activities that would 
draw America into a conflict or war. Yet one might also add that with 
the newspapers indoctrinating the American public to believe the 
Japanese were untrustworthy and planning more military advancements in 
China, American public opinion concerning Japan worsened. Still the 
fear of public opinion would not allow the goverrunent of the United 
States to do anything of major consequence about Japan. 
The war in Europe certainly was of great importance to the rest 
of the world. In Asia, the Japanese militarists who had spontaneously 
chosen to use the "incident" of 1937 in China to gain a buffer zone 
between Manchuria and China, had all the time been eager to join their 
hands with the Germans. What Hitler had done in the spring and sununer 
of 1940 stirred the expansionists of Japan as nothing had before. 
Hitler had made tremendous strides in taking over parts of Europe. 
Poland had been crushed earlier between two forces in hardly more than 
two weeks' time. During this time much to the dismay and frustration of 
the militarists the fighting in China dragged on into 1940. The Army 
General Staff decided in secret that unless total victory was achieved 
within the year, Japan's forces would have to be withdrawn from China, 
leaving only a "skeleton crew" of troops in Northern China as a pro-
tection against the spread of communism. The expansionist-attitudes 
were being forced to cool by the slow turn of events in Japan. Yet, 
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six weeks later on May 10, Hitler's blitzkrieg on the western front gave 
Japan refired hope. The Dutch surrendered, the French admitted defeat, 
King Leopold III surrendered, and the British hopes of being able to 
hold out against the Germans seemed to be doomed. Needless to say, the 
Japanese military leaders, intoxicated by Hitler's easy victories, 
changed their minds about the policy of troop removal. They adopted 
the slogan which in effect became the new policy, "Don't miss the bus!"
31 
The time for Japan to move was ripe. France had been defeated 
while Britain, seemingly, was barely holding on trying to avoid the 
pitfall of defeat. There was never a better time for Japan to strike 
into the Southeast Asian area for her needed supplies of both oil and 
natural resources. 
On the morning of June 22, the Army General Staff and the War 
Ministry held a joint meeting. Those who had recently advocated a 
withdrawal from China changed their minds. The new recommendation from 
this group was an immediate surprise attack on Singapore. The scheme 
was squashed by conservatives, but at least the victorious German army 
had given the Japanese military a new "spirit of chance."32 Obviously 
the crystal ball which seemed to have predicted defeat to the mili-
tarists now took on a new glimmer of what could be done and of what 
could be obtained. If Hitler could gain such sudden good fortune in 
Europe, why not Japan in Southeast Asia? 
The problem in China had been one of vast areas which made it 
virtually impossible to pin Chaing Kai-shek's Nationalist Army down. 
There had been little prospect of subduing China as long as the foreign 
powers--Russia, Britain, and the United States--continued to give the 
Chunking Government material support.33 
Against the background of undefeatable China and "her friends," 
appeared an alluring vision of the riches in Indo-China. Defeated 
France was the possessor of the rich states of Indo-China, while the 
powerless Netherlands held the East Indies, from which Japan hoped to 
secure strategic supplies in oil and materials. 
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There was at this time a logical stepping stone for the Japanese 
to step on in establishing claims in the southeast Asian area. The 
French and the Dutch possessions in the Far East were virtually, due to 
the latest German victories, under German control. Britain was hardly 
in a position to block Japan's attempts at building her new "Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" for Britain was up to her ears in war. 
The United States had given numerous signs to the Japanese that even 
if Japan would make moves toward southeast Asia, it was believed that 
the United States would not involve herself in any activities that 
would lead to conflict. The logical step for the Japanese then was to 
join with Germany to gain an agreement on Japan's rights to establish 
her new sphere in southeast Asia.34 
In the past there had been opponents to an alliance with Germany. 
More than seventy times during the spring and summer in 1939, the 
Hiranuma Cabinet found itself discussing and wrestling with the texts 
of a possible alliance with Germany.35 
The main issues the cabinet seemed to be wrestling with were 
1) whether the pact would apply only in the event of war with the 
Soviet Union--or also in the event of war with others; 2) whether or not 
the countries of the alliance were obligated to war if any member should 
go to war; and 3) whether the pact was to contain a promise of 
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"effective military support" or something less. Every method conceiv-
able was used to gain a pro-Axis Cabinet. Those who sided with the 
Germans gave false information to the Emperor, made threats of violence 
against those who balked at the alliance on the Cabinet, and gave mis-
information, suppressed information beneficial to the anti-Axis 
"moderates" or allowed classified information to leak out to the press. 
All of this was done in an attempt to "wear out" those members of the 
government that were against the alliance with Germany.36 The pro-
English elements seemed to be the Foreign Ministery Arita, who stood 
very firm against any deal that would obligate Japan to go to war 
against the British and the United States, the conservative financial 
and business circles, and the Emperor's court which looked upon any pact 
with the Axis as a move in the wrong direction.37 
The militarists, made up of the Army "center" and nationalist 
groups that saw Japan with like interests and oppositions as the Axis 
powers, tried to frighten the officials in that circle by stirring up 
popular feeling against them. That is, everyone except the Emperor, who 
was sacred was dishonored, yet even he was reminded of the times his 
predecessors were kept under lock and key.38 
The inevitable happened. A new cabinet was formed. Hiranuma's 
successor was General Nobuyuki Abe who lasted only four and a half 
months because of his and his Cabinet's inability to keep the support 
of the army, the diet and the people.39 
Another government was formed which was not much stronger than the 
Abe Cabinet. The Yonai-Arita Cabinet, considered to be moderate, 
governed Japan from January to July 1940 until the military forced it 
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to disband. The military and other circles of influence in Japan found 
it necessary to force the Cabinet to reopen the avenues to a military 
alliance with Germany. This is the basic flaw the military found in 
the Yonai Cabinet. The Cabinet had "systematically opposed" the German 
Alliance which left the Army little room for confidence in them and 
their abilities to move with the desires of the Army for such an 
Alliance~40 On July 16, the High Command engineered the downfall of 
the Yonai Cabinet and arranged for a new government under Prince 
Fumimaro Konoye, with General Hideki Tojo as Minister of War and Yosuke 
Matsuoka as Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
It is really very easy to see the effect the European War had 
upon Japan's attitudes of expansionism and the "new order" in East Asia. 
The attitude of the Japanese was one of opportunism. The golden 
opportunity afforded them by the German conquests in Europe showed her 
that a change in the status quo in Asia was entirely possible. This 
was not only due to the conquests in Europe but the effect of the 
conquests on the European colonial powers. The fact that several of 
the colonial powers of Southeast Asia were subdued or involved to the 
point that hardly any military support to this area of the world could 
be given, aided the Japanese desire to move while the time was right. 
Japan asked herself, "would there ever be an opportunity like this 
again?" 
On November 3, 1938 Premier Konoye proclaimed the " ••• estab-
lishment of the New Order in East Asia ••• " and made inference that 
third rate countries would have only the alternative of adjusting to 
it. .The Japanese were going to monopolize at this point such Chinese 
products and industries as she considered essential for her economy. 
This in reality was only a carryover from her "twenty-one demands." 
Japan did not want to be treated as a third rate power, nor a second 
rate power for that matter. East Asia was her backyard, yet the "old 
colonial powers"--Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and the 
United States--claimed more economic rights in the area than Japan. 
Japan was stating to the world in Prince Konoye's proclamation that 
she believed in her destiny to be the new leader of East Asia.41 
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General Hideki Tojo in the post war trials explained how he inter-
preted Japan's "new order." He saw this as "a matter of fundamental 
importance." He explained that there had been "from very early times" 
a need for close ties between Japan and China. The ''Manchurian 
Incident" was the earliest effort to bring about adhesion between the 
two. General Tojo pointed out that Japan was influenced, due to her 
geographical position, by internal conditions in China much more than 
any of the other powers interested. "Disorder and instability in China 
could spread quickly to Japan. By contrast, England and America were 
more remote from China and were not seriously affected by chaotic con-
ditions there ••• the problem was much less serious."42 Butow 
paraphrases Tojo's interpretation of the "new order" and why it was 
necessary. 
As the "central power" in East Asia, Japan wished "to 
insure the stability of the Far East." This did not mean 
that other nations would either be under Japan or become 
her dependencies, but only that Japan, "by reason of her 
greater strength, would have the initiative." Japan did 
not intend to "push aside" the Far Eastern interests of the 
European powers and of the United States. The sole purpose 
was to "effect lawful adjustments." ••• According to 
Tojo, an enlightened approach had characterized Japan's 
thinking about the new order from the very beginning. He 
insisted that such a selfish thought as greater wealth for 
Japan had not existed. "The basic intention was that the 
raw materials which China possessed in abundance would be 
contributed by China and the technique, capital and skilled 
personnel would be contributed by Japan for the mutual bene-
fit of both countries. Manchuria would come into the 
picture similarly. o • • The idea of profit or loss did not 
enter in. The idea of mutual benefit was the main one. It 
had a moral basis."43 
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Konoye had told correspondents in 1938, shortly after the declar-
ation of a "new order" that 
"• •• it is imperative ••• the economic activities of 
other Powers should be subject to certain restrictions 
dictated by the requirements of the national defense and 
economic security of the countries grouped under the new 
order ••• ~ But, even if these restrictions are put in 
force, there will remain vast field of commercial and 
economic activity open to the people of other Powers.44 
Great Britain, France, and the United States voiced their disa-
greements and opposition to the Japanese "shake-up." While in Japan 
this opposition was denounced in terms showing the opponents of the 
"new" Japan as members of an elite club of nations who were repeatedly 
refusing Japan her "correct-position'' in the world.45 
The Konoye cabinet had only been in power just a few days when it 
endorsed unanimously a "new national policy." Basically the policy was 
aiming its main thrust toward world peace. World peace, it was stated, 
could only be brought about by forming a "new order in Greater East 
Asia" uniting Japan with Manchukuo and China, under of course, Japan's 
leadership. Also it was determined that a tripartite pact would be 
signed with Germany and Italy, and a nonaggression treaty with the Soviet 
Union.46 
A change in the status-quo was being demanded by Japan. Japan was 
preparing itself on a national basis for a war economy. Alliances with 
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Germany and Italy were to be made showing the United States a "finn 
attitude," that Japan would do what she thought right and not be a 
servant to the major powers.47 Adjustments with the Soviet Union were 
to be made. Japan boldly declared to the world that she was the new 
supervisor of East Asia. 
The American attitude toward Japan was deteriorating. Hardly 
anyone in America trusted Japan and her "new policy", nor seemed to 
know how much to fear the Japanese, or how to control them. 
It was apparent to many in 1937 that the Japanese were launching 
upon a militarily aggressive conquest of the Far East. How far this 
conquest was to go, no one could say for sure. But it was apparent that 
the United States could not remain passively indifferent to a rewriting 
of the status quo in the Far East which would endanger its position. 
This change from being passively indifferent began to take place 
in the late 1930's. Some examples of a change were when the United 
States gave her moral support to the Chinese. A Roosevelt-added phrase 
in his speech of October, 1937 suggested 'quarantine" for lawless and 
aggressor nations. In July 1938, the State Department imposed its 
"moral" embargo upon the export of airplanes to Japan. The "Holy War" 
of Japan, in spite of American peaceful persuasiveness, continued to 
drag on seemingly with more and more sections of China falling into the 
hands of the Japanese. The public was becoming more vocal in wanting 
to stop the Japanese military efforts by placing economic sanctions on 
the Japanese.
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On July 10, 1939, Secretary of State Hull met with the Japanese 
Ambassador Horinouchi to tell him among other things: 
( 
) 
Nations cannot but take notice that Japan herself is 
engaged in military operations for purposes of conquest. 
This situation well calls for an ending if Japan is to 
exercise her fullest influence, along with the United 
States and other countries, to compose threatened military 
conquest in other parts of the world. • • • I need not 
remind you that for six years I have been earnestly pleading 
with your government and urging the view that there is enough 
room on this planet for fifteen or eighteen great nations like 
yours and mine. • • • Our big consideration is whether all 
China and the Pacific islands near by are to be '~anchurian­
ized" by Japan, with international law and treaties abolished 
and all other nations not allowed into that half of the world--
the door shut and locked by Japan--except over a wall of pre-
ferences for her own citizens •••• 49 
By the sununer of 1939, the administration in Washington was 
thinking in terms of abrogating the treaty of commerce and navigation 
signed with Japan in 1911. Secretary of State Hull and President 
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Roosevelt discussed reasons, which Hull noted in "rough-thoughts," for 
giving notice to the Japanese that the Treaty of 1911 was ended. 
Why keep up treaty when Japan does as she pleases with U.S. 
interests in China? U.S. for two yrs has tried hard to be 
friendly ••• w~ile all sorts of indignities, etc. have been 
suffered. 
Japan is clearly attempting the subjugation of China, 
despite her sworn duty to protect China against such attacks 
as they f!ap~7 are making. 
When Jap spokesmen were shouting their "new order," their 
domination of Western Pacific, etc. & that British had 
knuckled to them, that Japs had won "a sweeping diplomatic 
victory," etc. etc., it was high time U.S. was reproclaiming 
[}.ne"YJ.] its attitude on Far Eastern affairs. 
U.S. action has the effect of encouraging China, Britain, 
_ & also of discouraging Japs, Germans, & Italians, but it all 
grows out of Jap violation of 9-Power treaty •••• so 
This was a "policy of resistance" on the part of the United States to-
wards Japan which had been growing in strength. Japanese actions in 
China in 1938 were given somewhat of a "moral embargo" when the United 
States placed a ban on the exporting of airplanes and related materials 
used in bombing civilian targets.51 When Japan occupied several 
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strategic islands between China and Indo-China, the United States moved 
her fleet to the Pacific Ocean, eventually to Pearl Harboro When the 
war in Europe broke out, America took an introspective inventory of her 
raw materials and resources that would be necessary in maintaining her 
security. By the summer of 1940, arguments in Washington over economic 
embargoes on the flow of scrap iron and oil were heardo The State 
Department feared taking a "too-tough" stand against Japan, whereas 
certain members of the cabinet urged the President to take a "very-firm" 
stand and stop all sales of scrap metal and oil to the Japanese. The 
State Department won out in the end and an embargo of such magnitude was 
not placed on the Japanese.52 
A milder form of an embargo on July 2, 1940 was authorized by the 
United States Congress. The Congress gave Roosevelt permission to 
prohibit or curtail under license the export of strategic materials to 
conserve war supplies. in America. It was announced that starting in 
August aviation gasoline and most types of machine tools could no longer 
be exported to Japan.
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But even so, these actions were mere gestures 
to a country on the move with a powerful army and navy wanting only 
their share of the world. 
In the early fall of 1940 the new Konoye cabinet took over. The 
United States' ambassador to Japan, Joeseph Grew made these observations 
about the cabinet which had been in operation only a few days. 
For at first sight the Konoye Government, interpreting popular 
and especially military demand, gives every indication of 
going hell-bent toward the Axis and the establishment of the 
New Order in East Asia, and of riding roughshod over the rights 
and interests, and the principles and policies, of the United 
States and Great Britain.54 
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The facts as given by means of "visions" by Ambassador Grew, soon 
became reality. Indications were being received that pointed to Japan's 
keen interests in areas adjacent to China. Walter Millis gives vivid 
interpretation to Japan's actions in the French territory of the Far 
East. 
The indications were soon being fulfilled. Within the month, 
the tiger of Japanese militarism, already standing with 
dripping jaws over vast areas of China, was reaching a stealthy 
and lethal paw around the Chinese flank into the French ter-
ritory of Tonkin, in northern Indo-China.55 
To insure the "Japanese-right" of occupying and controlling these 
portions of Southeast Asia, the Konoye Cabinet, with pressure from the 
Supreme Command, set out to obtain an alliance, with Germany and Italy. 
This was accomplished over a two-month period of time. The document 
was signed on September 27, 1940 by Yosuke Matsuoka, the Japanese 
Foreign Minister, in Berlin. In short, the Pact declared in writing to 
the United States and the rest of the world that Japan was moving 
toward the German camp. In the same sense, the United States moved 
closer to the British camp. 
Over the past years, words, gestures, sanctions, and embargoes 
had been exchanged between the United States and Japan. Now a Pact had 
been signed by Japan with the Axis powers. It was now time for the 
poised nations of Japan and the United States to "flex their war-muscles." 
A turning point in the flexing of muscles of the United States 
military was heard on Sunday evening, December 29, 1940 when most of the 
nation listened to Franklin Roosevelt give an unusual "fireside chat." 
This is not a fireside chat on war. It is a talk on 
national security •••• 
. Never before since Jamestown, and Plymouth Rock has our 
American civilization been in such danger as now. • • • 
The Axis not merely admits but proclaims that there can be 
no ultimate peace between their philosophy of government 
and our philosophy of government. • • • It can be asserted, 
properly and categorically, that the United States has no 
right or reason to encourage talk of peace until the day 
shall come when there is a clear intention on the part of 
the aggressor nations to abandon all though of dominating or 
conquering the world. • • • 
Some of our people like to believe that wars in Europe and 
in Asia are of no concern to us. But it is a matter of most 
vital concern to us that European and Asian warmakers should 
not gain control of the oceans which lead to this hemis-
phere. • • • 
The British people are conducting an active war against 
this unholy alliance. Our own future security is greatly 
dependent on the outcome of that fight. Our ability to 
''keep out of war" is going to be affected by that outcome. • • • 
I make the direct statement to the American people that there 
is far less chance of the United States getting into war if 
we do all we can now to support the nations defending them-
selves against attack by the Axis than if we acquiesce in their 
defeat, submit tamely to an Axis victory, and wait our turn to 
be an object of attack in another war later on. • • • 
There is no demand for sending an American expeditionary 
force outside our own borders. • • • Our national policy is 
not directed toward war. Its sole purpose is to keep war away 
from our country and from our people •••• 
But all our present efforts are not enough. We must have 
more ships, more. guns, more planes,--more of everything •••• 
Your Government, with its defense experts, can then determi~e 
how best to use them to defend this hemisphere •••.• 
We must be the great arsenal of democracy. For us this is 
an emergency as serious as war itself. • • • There will be no 
''bottlenecks" in our determination to aid Great Britain. • • • 
I have the profound conviction that the American people are 
now determined to put forth a mightier effort than they have 
ever yet made. • • • As President of the United States I call 
for that national effort. • •• 56 
The stronger, more emphatic stand was certainly necessary by 
December, at least according to Ambassador Grew. In a letter to 
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Roosevelt entitled "Dear Frank" Grew asserted it was time for America to 
flex her muscles even more so in the area of the "embargo." 
It seems to me increasingly clear that we are bound to have 
a showdown someday, and the principal question at issue is 
whether it is to our advantage to have that showdown sooner 
or to have it later. • • • Only insuperable obstacles will 
now prevent the Japanese from digging in permanently in China 
and from pushing the southward advance • • • under present 
circumstances no Japanese leader or group of leaders could 
reverse the expansionist program and hope to survive •••• 
It therefore appears that sooner or later, unless we are 
prepared ••• to withdraw bag and baggage from the entire 
sphere of "Greater East Asia including the South Seas" 
(which God for bid) we are bound eventually to come to a 
head-on clash with Japan. 
• • • It is important constantly to bear in mind the fact 
that if .we take measures "short of war" with no real in-
tention to carry those measures to their final conclusion 
if necessary, such lack of intention will be all too obvious 
to the Japanese, who will proceed undeterred, and even with 
greater incentive, on their way. Only if they become certain 
that we mean to fight if called upon to do so will our pre-
liminary measures stand some chance of proving effective and 
of removing the necessity for war •••• 57 
Later Mr. Grew on New Year's Day, 1941, had been so inspired by 
President Roosevelt's "Arsenal of Democracy" speech that he wrote the 
following in his diary: 
With all our desire to keep America out of war and at 
peace with all nations, especially with Japan, it would be 
the height.of folly to· allow ourselves to be lulled into a 
feeling of false security. Japan, not we, is on the war-
path, and that path is not a whit the less dangerous to our 
own future welfare because it is camouflaged in such 
righteous-sounding terms as the "New Order in Greater East 
Asia including the South Seas" and the "Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere." If those American who counsel 
appeasement could read even a few of the articles by leading 
Japanese in the current Japanese magazines wherein their 
real desires and intentions are given expression, our peace-
minded fellow countrymen would realize the utter hopelessness 
of a policy of appeasement. The time for that has passed •••• 
Unarrested, the. cancer will progressively invade everything 
within reach until its malignant control can perhaps never be 
checked. But if the cancer is arrested and rendered impotent 
in its earlier stages, we may yet see Japan return to healthy 
ways, when constructive instead of destructive forces may 
again control •• o • It may become open to question ••• 
whether we should allow Japan to dig in throughout the areas 
where she now visualizes far-flung control. That question, · 
I think, will depend upon the tempo of the Japanese advance. 
In the meantime let us keep our powder dry and be ready--for 
anything. 
• • • To those of our fellow countrymen who want to get into 
bed and pull the covers over their heads, it is an invincible 
clarification and an unanswerable warning.SB 
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The President responded to the Ambassador's letter on January 21. 
It came across loud and clear to Grew that the President was in close 
agreement with his attitudes about Japan and the methods to be used. 
I have given consideration to your letter of December 14. 
As to your very natural request for an indication of my 
views as to certain aspects of our future attitude toward 
developments in the Far East, I believe that the fundamental 
proposition is that we must recognize that the hostilities 
in Europe, in Africa, and in Asia are all parts of a single 
world conflict. We must consequently, recognize that our 
interests are menaced both in Europe and in the Far East. 
We are engaged in the task of def ending our way of life and 
our vital national interests wherever they are seriously en-
dangered. Our strategy of self-defense must be a global 
strategy which takes account of every front and takes 
advantage of every opportunity to contribute to our total 
security •• 
• • • 
President Roosevelt had also written in the letter to Grew, "Our 
strategy of giving assistance (to Great Britain) • • • must envisage 
both sending o~ supplies to England and helping to prevent a closing of 
channels of communication to and from various parts of the world, so 
that other important sources of supply will not be denied to the British 
and be added to the assets of the other side."59 This letter was in so 
many words telling Grew that the United States would be, if Roosevelt 
had his way, taking on a policy of preventing any Japanese attack upon 
the Dutch or British possessions in the Far East. This proposal for a 
Lend-lease type of situation was similar to the commitment the Japanese 
had with Gennany in the Tripa~tite Pact which was partially created to 
keep us out of the war with the Axis countries. The risks involved in 
actually doing something like this to halt the Japanese expansionism 
and also the cost to the United States were definitely bold suggestions 
made to Grew. One wonders if the President actually envisioned 
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the consequences of such plans. Regardless, the muscles were beginning 
to move against the Tripartite Powers. 
The United States was aware of the power and might of the German 
and Italian armies, but what of the Japanese military force? How 
serious was a country supposed to take the military might of Japan. 
She had been making a somewhat futile attempt at bringing the ''Holy 
War" in China to a successful ending. It was believed by the opponents 
of the "Japanese-aggressors" that if Japan was faced with a united 
effort by America and Great Britain to militarily handle the Japanese, 
the Japanese would have neither the fortitude n·or courage to stay for 
the battle.
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On January 6, 1941 President Roosevelt declared in his annual 
message to the Congress that never had American security been so 
seriously threatened from without, and that never had direct assaults 
on the democratic way of life been made so continuously both by arms 
and propaganda. 
Let us say to the democracies: ''We Americans are vitally 
concerned in your defense of freedom. We are putting forth 
our energies, our resources and our organizing powers to 
give you the strength to regain and maintain a free world. 
We shall send you, in ever-creasing numbers, ships; planes, 
tanks, guns. This is our purpose and our pledge." 
In fulfillment of this purpose we will not be intimidated 
by the threats of dictators that they will regard as a breach 
of international law or as an act of war our aid to the 
democracies which dare to resist their aggression. Such aid 
is not an act of war, even if a dictator should unilaterally 
proclaim it so to be. 
When the dictators, if the dictators, are ready to make 
war upon us, they will not wait for an act of war on our 
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part •••• 
In an attached note to the above annual message to the Congress, 
President Roosevelt names who he is referring to as the dictators and 
aggressors. 
NOTE: In the decade since 1931, international lawlessness 
practiced successively by Japan, Italy, and Germany, has 
been casting a lengthening shadow over the world. Repudi-
ation of solemn treaty pledges, invasion of independent 
countries, bombing of civilians, enslavement of captive 
peoples--those are the princi~les which have seemed to 
guide the aggressor nations.6 
It would seem that the "confrontation-temperature" between the 
United States and Japan was nearly at the boiling point at this time. 
Both sides were becoming rather open in their statements about the 
errors of the other country. On January 15, 1941 at a hearing of the 
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Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, Secretary of 
State Hull, in a speech concerning the Lend Lease bill, underscored the 
disturbing fact that Japan's leaders had openly declared their intention 
to achieve and maintain a dominant position in the entire region of the 
Western Pacific by force of arms. He also stated that they were trying 
to make themselves masters, of an area containing almost half of the 
entire population of the world. 
Secretary of State Hull told the members of this committee that 
Japan, Italy, and Germany all fit into the same category. They were all 
taking steps to "destroy the very foundations of a civilized world order 
under law and to enter upon the road of armed conquest •' •• subjugation 
. . . 
and 
• • 
• tyrannical rule over their victims." 
Three steps were 
shown to have been taken by Japan that placed her in this category of 
countries. 
The first step had occurred in 1931, said Hull, when Japan had 
forcefully occupied Manchuria, breaking Japan's agreements as signatory 
of the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The second step 
had been Japan's termination of the Naval Treaty of 1922 and her 
construction of large amounts of "military and naval armaments." The 
third step was Japan's "large-scale military operations against China" 
in 1937 and her establishment of "puppet-regimes" there. 
Hull hardly held back any punches in this presentation to the 
House of Representatives' Committee. The language he chose to use was 
not highly diplomatic in style. 
It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated 
from the start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing 
herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the 
Western Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their 
determination to achieve and maintain that position by force 
of arms and thus to make themselves masters of an area con-
taining almost one half of the entire population of the world. 
Previous experience and current developments indicate that 
the proposed "new order" ••• means, politically, domination 
by one country. It means, economically, employment of the 
resources of the area concerned for the benefit of that 
country and to the ultimate impoverishment of other parts of 
the area and exclusion of the interests of other countries. 
It means s9cially, the destruction of personal liberties and 
the reduction of the conquered peoples to the role of 
inferiors.63 
On January 21, Ambassador Grew sent a letter to the Secretary of 
State informing him of the attitude and opinions some of the Japanese 
leaders, namely Yosuke Matsuoka, had toward the United States. 
Matsuoka had spoken to the Japanese Diet along with several other 
leaders. 
In discussing relations with the United States the /)oreig~7 
Minister enumerated the embargoes and restrictions on exports 
to Japan since the abrogation of the commercial treaty. He 
stated that the situation had become so aggravated that Japan 
must now be adequately prepared not only to meet this pressure 
but to secure her economic life line within the area of greater 
Asia. In effect, he stated Japan's demands of the United 
States to be: (1) understanding of the vital concern to Japan 
of the establishment of an East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 
(2) recognition of Japan's superiority in the Western Pacific, 
and (3) cessation of economic pressure on Japan. 
Mr. Matsuoka then appealed for reflection on the part of the 
United States for the sake of peace in the Pacific and in the 
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world: the Foreign Minister envisaged American entry into the 
war and the possibility of Japan being "compelled to enter the 
war" which would then bring about another world conflict. 
For several days the press has suggested that the Foreign 
Minister would answer Secretary Hull's statement and a strong 
attack aimed at American policy was expected. The fact that 
the Foreign Minister's remarks were surprisingly mild and the 
fact that no Goverrunent statement had been issued in reply to 
Secretary Hull, although such a statement has been twice 
announced may indicate that careful consideration is being 
given within the Government to the avoidance of official 
utterances calculated to exacerbate American feelings toward 
Japan.64 
Matsuoka had been expected to make much stronger statements, but 
Grew had believed, due to the urgings of other members of the Japanese 
Cabinet, he had been restrained for the-time being from doing so. In 
view of other speeches made by Matsuoka, it is noticeable the caution 
used by him in this particular speech. ·An example of this caution is 
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seen when one readp a portion of Matsuoka's speech to the Diet and sees 
him put his feelings in a very.diplomatic way. 
The United States has evinced no adequate understanding of 
the fact that the establishment of a sphere of common pros-
perity throughout Greater East Asia is truly a matter of 
vital concern to Japan. She apparently entertains an idea 
that her own first line of national defense, on the east, 
lies along the mid-Atlantic and, on the west, not only along 
the eastern Pacific, but even as far as China and the South 
Seas. If the United States assumes such an attitude, it 
would be, to .say the least, a very one-sided contention on her 
part, and would cast reflections on our position of superiority 
in the Western Pacific, thus intimating that it betokens am-
bitious designs on our parto I, for one, believe that such a 
position assumed by the United States would not contribute 
toward the promotion of world peace. Speaking frankly, I 
extremely regret such an attitude of the United States for 
the sake of Japanese-American friendship, for the sake of 
peace in the Pacific, and also, for the sake of the peace of 
the world. It is my earnest hope that a great nation that is 
exerting such a tremendous influence in the world as the United 
States will realize her responsibility for the maintenance of 
peace, will reflect deeply on her attitude with fear of God, 
that is, true piety, will courageously liquidate the state of 
things created by the force of past circumstances and put forth 
her utmost efforts toward overcoming the impending crisis of 
civilization. 65 
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The Foreign Minister's words of January 26 were more like the 
Matsuoka who had claimed that the only way to gain respect from the 
United States was to be "finn." Matsuoka could not hold back his 
feelings concerning Hull's speech of January 15, any longer. Grew 
passed the "paraphrased" version of the text Matsuoka made to the Budget 
Conunittee on to Hull. 
1. The time has passed for Japan and the United States to 
engage in arguments but since the interpellator has raised 
the question, certain points in Secretary Hull's statement 
requires clarification. His statement is based on erroneous 
thinking and his language is violent. The assertion that the 
Manchurian incident was the first step toward destruction of 
civilization is based on a superficial point of view. Rather 
the Anglo-Saxon support of the status guo in East Asia, 
except when such status guo was injurious to Japan, must be 
blamed. Chinese resistance must be in large part attributed 
to Anglo-Saxon encouragement. An extremely generous Japanese 
policy ser\Ted only to make the Chinese think that Japan would 
suffer all insults. Traditional Japanese patience was finally 
exhausted and 'the Marco Polo.Bridge attack carried out. 
2. American statesmen do not want to understand Japan's 
policy. We are endeavoring unsuccessfully to urge the Amer-
icans to reflection. "Since the United States has no correct 
understanding of Japan's thoughts and actions we have no 
recourse but to proceed toward our goal. We cannot change 
our convictions to acconunodate the American viewpoint. There 
is nothing left but to face America, though we shall continue 
without disappointment or despair to try to correct the funda-
mental misconceptions held by that nation." 
3. During the tenure of the two previous Cabinets there 
seemed to be sane effort on the part of theAmerican Government 
to reach an understanding with Japan. Mr. Hull is pardoned on 
this point. However, it has become evident that American con-
ditions are the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and 
abandonment of f2r17 50% curtailment of Japan's continental 
and southward advance policies. "Not one Japanese in the 
Empire would assent to the abandonment of these policies." 
This American demand is equivalent to Japan's offering friend-
ship to America in return for abandonment of the Monroe 
Doctrine, admission that predominance in the Western Hemisphere 
is wrong and immediate granting of independence to the 
Philippines. 
4. The United States seems to consider all of Asia and the 
South Seas as first line of defense. Japan's domination of the 
Western Pacific is absolutely necessary to accomplish her 
national ideals. "My use of the word 'dominate' may seem 
extreme and while we have no such designs, still in a sense 
we do wish to dominate and there is no need to hide the fact. 
Has America any right to object if Japan does dominate the 
Western Pacific?" 
"As Minister of Foreign Affairs, I hate to make such an 
assertion, but I wish to declare that if America does not 
understand Japan's rightful claims and actions, then there 
is not the slightest hope for improvement of Japanese-Amer-
ican relations." Japn will still not give up the small hope 
remaining that a change in American attitude can be brought 
about. 
5. America's stiffened attitude may be partially attributed 
to an illusion that Japan's military power is weakened, and to 
the rumors that certain influential quarters in Japan secretly 
oppose the t.ripartite pact and say that Japan will not follow 
its obligations even though the United States should enter the 
war. However, the provisions of article 3 of the treaty will 
come into effect in almost every case except that of an overt 
German attack upon the United States. If the treaty is in-
voked after consultation of the three powers it is not believed 
that Japan will without reason take the narrow viewpoint and 
for its own selfish advantage remain an onlooker in the war 
even though it means staking the fate of the nation on the 
outcome.66' 
These comments and those of the past weeks were not as upsetting 
to the United States as the actions of Japan in the Netherland East 
Indies and Indo-China were. This turned out to be another reason for 
muscle-flexing between Japan and the United States. 
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The Japanese mission to the Netherland Indies renewed a number of 
demands for special privileges which had earlier been denied. The Dutch 
made attempts to delay and postpone the Japanese demands. In Matsuoka's 
speech to the Diet on January 21, he had suggested that the Netherland 
Indies were part and parcel of the Japanese sphere.67 There was not 
much assurance at this point that Tokyo would not at some early date 
attempt to take the Indies.68 
As far as Indo-China was concerned, January looked somewhat bleak. 
In December the French had broken into open hostilities with the 
Siamese because Siam was laying hold to her claims on the Mekong River. 
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In January the French had met the Siamese Navy and had all but destroyed 
it. The Japanese had intentions of using these areas under dispute. 
Siam could be counted as being somewhat loyal to Tokyo, whereas the 
French were hardly loyal to the Japanese and would not easily allow 
them to take what they needed from French Indo-China. When the French 
were getting the better of Siam in battle, Japan attempted to intervene. 
On January 18, the Japanese military commander presented the Indo-China 
Government with demands for the conclusion of an armistice in which 
Japan made it very clear that refusal would bring about an ultimatum. 
On January 22, France agreed to negotiate with Japan.69 
The governments of Britain and the United States could hardly 
interpret these actions to mean less than further Japanese advances 
into southeast Asia. The forced mediation of Japan in the Indo-China-
Siamese dispute appeared to be so much more evidence that grave events 
were in the offing. 
Is there any wonder then that Ambassador Grew would write this 
portion in his diary reviewing the relationship between the United 
States and Japan. 
February 1, 1941 
One of my colleagues in Tokyo recently characterized the 
present situation in Japan as one of "unstable equilibrium." 
We can fully subscribe to the instability, but as to the 
equilibrium, that seems to be hardly the right word, and if 
the tilt is really held in balance, that balance is not 
obvious to the naked eye. It is true that the moderates are 
steadily working to maintain that balance, especially behind 
closed doors in the current sessions of the Diet, where com-
mittee meetings are being held in camera in order to avoid 
public censuring of the Government's policy. We know that 
Arita has been interpellating the Foreign Minister for days 
on end; we know that Hirota has said that Matsuoka is fol-
lowing a foreign policy "fatal to Japan"; we know, according 
to several prominent members of the Diet, that assurances 
have quietly been given by the Government that a policy aimed 
to avoid a clash with the United States will be followed. 
Yet in practice the southward advance is being pushed with 
all energy by the military; their stranglehold on Inda-China, 
in contravention of the agreement with Vichy, continues with 
ever-increasing intensity, while Japan's insistence on medi-
ating the Thailand-Inda-China dispute and, according to 
reports, on being paid for such mediation by the acquisition 
of naval bases in Camranh Bay is patent evidence of her firm 
intention to acquire jumping-off facilities for an eventual 
attack on Singapore. "Equilibrium" between the moderates and 
extremists seems hardly the right word. The latter are firmly 
in the saddle, and in practice there is ample evidence that 
they intend to push rapidly ahead, obviously stimulated by the 
Nazis, either in the belief that the United States will remain 
quiescent or, if we do not remain quiescent, discounting the 
results of American intervention. The outlook for the future 
of the relations between Japan and the United States has never 
been darker.70 
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During the vocalizations of mistrust and ·suspicion by both sides, 
the American government had attempted not to go overboard in its decla-
rations agains~ the Japanese practices. The policy the United States 
seems to have attempted to follow toward Japan was one of not appeasing, 
yet not provoking; rejecting Tokyo's claims to leadership in East Asia; 
puting a gradual end to the exporting of war materials except oil, and 
in some minds, the effect of sending American warships to Singapore to 
signify the intent of the .United States siding with Great Britain, was 
contemplated.
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In a letter to Grew in January, Roosevelt had told the ambassador 
the primary American concern, as he saw it, was to support Britain. 
Any action against Japan would depend on circumstances and capabilities.72 
The president followed this course by steadily enlarging the number 
of items placed on the embargo of American exports to Japan. At the 
same time he continued to allow aid to China. Roosevelt did not bend 
to British pleas that Americans should persuade the French to cecede land 
to the Japanese influenced Thailand. He turned his ears from the French 
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pleas for assistance. Throughout the long negotiations between Siam and 
Indo-China, with the Japanese as mediators, the American government was 
careful to keep away from the dispute, and would not allow this alter-
cation to influence them in their actions against Japan. 
In general, the President seems to have shared the feeling of the 
State Department, particularly those of one of Hull's key advisors, 
Dr. Stanley Hornbeck, that the danger of a clash in the Pacific was not 
as. great as Matsuoka's statements appeared to indicate.73 Hornbeck had 
pointed out from a historical angle Japan when noisy was always bluffing 
and it appeared to him Japan only attacked when she stopped talking. 
In a memo of January 29, 1941, Hornbec~ wrote if Washington permitted 
itself to be scared, Japan and Germany would gain their objective with-
out war. He believed that it was an approp~iate time to call Japan's 
bluff. ''We should keep all the time in mind one big, outstanding fact, 
that Japan is not prepared to fight a war with the United States.
11
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Whether a bluff or not, the result was the same. Imperial Japan 
had not yet determined any irrevocable decisions and the Japanese 
statesmen were no less inclined than the American leaders to hope that 
a sufficient show of threat and "firmness" might gain their ends. On 
both sides of the Pacific the lines of policy had been clearly defined. 
Sooner or later, it would have seemed, that with both countries firming 
up their policies to the point of inflexibility, one or the other would 
have realized that the outcome would be war. 
Only a radical change of course by one government or the 
other could now avert it [jvaE7• Either the Japanese mili-
tants must abandon their determination to seize the hegemony 
of East Asia and the Western Pacific, or those in control of 
American policy must abandon the conviction that to yield 
that hegemony would be fatal • • • to the American 
interest.75 
A test of nerves over whether to use American strength did occur 
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in early February. On February 4, one American Naval attache in London 
was made aware of massive Japanese naval movements to the south of 
Japan. He forwarded this information immediately to the United States. 
Upon reception of this information, Roosevelt conferred with his military 
advisors upon courses of action to take. It was finally decided to do 
little more than offer to Admiral Nomura, the Japanese ambassador to the 
United States, some "long faces" and "moral" guidelines. 
While this was transpiring, Great Britain had a frank talk with 
Ambassador Shigemitsu in London about Japanese movements to the south. 
Secretary Eden spoke to the Japanese ambassador and pointed out that 
"• •• Anglo-Japanese relations were deteriorating rapidly, that Japan 
was more and more following the Axis line, and that evidently Tokyo was 
preparing for further action. • 
If British territories were 
attacked, they would be defended with the utmost vigor.
11
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Great Britain, of course, wanted the United States to support them 
in their effort to stop the Japanese. Not much of any "physical" sup-
port was to be given. What did happen was somewhat of a mistake. 
Eugene Dooman, Counselor of Embassy in Japan, did give Japan a jolt 
which appears to have slowed her down. Dooman was known by the Japanese 
to be a firm and straight forward friend. It was thought, that upon 
his return to Japan after his brief tenure in America, his account of 
American opinion about the world situation would not be taken as a 
threat, but rather as advice.
77 
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Dooman presented the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Ohashi the 
American "philosophy" behind her stand in Asia affairs. Four major 
points concerning Japan, Britain and the United States were given. The 
first was that the American people were determined to support Britain 
even at the risk of war. The second, that if Japan or any country for 
that matter, menaced our effort to support Britain, it could expect 
conflict with the United States. The third, that if Japan were to 
oc~upy Dutch or British areas in the Pacific it would create havoc with 
the British position in the war. And fourth, that the United States had 
abstained from an oil embargo in order not to impel Japan to create a 
situation that could only lead to the most serious outcome.78 
Grew sununarized the Ohashi-Dooman talks for Hull. It seems that 
they upset the Vice-Minister greatly. 
Upon listening attentively to what Mr. Dooman described as 
the philosophy of the American position, Mr. Ohashi remained 
perfectly quiet for an appreciable space of time and then 
burst forth with the question "Do you mean to say that if 
Japan were to attack Singapore there would be war with the 
United States?" Mr. Dooman replied, "The logic of the situ-
ation would inevitably raise that question." 
••• Circumstantial evidence that Mr. Ohashi was affected 
by the interview was given by Sir John Latham, the Australian 
Minister, who called on Mro Ohashi a few minutes after Mr. 
Dooman left ••• told me that he fo¥nd Mr. Ohashi greatly 
agitated and distrait ~istraughtl7• 
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This frank appraisal of the American philosophy, it seems, was 
not urged by Washington D.C. but rather seems to have come from 
Ambassador Grew. The interesting point would have to be that Washington 
did not disavow the ambassador's and the counselor's efforts. 'lllis 
''February War-Scare," according to Winston Churchill in his Grand 
Alliance, was postponed "• •• largely due to fear of United States."80 
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The United States and Japan at this point in early 1941 should have 
sized-up each other's abilities to make threats and bluffs. If they 
had they would have found that the Americans were not prepared to war 
against the Japanese. Yet, President Roosevelt during these months 
boldly assumed that it was essential to bring Japan to a halt with the 
use of embargoes, naval blockades if necessary, with apparently little 
thought concerning what the Japanese could do physically to the American 
power. 
Secretary of State Hull continued to lecture the Japanese diplo-
mats with disdain as if the Pacific Ocean was merely a small lake in 
one of the states in America. 
Had anyone in the United States calculated the difference in 
strength between Japan and themselves? Cer~ainly the massive land size 
with all its raw materials, the technical knowledge, the skilled and 
highly productive population was superior to that of Japan. Yet, the 
United States had done very little to develop her military power. Her 
flex, her muscle-tone, was definitely inferior to that of the Japanese. 
The possibility of a conflict at the beginning of 1941 with not 
only Japan, but also with Germany and Italy was there for the United 
States. What was the strength of the United States? The Germans had 
approximately three hundred organized army divisions, the Italians about 
seventy, and the Japanese nearly one hundred-twenty, for a total of 
nearly five hundred divisions. The United States had twenty-eight.Bl 
Many of the Japanese divisions had received valuable combat 
training in China, while the Japanese Army on the whole had been at 
war on a large-scale operation for four years. The United States Army 
had virtually no experience. 
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The Japanese Navy declared that their airforce numbered about four 
thousand aircraft, and it was believed the Anny had a force about the 
same. The United States Navy's air force was small and the Army's 
nearly non-existent. 
America's strength abroad was even smaller. When Major General 
Wainwright arrived in Manila in late fall, 1940, he took command of the 
Philippine Division. His force numbered seven and a half thqusand. 
Assembled in Formosa was a force of Japanese numbering close to one 
hundred and fifty thousand men.82 
The United States did not agree with the policy of the "new order" 
and let Japan know of her displeasure and at the same time Japan let it 
be known that she did not appreciate the interference of the United 
States in a sphere that was of no concern to the Americans. At this 
juncture in history in the early months of 1941, destiny had been set 
. j 
for a future conflict between the two countries. Or had it? Were there 
any chances for negotiations between the two countries that might 
reconcile the differences? Was there anything to negotiate? Was it too 
late? A man named Yosuke Matsuoka helps us answer these and other 
questions. 
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CHAPTER II 
YOSUKE MATSUOKA 
No single man had more influence on the Japanese-American route 
to war than Yosuke Matsuoka. 
Born in 1880 of a poor branch of the 
Choshu clan in Hagi, Japan. 
He was raised in an atmosphere of old 
Japanese clanism. 
At the age of thirteen he came to America to obtain 
an education. 
At the turn of the century in the United States, it will 
be recalled it was a time when outspoken hostility, insults, and 
agitation were directed toward the members of his oriental race. 
Staying in the home of a Presbyterian family in Portland, Oregon he 
went to grade school, high school and Oregon State Law School from which 
he graduated in 1900, at the age of twenty, with honors. In order to 
pay for his education, he had to work as a bus-boy, a waiter, a lumber-
jack, door-to-door coffee peddler, and an interpreter for a Japanese 
labor contractor on the railroads. He learned to speak English fluently 
and could do just as well in English as in Japanese, whether speaking 
privately or publicly. He remained in America until the age of twenty.I 
The results of the United States tenure on Matsuoka were evident 
later more in his actions against the United States than what he had to 
say about her. "Life in the United States may have encouraged in him 
the habit of candid and unguarded speech, so unusual amongst the 
Japanese. Also perhaps, the wish to exert his will against us."2 
Toshikazu Kase, a member of the Japanese Foreign Affairs Ministry during 
/ 
the time when Matsuoka was Minister of Foreign Affairs, recalled that: 
For all his love of ostentation, however, Matsuoka was 
not vain at heart. He was a devout Christian, to begin 
with, and died a converted Catholic. He was a man of rug-
ged honesty and homeliness and possessed of a sterling 
sense of honor. • • • To the end of his days • • • he 
entertained a genuine affection for America.3 
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"The American ideas that he had absorbed," wrote the Japanese Ambassador 
in London and later Foreign Minister, Mamoru Shigemitsu, "were neither 
of a pronounced right or left leaning."4 
As soon as he had won his law degree, Matsuoka returned to Japan. 
He prepared at that time to enter the foreign service. Passing the 
difficult diplomatic examinations, he was appointed Junior Consul in 
Shanghai in 1904. Before he left Shanghai, he had served for several 
years as the Acting Consul General. His ability at directing propaganda 
became very well known. On his return to Japan, he was appointed to 
the Information Bureau of the Foreign Office. In 1917, he became 
Secretary to the Foreign Minister; in 1918, Secretary to the Premier. 
He developed a reputation for his style of diplomacy. His did away 
with the traditional ways of diplomatic communication for a much more 
straight forward, to the point, type of diplomacy. In 1919, he received 
an appointment as one of the delegates to the Versailles Peace Confer-
ence. In 1921, Matsuoka was offered and accepted the position of 
Director of the South Manchurian Railway which later allowed him to go 
into politics because of his tremendous success, organization, and hard 
work in this position.5 
While in Manchuria he became aware of the financial interests 
Japan had there and in the areas of China. He also became well-
acquainted with the key officers and leaders of the Kwantung Army. 
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It was Yosuke Matsuoka who had the duty of speaking at the League 
in defense to what had been presented by the Lytton Commission. He 
defended the conquest of Manchuria. It was Matsuoka who had led the 
Japanese delegation defiantly from the Conference Hall of the League of 
Nations.6 He rose to political fame in Japan and was a member of the 
parliament, which he later denounced and resigned his seat in the Diet. 
He formed his own political party which was opposed to the party system. 
H~ became a member of the "Show Restorationist," which planned to "save" 
Japan by making the people and the government more loyal to the Emperor. 
This group failed because in the public's eyes it was associated with 
the bloody mutiny of February 1936 in which many members of the govern-
ment were assassinated. Yet Matsuoka never quit trying to develop a 
"single-party" whose goal would be "Neo-Nipponism."7 
In the summer of 1940 a reformation of the present Japanese 
Cabinet came about. Six weeks prior to the fall of the Yanai Cabinet, 
Germany had spectacular success in winning on her European front. The 
Yonai Cabinet had come under the attack of the army which favored an 
alliance with Germany and Italy. The Yanai Cabinet was looked upon as 
favoring the present status quo of countries in Southeast Asia and as 
being friendly toward the United States and Britain. The army was not 
in agreement with the foreign policy that seemed to lean in the di-
rection of Great Britain and the United States rather than toward 
Germany. The character of the Yanai Cabinet, top army officials had 
said, made the talks extremely "inconvenient" that were taking place 
with the Germans. The army believed the time was right for an alliance 
with Germany and Italy and at the same time, a different cabinet needed 
to be chosen. As a direct result of this dissatisfaction the Army was 
displaying, the Yonai Cabinet was forced to retire in mid-July 1940.8 
On July 18, 1940 prior to the installation of the new cabinet, 
Konoye, Matsuoka, Tojo, and Yoshida met to come to an understanding in 
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regard to national policies, both domestic and foreign, military plans, 
and political strategy. The Konoye Government emerged on July 22, 1940 
in response to the demand for a powerful government.9 The new Foreign 
Minister--Yosuke Matsuoka. 
Mamoru Shigemitsu, Japanese Ambassador to England during this 
time, saw Matsuoka and Konoye as possible barriers to the demands of 
the Army to ally Japan with Germany. But instead of a barrier Matsuoka 
became the leader of both the militarists and the cabinet and took them 
wherever he pleased • 
• • • The principles he stood for were those of a Japanese 
patriot •••• now at last, in the association-of two liberal 
thinkers, Konoye and Matsuoka, Japan might keep the mili-
tarists in check and get back on the right track again. 
Matsuoka had valuable experience of our Foreign Ministry. 
Many thoughtful people, including myself, expected great things 
of Matsuoka. 
Alas that conditions falsified our hopes! Matsuoka was very 
ambitious. He hoped to follow in the footsteps of earlier 
great men of Choshu--Yamagata, Terauchi and Tanaka--and saw 
himself as the architect of a New Japan. Possibly the state 
of his health made him impatient to seize the chance to achieve 
his political ambitions while the general trend seemed favour-
able. In any case the result was disastrous to Japan. 
He was in too great a hurry to get results. He wanted to be 
always in the vanguard, leading the Army, not as their plaything 
but as one who could mold them to his own uses. In the cabinet 
he assumed a role larger than that of Konoye himself. There was 
no room in the Japanese political world for two such outstanding 
men on the stage at the same time.10 
Koichi Kido, generally known as Marquis Kido, "keeper of the seal," 
and the Emperor's right-hand man,11 saw Matsuoka as a garrulons, excited, 
untrustworthy person, who would eventually destroy the society of the 
world, including Japan. 
• • • on approving the selection, the Emperor asked him to 
advise Konoye "to be especially prudent in the choice of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance, in the light of 
conditions at home and abroad." Especially prudent in the 
choice of a Foreign Minister! It was to be Matsuoka. Loose 
talking, always in a state of excited confusion, deceiving, 
and unstable, he was the chosen medium for Saionji's parable: 
"He eventually destroyed society completely.
11
12 
A member of the Japanese Foreign Office, Kase, was not quite as 
severe about his impressions of Matsuoka as some. One notes a true 
attempt at empathy for the Foreign Minister's "ways" or a complete 
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blindness to them in an attempt to idolize the man he once worked foro 
It is nowadays the fashion in Japan to blame Matsuoka for 
the breakdown of the negotiations with the United States. 
This fashion has gained popularity since Konoye in his 
memoirs treated Matsuoka as chiefly responsible in the case. 
Granted that Matsuoka's behavior was difficult to understand, 
it is unfair, to say the least, to distort the facts re-
garding him. 
Matsuoka was a genius, dynamic and erratic. His mind 
worked as swiftly as lightning. People were dazzled by his 
brilliance. He was eloquent and could plead a cause with 
passion. Many were impressed by the vigor of his utter-
ances and were carried away by them. But he of ten contra-
dicted himself. Consistency to him was, as to Emerson, 
"The hobgoblin of little minds." He despised conventions 
and swept them aside as if they were cobwebs. This created 
the misapprehension that he was a radical. In short the 
personalities of Konoye and Matsuoka were poles apart. If 
Konoye was a shy squirrel sheltered in the deep forests, 
Matsuoka was the stormy petrel that delights to spread its 
wings over the foaming sea. It is doubtful if the two ever 
understood one another.13 
The impressions of the "new" Foreign Minister to those within the 
United States Foreign Affairs Department were considerably negative in 
natureo Secretary of State Cordell Hull writes about his first encounter 
with Matsuoka and how his distrust of the man who he had met in 1933 was 
to prove to be entirely correct. 
On March 31 I received Matsuoka as he passed across the 
United States enroute to Japan from Geneva. After leaving 
the League, Matsuoka had made unfriendly statements to the 
press concerning our country. I had little inclination to 
engage in a political discussion with him, and I so told 
Japanese Ambassador Debuchi. Bespectacled, with a black 
mustache, he looked like a businessman of his race, which 
he was. • • • He was affable enough, did not try to dis-
cuss political matters, uttered a few casual words of 
greeting, and then rose to go. Once on his feet, however, 
he could not resist the temptation to make some political 
statement. He said he and his country regretted having felt 
obliged to quit the League. • • • As he moved toward the 
door he said he did not want war to come between the two 
countries. He urged that Japan be given time in which to 
make herself better understood, and said he would undertake 
personally to do his full share toward this end when he 
reached home. I refused to be drawn into a discussion and 
merely wished him a pleasant journey. 
When Matsuoka arrived home he received a public patriotic 
demonstration seldom seen in Japan. • • • Later in the 
year Matsuoka resigned from the Seiyukai Party and from the 
Diet and proclaimed his opposition to party government, 
meaning his advocacy of a dictatorshipo He was to prove 
one of our major enemies when he became Foreign Minister in 
1940. It was while he was Foreign Minister that Japanese 
troops invaded French Inda-China and that Japan entered into 
the Tripartite Alliance with Germany and Italy aimed directly 
at the United States. My distrust of Matsuoka· in 1933 was to 
prove correct.14 
When the Secretary of State found out about Matsuoka's position 
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in the "New Konoye Cabinet" he wrote that Matsuoka had never shown the 
United States any reason for placing hope in him as Foreign Minister. 
If anything could be said about him it was just the opposite of trust 
and hope and that was distrust and pessimism for what he was able to do 
for the United States and Japan. 
• • • I had long considered him to be as crooked as a basket 
of fishhooks. He had led the Japanese delegation out of the 
Leage of Nations in 1933. He was committed, by statements 
and actions to the support of an aggressive imperialism.15 
Hull thought of Matsuoka as being the mouthpiece for Japan's 
"bellicose" statements. He believed Matsuoka should be called Japan's 
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"bellwether."16 About the many loud statements he would make, Hull had 
been told by Ambassador Nomura that the Foreign Minister talked in this 
loud manner basically for home-consumption because he was politically 
ambitious.17 
The United States Ambassador to Japan, Joeseph Grew assesses 
Matsuoka and the "new" Cabinet as being distructive of any foundation 
the Yanai Cabinet had laid for better relations between Japan and 
America. This Japanese Government was headed down the road to Germany. 
A typhoon could hardly have more effectively wrecked a foun-
dation than the change of cabinet--with all that change 
implies--now appears to have accomplished. For at first 
sight the Konoye Government, interpreting popular and espe-
cially military demand, gives every indication of going hell-
bent toward the Axis and the establishment of the New Order 
in East Asia, and of riding roughshod over the rights and 
interests, and the princilles_and policies, of the United 
States and Great Britain. 8 
The Ambassador records his feelings concerning Matsuoka's personal 
traits. Grew states that in his meetings with the Foreign Minister he 
discovered certain peculiarities about Matsuoka. One of them was 
quite obvious. He usually did most of the talking. 
Matsuoka did about ninety-five per cent of the talking 
because his .continuous monologues can be broken only by 
forceful intrusion. Although from time to time he brings 
up points of marked interest, his volubility flows on by 
the hour with little or no punctuation
9 
and his discourses 
are therefore difficult to chronicle.l 
MaGsuoka's egocentric attitude was clearly observable when over 
several conversations with Grew he told that in attempting to find the 
perfect man for the ambassadorship in Washington D.C. his mind continu-
ally returned to himself. Grew writes that Matsuoka, 
• • • has on more than one occasion said to me that of 
course he himself was the ideal man to go to Washington 
but that he couldn't be spared from Tokyo. So Nomura is 
clearly second-string!20 
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On Matsuoka's "continuous monologues," Grew writes that only once 
before did he have to listen to such lengthy conversation and then that 
was several men in a row, not just one. 
One emerges from such a conversation with one's head 
feeling like a whirlpool, for the Minister's volubility 
is surpassed in my experience only • • • as Under Secre-
tary of State (to Turkey) when it was sometimes necessary 
to receive six or eight foreign diplomats in rapid suc-
cession and with no time to dictate the memorandums until 
afterward. • • .21 
Ambassador Grew humorously jests about the personality of Mr. 
Matsuoka when he surmizes how the conversations went between Matsuoka 
and Hitler. "I would give a lot to know whether Matsuoka managed with 
equal success to hold the floor in his talks with Hitler; it would take 
a superman to outtalk Matsuoka, but maybe Hitler is a superman.
11
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Yosuke Matsuoka returned home from the Soviet Union and Gennany in 
mid-spring extremely happy about his considered success in signing a 
non-aggression pact with the Russians. His disregard for his fellow 
cabinet members was "aired" in a public meeting which gave the impression 
to Grew that he was trying to elevate his position by downgrading other 
ministers. 
• • • It is generally believed that his ambition is to become 
Prime Minister (God help Japan if he does) and that he will 
exploit his diplomatic successes to promote his personal 
interests. 
But we learn on the best of authority that he is sailing 
very close to the wind. It is known that in his speech at 
the big public meeting to welcome him on his return he made 
several thinly veiled allusions critical of his cabinet col-
leagues. He indirectly charged them with willfully causing the 
breakdown in the system of commodity distribution •••• 23 
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There was a part to Matsuoka's personality that seemed to esti-
mate data in an exaggerated way, and if this was not happening, the other 
part of his personality seemed to be completely lost as to direction or 
details. In a Privy Council meeting of September 26, 1940, Matsuoka had 
been asked about the sphere of "Greater-East Asia," the tenn referring 
to the restructuring of the status-quo in relation to Japan. He answered 
quite candidly, "I mean the area which includes French Indo-China, 
Th~iland, Burma, the Straits Settlements, and the Oceanic group compris-
ing the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea, New Caledonia, etc."24 Matsuoka's 
use of the word "etc." certainly is some proof for his disregard for 
details. What was happening in the mind of Matsuoka or what was in-
tended 
11
0 •• at any given moment any guess seemed to be as good as 
another--so like a twisted rope was he.
112
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The fact that Matsuoka could not be trusted was made by Grew to 
Hull. Much of his problem was his incessant speech. 
On the point of Mr. Matsuoka's intellectual and political 
honesty I am reluctant to express a doubt. In the political 
maneuvering that constantly goes on in Tokyo he is sometimes 
quoted as saying one thing in one quarter while making a 
totally divergent statement in another quarter. He talks 
so flowingly and freely, by the hour if time affords, that it 
is inconceivable that he should never make conflicting 
statements.26 
Some believed that Matsuoka's disregard for details, his seeming 
lack of direction, his blatant statements, all pointed to the fact that 
he was insane or at least moving in that direction. The secretary of 
the elder statesman Prince Saionji said to the Prince, " ••• there are 
some who say Matsuoka must be insane ••• " The Prince, who was quite 
the philosopher, replied, "It will improve him if he becomes insane.
11
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Matsuoka definitely had some strange habits and methods. It is 
no wonder that so many found this man of many words unreliable and at 
the same time, one not to be trusted. 
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As one studies the actions and tactics of Yosuke Matsuoka, he 
cannot help but notice that the Foreign Minister was a power-minded 
individual who seemed determined to become the master of Japan's destiny 
Matsuoka had told Grew that he would direct the Foreign affairs of Japan 
regardless of the pressure placed on him by the Army. A non-negotiable 
condition of him becoming Foreign Minister was that he would • • • 
"direct Japan's foreign relations, and he says he does not propose to 
let the military, particularly the hotheaded younger officers, dictate 
to him."28 
The military, as it can be shown, did not have much confidence in 
the dealings of their Foreign Minister. Even though he fit more the 
mold of the pro-Axis image the military had in mind for the Foreign 
Minister, they still realized that Matsuoka could be his own man when 
it came to making "important" decisions. One Japanese general described 
Matsuoka as "voluble and unconventional by nature," which were terms 
not too common nor complimentary to a politician.29 Admiral Yonai, who 
Butow describes as being very prominent in and out of military circles, 
had felt that the Foreign Minister had "the good point of coming up with 
splendid ideas, but ••• the fault of recklessly advancing in the 
wrong direction." Admiral Yonai went on to say that it was bad enough 
that Matsuoka did not judge matters objectively, but to take another 
step in the wrong direction of misunderstanding, he was blinded by the 
idea ·that his opinions were "absolutely correct" which made him 
"dangerous.
11
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When Matsuoka was going to Europe in the Spring of 1941, he had 
become outwardly so pro-Gennan that even the Supreme Command feared 
what promises he might make to Hitler. Ambassador Shigemitsu remarked 
that: 
Before Matsuoka left Tokyo there had been a conference at 
Imperial Headquarters on the subject of his visit to Eur-
ope. • • • It was at this conference that the Supreme Conunand 
had impressed on Matsuoka that he should enter into no under-
taking to attack Singapore and his military advisers had private 
instructions to watch over him to see that he kept the point in 
mind.31 
Matsuoka was driven somewhat by the Supreme Command, yet he was 
in contact with powers that were used to making. decisions that affected 
their country's policies immediately. These contacts put much pressure 
on Matsuoka and he in return, it seems, attempted to comply properly. 
Matsuoka had a mind of his own and a real drive for power which the 
Supreme Command recognized and was concerned about. The Army and Navy 
became so concerned over Matsuoka's interpretation of the Foreign 
Minister's power to make decisions that they did not trust him and as a 
result kept constant watch over his "diplomatic affairs." 
In an early meeting of the newly formed "Matsuoka-Konoye" Cabinet, 
Konoye was forced by Matsuoka's talk of advocating war with the United 
States to calm down the upset and alarmed Navy Minister Yoshida. Konoye 
attempted to calm the Navy Minister with these words. "To say something 
out of li'ne and scaring others is one of Matsuoka's weak points."32 
The problem, as far as the military saw it, was that they were 
not completely in charge of Japan. It was true that their influence 
upon the government was great, yet it is important to realize that it 
was not thorough. A cabinet or a minister could create havoc with the 
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plans the military envisaged for the future of Japan. 
If Japan had been a facist state or a thorough military dictator-
ship she would scarcely have hesitated to join in a pact with the 
Gennans and Italians as early as 1939. But instead, being a monarchy 
with a "divine sovereign," real political unity to make that kind of a 
decision required one of the following 
• • • Either the sovereign must possess autocratic powers and 
have the character and ability to use them; or government must 
be in the hands of officials, appointed by the sovereign and 
responsible to him, and they must be men of outstanding qual-
ities of mind; or ·thirdly, there must be real parliamentary 
control of policy.33 
Japan during this time in history had none of these necessary ingredients. 
The issue of a Gennan, Italian, Japanese pact within governing circles 
required, after more than a year ~f struggle, a cabinet with pro-Gennan 
sentiments. The Gennan Ambassador to Japan in frustration of not being 
able to obtain a pact, cabled that the "Japanese attitude must astonish 
the Axis, which is accustomed to unequivocal decisions, but it arises 
necessarily from lack of unified leadership."34 
The military attempted and succeeded in "unifying" the leadership 
of Japan. They did this by taking on a new role which had its birth 
in the late 1920's. The role the Army played in directing public 
opinion and governmental support towards the "new order" and the German 
alliance ,was one of "uniformed politicians" showing the errors the nation 
of Japan had made in the past and what she was to do about them in the 
future. Admiral Yoshida writes that the primary objective of these 
"unifonned politicians" was to gain power. They did this by campaigning 
against the British and the United States' policies, by "eliminating 
existing social and political evils at home" and by advocating a "new 
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order" in the Asian area of the world. This campaign created a fol-
lowing that grew in strength and power. It is this group of militarists 
that must take the blame, writes Yoshida, for driving Japan " ••• into 
the Axis camp" and precipitating the "greatest disaster ever suffered 
by the nation. For this--and the defeat and universal misery which 
their policies visited upon my nati~n--they must be held responsible1°5 
The Supreme Command had taken over the power of the Emperor and 
the democratic form of government. Both powers had been weak and "there 
was room for an interloper to drive in a wedge." Mamoru Shigemitsu 
explains that the Emperor became a figurehead only to be used when 
needed by the true leaders, the Supreme Command. Constitutionally the 
Emperor in the past had the final word. In this situation brought 
about by assassinations, coups·d'etat, and threats of violence, Yoshida 
remarks: 
• • • the military were released from the highest and final 
restraint, intended to keep them under control. In order to 
grasp the actual power, they preached the independence of the 
Supreme Command and the doctrine of nationalism, the theory 
that the Emperor was an organ of state was rejected and the 
entourage of the Emperor was even persecuted o • • • inasmuch 
as they aimed directly and indirectly at the realization of 
military dictatorship, the fact is that the continuation of 
such measures brought about the accomplishment of their aims.36 
The shakeup in the cabinet brought about a "military-minded" 
majority made up of a group of men who had been associated with the armed 
~ 
forces or the administration in Manchuria. Because of this they re-
fleeted the views and aspirations of the pro-German alignment that the 
Supreme Command held. 
Matsuoka, at the urging of the Army and those who supported the 
Army,. took the moment of his appointment as the new Foreign Minister to 
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make the most of his detennination to go with Gennany. He instituted a 
major purge of the Foreign Ministry positions that involved diplomats 
who opposed the pact with Germany or those who favored close relations 
with London or Washington D.C. He also put to use two pro-Gennan men. 
He appointed Chuichi Ohashi, a member of the Manchurian clique, and 
Toshio Shiratori former Ambassador to Rome as special advisors. These 
men lent "assistance where it was needed most, busily flitted around 
behind the scenes.
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The Konoye Cabinet immediately drafted a program for action on 
July 26, and July 27. Two key documents came out of these meetings. 
The Outline of Basic National Policy, and Gist of Main Points in Regard 
to Dealing with the Situation to Meet the Change in World Conditions.38 
On August 1, 1940 the "Fundamental Policies of the Japanese 
Government" were announced to the world.39 The nations of the world 
were told that a historic turning point in the creation of "new forms of 
government, economy, and culture" were to be witnessed. Japan was one 
of the countries to watch, the declaration stated, and was "confronted 
by the greatest trial" she had ever experienced. Moving with the "inev-
itable trends in the development of world history," all parts of the 
Japanese government were to be rennovated in an attempt to perfect the 
"State structure for national defense." 
The' main objectives of these plans provided for an "unshakable 
national structure" which "conforms to the new world situation" on which 
Japan could "march forward toward the realization of the national policy 
by mobilizing the total strength of the nation." The settlement of China 
as usual, was given first priority among the list of objectives~ This in 
tum involved the "settlement" of southern problems: "to strengthen 
policies toward French Indo-China, Hongkong, and the Settlements, to 
check assistance to the Chaing regime and root out the feelings of 
enmity toward Japan."40 Also, so that Japan could obtain needed raw 
materials, "the diplomatic policy" toward the Netherlands East Indies 
needed reinforcement.41 The "new" policy was thus stated: 
1. Basic Policy 
The basic aim of Japan's national policy lies in the firm 
establishment of world peace in accordance with the lofty 
spirit of Hakko Itiu, in which the nation was founded, and 
in the construction, as the first step, of a new order in 
Greater East Asia, resting upon the solidarity of Japan, 
Manchoukuo and China. 
Japan will, therefore, devote the total strength of the 
nation to the fulfillment of the above policy by setting up 
speedily an unshakable national structure and stand of her 
own adapted to meet the requirements of new developments 
both at home and abroad. 
2. National Defense and Foreign Policy 
The Government will strive, in view of the latest world 
and domestic developments, for the repletion of armaments 
adequate for the execution of national policies, armaments 
founded upon the State structure for national defense organ-
ized in such manner as to bring into full play the total 
strength of the nation. 
Japan's foreign policy, which aims ultimately at the con-
struction of a new order in Greater East Asia, will be 
directed, first of all, toward a complete settlement of the 
China Affair, and to the advancement of the national fortune 
by taking a farsighted view of the drastic changes in the 
international situation and by formulating both constructive 
and flexible measures to meet these changes.42 
It was believed that this program would receive opposition from 
58 
other pow~rs, so preparations were made. The Konoye Cabinet decided "to 
foster a strong political tie with Gennany and Italy, and to take active 
steps in the adjustment of diplomacy towards the Soviet Union while 
maintaining a firm front towards the United States.
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The policy of taking a -"firm front" against the United States 
brought about a debate between the proponents, Matsuoka and the army, of 
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such a stand against America and those who opposed, Konoye and the navy, 
such action in fear of Anerican economic reprisals. Matsuoka succeeded 
in persuading those who opposed the stand by making a basic point. This 
was that just the mere fact of such an American threat of an embargo of 
essential supplies to Japan, was all the more reason for the govennnent 
to "secure a free hand" in the southern regions. In order to obtain 
this "free hand," it would be necessary for Japan to ally with Gennany 
and Italy, obtain an agreement of non-aggression with the Soviet Union, 
and above all else, take a "resolute position" against the United 
States.44 
On August 5, Matsuoka, in a letter to Shigemitsu, appears to have 
been quite confident that he could use the Axis Powers without committing 
Japan too much to their side. He told Shigemitsu that· Italy would be 
subject to· Germany but not Japan. Japan would be able to maintain her 
independence without losing it to Gennany he reasoned, because of the 
geographical location of Japan in relation to Germany. Japan, wrote 
Matsuoka, should follow after " ••• an independent parallel policy, 
similar to that of the Soviet Union." He went on further to tell the 
Japanese Ambassador, through the letter, that Japan should take advantage 
of the victories of Germany and move in on the territories that France, 
Holland, and Portugal controlled in the Far East. This way Japan would 
' 
be making great territorial gains without any involvement in war. 
Matsuoka in this letter emphasized his belief that Great Britain would 
be thoroughly defeated by Germany and this would open the door to further 
possessions for Japan in the Far East. The United States could be.kept 
from .intervening by the threat of Japan's entrance into the war on the 
side of Germany and Italy.45 
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The misconceptions of this letter were the guidelines that 
Matsuoka pursued placing Japan in an awkward position between "two 
worlds." Matsuoka and his alliance with Gennany established an "either-
or" situation for Japan. Japan would either risk everything in war on 
Gennany's side or remove herself, with humiliation, from the obliga-
tions of an alliance with the Axis powers.46 
The man named Matsuoka, then fell into line with the desires and 
objectives of the "center," the anny echelon that was made up of a 
nucleus of young powerful officers, and the "expansionists" who believed 
an alliance with Gennany and Italy the answer to Japan's needs. 
In late July it was felt within the Cabinet in Tokyo that a solu-
tion to the China Incident required good relations on Japan's part 
toward Great Britain and the United States. Matsuoka believed that a 
finn-bold stand was the answer in improving relations between these 
countries and his own. But at the same time, he argued that a war with 
the United States would result in destruction 'of the world. Since war 
with the United States was to be avoided, Matsuoka felt that his was all 
the more reason to improve relations with the United States.47 
The "firm attitude" that Matsuoka had in mind took further form 
in a four minister conference, September 4, 1940. The Matsuoka Plan, 
as it was called, was readily accepted by the other ministers. It 
proposed that the Japanese "new order in Greater East Asia" take, in 
addition to Manchukuo and China, the areas of French Indo-China, Thailand, 
Burma, British Malaya, British Borneo, the Netherland Indies, the fonner 
German mandated islands, French insular possessions in the Pacific, and 
India. The "plan" also made it extremely clear exactly what Japan's 
61 
intentions toward the United States would be. Peaceful measures short 
of war would be used. But in the negotiations with Germany it would be 
noted that Japan had the right to make the decision to use force against 
the United States and Britain independently in accordance with the con-
ditions at any particular moment. What this conference accepted from 
Matsuoka was that Japan would be able to do everything in her power to 
obtain acceptance of the demands for Japanese expansion without going 
to war for them. If she had to, it should be added, it seems very 
evident that she would use force to secure these countries.48 
The talks with the Germans began one week after the four-minister 
conference. The representative to meet with Matsuoka was Heinrich 
Stahmer a special Gennan envoy.49 The meetings were held in secrecy and 
they were numerous in sessions. Germany at this point had failed to 
persuade the British to beg for peace and was contemplating an attack on 
Russia. Stahmer let it be known to Matsuoka that they were not inter-
ested in Japan going to war against Britain, since that war was to be 
ended quickly. He wanted Japan's help in keeping the United States from 
entering and prolonging the war. Stahmer put it in such a way that 
agreement to an alliance was easy. The Alliance would only be used if 
an emergency came up between the three countries. Plus, if Japan and 
Russia could better their relationships, the alliance would be an 
effectiv~ barrier to the United States entering the war.so 
The army was in favor of such a tie-up but the navy had some 
reservations and wanted to study the matter further. Because of the 
feelings held by the navy, a liaison conference was scheduled for the 
fourteenth of September. Konoye discussed this matter with the "keeper 
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of the seal," Kido. In this discussion Kido showed concern about the 
direction the country was moving. This, of course, was toward the German 
camp. Both he and Konoye had been disciples of Prince Saionjii, the 
elder statesman-philosopher. Kido had made it a practice of visiting the 
Prince at least once a month for nearly seven years just to listen to the 
old man give his views on happenings in Japan. During these talks, 
Saionjii had repeatedly taken the stand that Japan should base her for-
eign policy with that of the United States and Great Britain. Kido 
seemed to share this view and feared that an alliance with Italy and 
Germany would only result in a Japanese-American war. Matsuoka and 
Konoye discussed this with Kido and pointed out that the Alliance was a 
preventative step and if it was not taken, Japan would be isolated in 
the Pacific leaving themselves open to an almost certain attack from the 
United States. This response of fear concerning an American attack 
became the regular answer by those who favored the alliance toward those 
that disapproved.51 Under the firm pressure of Matsuoka, the cabinet 
and its members began understanding thatif Japan was to avoid a conflict 
with the United States an alliance with Germany was necessary. The 
navy dragged its heels. 
The naval opposition to the Alliance was based mainly upon the 
portion of the pact which pledged all who signed "to assist one another 
with all political, economic and military means" if one of the signa-
tories were attacked ''by a power at present not involved in the European 
War or in the Sino-Japanese Conflict." The navy felt that this arrange-
ment would plunge Japan into war. 
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In the meeting of September 14, Matsuoka pointed out to the naval 
representatives that the question of peace or war would be decided by 
Japan. A tripartite pact would allow Japan to focus her attention upon 
the Chinese issue. Also, Japan would be free for the first time from 
the danger of being isolated in the Pacific and the threat of being 
attacked by the United States would be removed. Matsuoka urged that 
"the conclusion of a tripartite alliance would force the United States 
to_ act more prudently in carrying out her plans against Japan." He had 
pleaded that in the long run the alliance would be the best way to block 
a war between the two countries.52 
So persuasive was Matsuoka that Konoye wrote in his diary that 
Matsuoka in the company of politicians began to cry out loud sobbing 
that it was he and Tojo who most longed for and arranged the alliance.53 
The °leaders of the navy found it hard to agree with Matsuoka, yet 
due to his ability to persuade, the fear of Japanese reactionary groups 
who favored such an alliance and had been known to assassinate those who 
opposed their desires, and the threat of losing some of its military 
budget, it "had to respect the opinion of a responsible diplomatic 
specialist."54 Robert Butow writes of the Navy's change of heart: "The 
Navy apparently held this view even though Matsuoka's predecessor had 
strongly opposed the conclusion of a close military alliance." The pre-
decessor had been a "diplomatic specialist" also. After the war the 
naval leaders who were being tried for war crimes recalled: 
• • • if Japan took an aggressive attitude toward the United 
States, the United States would be compelled to resort to 
equally aggressive measures, thus aggravating relations 
between the two countries to a degree where compromise would 
be impossi. ble.55 
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This hindsight observation was not made at the conference of September 14, 
1940. The opposition was under control. All that was left was to 
endorse the pact and send Matsuoka on his way to Berlin. 
The endorsement came in an Imperial Conference of September 19, 
1940. The fine points were thoroughly harrnnered out prior to this meeting, 
yet there were still some feelings of friction between the army and navy. 
Oil seemed to be the main point of contention. In reply to Matsuoka's 
comments on possible oil sources being the Soviet Union.and the Nether-
lands East Indies, the Navy Chief of Staff, Prince Fushimi, asked: 
May I interpret this to mean that there is, in general, no 
assurance that additional oil can be obtained? I will add 
that we cannot count on supplies from the Soviet Union. In 
the end, we will need to get oil from the Netherlands East 
Indies. There are two ways of getting it--by peaceful means, 
and by the use of force. The.Navy very much prefers peaceful 
means. 
Matsuoka replied in his convincing manner, 
In negotiating the Pact, we paid most attention to the 
question of procuring oil. Even though British and American 
capital is involved, since it is under Dutch control we asked 
Ott and Stahmer what Germany, which controls the Netherlands, 
could do to help us obtain oil from the Netherlands East 
Indies, and develop Japanese enterprises there in the future. 
They said that Germany could do a great dea1.56 
The oil need brought up a discussion on the alternative of using 
force to obtain it and the effect this would have on the pact. A dis-
cussion followed that revealed Japan's attitude toward an "encirclement" 
by the United States. The Privy Council President Yoshimichi Hara asked 
Matsuoka, 
• • • supposing that the United States should lease bases in 
New Zealand, Australia, etc. and encircle Japan, we have [Jt.ave 
w~.7 decided whether such an act should be interpreted as an 
American attack on Japan. 
Matsuoka answered, 
The object of this Pact is to prevent the United States from 
encircling us in that way. The only thing that can prevent 
an American encirclement policy is a finn stand on our part 
at this time. • • • 
The President of the Privy Council retorted, 
The United States is a self-confident nation. Accordingly, I 
wonder if our taking a firm stand might not have a result quite 
contrary to the one we expect. 
Matsuoka's persuasiveness and logic are keenly shown in this reply. 
I see your point; but Japan is not Spain. We are a great power 
with a strong navy in Far Eastern waters. To be sure, the 
United States may adopt a stern attitude for a while; but I think 
that she will dispassionately take her interests into considera-
tion and arrive at a reasonable attitude. As to whether she will 
stiffen her attitude and bring about a critical situation, or 
will levelheadedly reconsider, I would say that the odds are 
fifty-fifty. 
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The final summaries of opinions were given by the anny and the navy 
with approval of an Axi·s pact given by both. The navy in its concluding 
remarks seems to have alluded to some "loud-mouthed" talking by someone 
and a concern that "restraint and common sense" be used. The Navy 
Minister Fushimi gave these final remarks. 
The Navy section of Imperial Headquarters agrees with the 
Government's proposal that we conclude a military alliance 
with Gennany and Italy. However, on this occasion we pre-
sent the following desiderata: (1) that even though this 
alliance is concluded, every conceivable measure will be 
taken to avoid war.with the United States: (2) that the 
southward advance will be attempted as far as possible by 
peaceful means, and that useless friction with third parties 
will be avoided; (3) that the guidance and control of speech 
and the press will be strengthened, that unrestrained dis-
cussion of the conclusion of this Pact will not be pennitted, 
and that harmful anti-British and anti-American statements 
and behavior will be restrained.57 
Approximately one week later in a council meeting on September 26, 
a member pointed out that the United States so far had been holding back 
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on her embargo of Japanese war materials lest pressure on her part would 
drive Japan into an alliance with Germany and Italy. Now with a pact 
Japan, instead of warning the United States to stay out of the war, 
might cause a reverse effect. The United States might be led to stiffen 
her attitude towards Japan which would lead to war and not to peace.
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Matsuoka challenged this view stating that nothing could be 
achieved by friendly means. 
If there is any means by which to check the deterioration of 
relations, and if possible, to improve them at all, that will 
be to assume what Minister Stahmer called a "determined atti-
tude." For that purpose, it will be of the utmost importance 
to make as many allies as possible, and to proclaim it before 
the world as soon as possible thus strengthening our position 
against the United States. While keeping ever viligant eyes upon 
any repercussions which may arise from such a move on our part, 
I will try at the same time not to overlook any opportunity of 
restoring our relations with America to a more normal basis. The 
important point, is first of all, to show unmistakably a firm 
stand against the United States.59 
On September 27, 1940, the "pact of steel" was signed in Berlin. 
Because of its importance to American-Japanese relations the whole docu-
ment is reproduced here: 
The governments of Japan, Germany, and Italy, considering it 
as the condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations 
of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to 
stand by and cooperate with one another in regard to their efforts 
in Greater East Asia and the regions of Europe respectively where-
in it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order 
of things calculated to promote mutual prosperity and welfare of 
the peoples concerned. Furthermore it is the desire of the three 
Governments to extend cooperation to such nations in other spheres 
of the world as may be inclined to put forth endeavours along 
lines similar to their own, in order that their ultimate aspira-
tions for world peace may thus be realized. Accordingly the 
Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy have agreed as follows: 
Article 1: Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of 
Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe. 
Article 2: Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leader-
ship of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East 
Asia. 
Article 3: Japan, Gennany and Italy agree to cooperate in 
their efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake 
to assist one another with all political, economic and mili-
tary means when one of the three Contracting Parties is 
attacked by a power at present not involved in the European 
War or in the Sino-Japanese Conflict. 
Article 4: With a view to implementing the present Pact, 
Joint Technical Commissions the members of which are to be 
appointed by the respective Governments ••• will meet with-
out delay. 
Article 5: Japan, Gennany and Italy affinn that the afore-
said tenns do not in any way· affect the political status which 
exists at present as between each of the three Contracting 
Parties and Soviet Russia. 
Article 6: The present Pact shall come into effect immedi-
ately upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years 
from the date of its coming into force. 
At proper time before the expiration of the said tenn the 
High Contracting Parties shall, at the request of any one of 
them, enter into negotiations for its removal.60 
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Japan had taken on a cause that was set against the United States. 
This cause was much greater than her attacks had been against China. She 
had created a polarizir:ig-action in the United States toward the British 
Camp. Secretary of State Hull attempted to hide his surprise in his 
statement of September 27, 1940 when he spoke to the press: 
The reported agreement of alliance does not, in the view of 
the Government of the United States, substantially alter a 
situation which has existed for several years. Announcement 
of the alliance merely makes clear to all a relationship which 
has long existed in effect and to which the Government has 
repeatedly called attention. That such an agreement has been 
in process of conclusion has been known for some time, and 
that fact has been fully taken into account by the Government 
of the United Stat"es in the determining of this country's 
policies.61 
The shock of the pact was well-hidden but still the unending list 
of questions and interpretations of the meaning of the alliance began 
flooding in from various sources. What was "unwritten" in this agree-
ment, it was feared, was that Japan had been given a "free hand" in 
Indo-China.62 
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The effect on the United States was one of shock in some circles 
and in other areas it was seen as a bluff. Those who had been urging 
the president to place an embargo on oil, Secretaries Stimson, Knox, 
Morgenthau, and Ickes, saw it as a golden opportunity to push harder 
for the embargoo In a notation in his diary Stimson wrote: 
It is a very serious proposition of course, but it is so 
evidently evidenced by fear on the part of the Axis and so 
clearly represents only what they would do without a treaty, 
that I personally have not been worried by it and I don't 
think the President haso If it should come to a showdown, 
at present and so long as the British Fleet lasts, the Axis 
in Europe could not help Japan if she got into trouble with 
uso So in substance the new arrangement simply means making 
a bad face at us. It will be pretty useful, I think, however, 
in waking up our people to the effect that at last they have 
got what they have been talking about--isolationo The United 
States is isolated except for one great power and that's the 
British Commonwealth, and I already see signs of a realization 
of this among the thoughtlesso Clamours are being made for an 
alliance with Great Britain already.63 
Pressure to respond in some way or another to the alliance was 
mounting and growing in strengtho In a letter to the President, Secretary 
Ickes wrote: 
We didn't keep Japan out of Indo-China by continuing to 
ship iron, nor will we keep Japan out of the Dutch Indies 
by selling it our oilo When Japan thinks that it can safely 
move against the Dutch East Indies, and is ready to do so, 
it will go in regardless. It will make it all the more dif-
ficult for it to go in if it is short on oil and gasoline.64 
Secretary Stimson made a record of the October 4, 1940 cabinet 
meeting where it was decided that the main purpose of the Alliance was 
to scare the United States out of supporting Great Britain. It was 
decided to remain silent in word for the time being but to act in deed 
immediately. 
• • • The President spoke very seriously on the situation that 
confronts us with the agreement between Japan and Germany and 
Italyo Japan has already begun to checkmate and we had a long 
discussion of what our action should be. Everybody agreed 
that the purpose of the three axis powers was to scare us 
out of giving material aid to Great Britain, but the general 
consensus was that we make no reply--we should do no talking, 
but do some·straight acting which will show Japan that we 
mean business and that we are not in the least afraid of her. 
Various plans were discussed.65 
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Grew cabled Hull on October 9, with this message of "private and 
off the record" feelings and fears of the Vice-Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of Japan. 
For the first time in several weeks I went to the country 
on October 9, but the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs 
(Ohashi) urgently requested me to return to Tokyo so that he 
might see me, without delay, on behalf of the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. We talked for about an hour.and it was 
evident that the Foreign Minister is worried on two points: 
(a) reports received by him through Suma that a total embargo 
against Japan has been decided upon by the Government of the 
United States; and (b) reports from Washington that the 
evacuation of American citizens from the Far East has been 
"ordered" by the American Government. I stated that I had 
no information concerning the first point, and that with regard 
to the second, advice had been given to Americans in the Far 
East as a precautionary measure but no "order had been issued. 
The "embargo" on iron and steel scrap was ref erred to by the 
Vice Minister and I informed him of the substance of • • • the 
Department's telegram No. 383 dated October 8, 1940, 6 p.m. 
I had received this telegram a few minutes before the con-
versation. 
That Japan desires peace with the United States and has no 
intention of attacking us, was a thesis dwelt upon at length 
by Mr. Ohashi. I said that the United States feels likewise 
toward Japan and that, as the Vice Minister knows, the American 
people are strongly peaceminded, but that both the American 
Government and people have been made less certain of Japan's 
real intentions by inflammatory utterances made recently by 
Japanese statesmen. I added that the American reaction to 
those utterances is exactly what should have been expected be-
fore the statements were made public, and I mentioned our 
preparedness program and the inevitable effect on it of the 
Japanese utterances. 
Confidentially, I received the clear impression from the nature 
of the conversation and the marked urgency with which I was 
called, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs is seriously dis-
turbed by the course of developments in the United States re-
sulting from the Japanese Government's recent actions and state-
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The effect caused by the Tripartite-Pact could hardly be called 
a positive boost to United States-Japanese relations. The connotation 
taken was one of Japan selecting sides with the "fascist" countries of 
Europe. Polarization resulted. 
Yet no drastic measures were taken by the Roosevelt Administration 
which had detennined carefully to select its route in dealing with 
Japan. This was the case even though the Administration " ••• burned 
with resentment at Japanese attempts to intimidate the U.S ...... 67 
Grew records in his diary that this gesture was tremendously effective. 
The fact that the Japanese Foreign Office presently sent out feelers to 
see how the United States was reacting was proof of this. It also 
showed Grew that to many Japanese the decision for peace or war was not 
necessarily going to be made in Tokyo.68 The ambassador later recalls 
that the only thing at this point that possibly would have stopped the 
Japanese course of action would have been an all-out oil embargo. 
But it was men such as Admiral Stark and General Marshall who 
were firmly opposed to any oil embargo. They realized that a confron-
tation was in the making between Japan and the United States. Yet at 
the same time, they insisted that it was inconceivable for the United 
States even to think of a physical encounter with Japan at this time. 
They also felt that it was more in the American interest to support 
Great Britain than it was to devote a major effort toward Japan.69 
The oil embargo did not come immediately as a result of this 
alliance, but something did. On Columbus Day, Franklin Roosevelt made 
a speech which added to Winston Churchill's proclamations caused some 
sort of fear to rise in the hearts of the Japanese leaders. Roosevelt 
said: 
The Americans will not be scared or threatened into the ways 
the dictators want us to follow. No combination of dictator 
countries of Europe and Asia will halt us in the path we see 
ahead for ourselves and for democracy. No combination dic-
tator countries of Europe and Asia will stop the help we are 
giving to almost the last free people now fighting to hold 
them at bay.70 
These warnings showed the Japanese that America was being drawn 
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closer to assisting Britain by the pact and that any aggressive action 
on her part only would draw the two countries of America and Britain 
closer together. On October 10, 1940 Matsuoka apologized to the United 
States. 
Lastly, I might add that the Tripartite Pact was not 
entered into with the intention of directing it "against" 
the United States. To state frankly, the parties to the 
Pact wished earnestly that such a powerful nation as the 
United States, in particular, and all other nations at 
present neutral would not be.involved in the European War, 
or come by any chance into conflict with Japan because of 
the China affairs or otherwise. Such an eventuality, with 
all the possibility of bringing an awful catastrophe upon 
humanity, is enough to make one shudder, if one stops to 
imagine the consequences. In short the Pact is a pact of 
peace.71 
This retreat by Matsuoka was treated with considerable joy in the 
United States. The Chicago Daily News wrote, "Throughout the country 
there was much elation. 
. . 
.Japan's 'bluff' had been called and Japan 
had executed one of the most precipitous backdowns in diplomatic 
history."72 A few days later Matsuoka invited the United States to join 
the Tripartite "Peace" Pact and to assist the Axis in making the world 
one large happy family.73 
The fact that Grew had mentioned Matsuoka was "deeply disturbed" 
by the American reaction to the Tripartite Pact gave relief to Wash-
ington. The course the President chose was not to push the American 
position with Japan too far. For the United States to impose the oil 
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embargo or send her fleet further west might only provoke the Japanese 
to action. This, it was believed, could possibly lead to a loss of the 
Dutch Indies. The biggest concern was a military involvement by Britain 
and the United States in an area which was considered secondary to 
Europe.74 
In retrospect it appears that within the short span of time the 
"new" Knoye cabinet had been in power, the entire complexion of 
Japanese-American relations were altered. This time in history seems 
to be a pivotal point that led Japan down the "road of no return" which 
would lead to a collision with the United States. The sides had been 
selected. How much faith could the United States have in any future 
negotiations with Japan? Was she the future enemy? 
The United States was encouraged to take action. Grew wrote that 
it was painful for him to see how far the relations between his country 
and Japan had deteriorated. Grew gave "Second Thoughts on Japan's 
adherance to the Axis." As he recalled that the month prior to the 
signing of the "Pact," many in Japan were fed up with Germany trying to 
stir up trouble between the United States and Japan. But with the 
leadership of Matsuoka and the army, the Alliance was drawn up for the 
"specific purpose ••• of getting Japan and the United States into 
eventual war." The "better relations," that Matsuoka had verbally 
declared to Grew he wanted between the United States and Japan, should 
be interpreted as relations that would allow Japan complete control of 
the Far East. This was what a "friendship" between the two countries 
would have to be based. Japan could no longer be looked upon as an 
individual nation, but instead she should be looked upon as a member of 
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a team. The Konoye cabinet had shown its real intentions when it joined 
with Germany and Italy. The United States should not view this with 
complacency. With the forming of the Konoye cabinet writes Grew, 
••• we were given an undeveloped photograph negative, the 
general type of which we knew in advance but not the precise 
outline of the picture that would appear. Now the negative 
is pretty well developed, the picture is taking shape, and 
it is not the sort of picture to afford complacency with 
regard to the future relations between Japan and the United 
States.75 
Matsuoka it could be said was positive at the time of the signing 
of the Axis agreement that he had completely engineered a plan for world 
peace. His close friends found this agreement to be confusing to them 
in relation to their understanding of Yosuke's feelings and attitudes 
toward the United States. In discussing his rationale for the pact 
with his son, he said, "If you stand finn and start hitting back, the 
American will know he's talking to a man and you two can then talk man 
to man." This was in his thinking the best way to prevent war with the 
United States. This thought-process was based on his knowledge of what 
the American was like and how he reacted. Said Matsuoka, "It is my 
America and my American people that really exist. • 
. . 
There is no 
other America; there are no other American people." He spoke to Doctor 
Yoshie Saito, one of his Foreign Ministry advisors, concerning this 
rationale. "I admit people will call all this a tricky business," but 
he had joined with the Axis "to check the Army's aggressive policy •. 
and to keep America warmongers from joining the war in Europe. And 
after that we can shake hands with the United States." This would keep 
peace in the Pacific and at the same time form a great group of 'capi-
talistic" nations around the world against "communism.
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This rationale did have an effect on the United States-Japanese 
relations. A major problem is one of over-emphasizing the part Matsuoka 
played in the deterioration of relations. The stiffening of American 
flexibility toward the Japanese in part, during these times, was due to 
Matsuoka's rationale. There were many pressures that led Matsuoka to 
believe that his solution of "firmness" was correct. These ranged from 
the extremists in the Supreme Command all the way to the attitudes of 
racism in the United States toward the Japanese immigrants. Joeseph 
Grew put the responsibility for the Alliance on Matsuoka nearly two 
months after the signing of the pact. His diary of November 18, 1940 
reads: 
With regard to the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance ••• 
it was Matsuoka himself who put it through, bringing Konoye along 
with him. We are told on very good authority that other cabinet 
members were not consulted until the end and knew little or 
nothing. about it. I now have it straight from a person closely 
in touch with the Imperial Court that the Emperor was most re-
luctant to approve the pact and was finally led to do so only 
when Matsuoka gave the Emperor his studied conviction that war 
with the United States would be inevitable if the alliance with 
the Axis were not concluded. Judging from Matsuoka's subsequent 
statements I think that this version rings true.77 
Whether Matsuoka was completely responsible for leading the 
Japanese into the Alliance is not as important as the effect the Pact 
seemed to have on the negotiations, the openness between Japan and the 
United States in the future to solve differences. A vindictive note can 
be made about ''Matsuoka' s masterpiece," the Alliance with Italy and 
Germany. The Tripartite Pact did alter the relations between Japan and 
the United States. It became a stumbling block to negotiations through-
out the year of 1941. The concessions the United States would possibly 
think of making in allowing Japan a portion of the control of the Far 
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East were shadowed by the implications the "Pact" cast on future rela-
tions between the two countries. Japan had obligated herself to go to 
war against the United States if the United States were to go to war 
against Germany.78 
What had been thought by Matsuoka, Tojo, and Konoye to be a method 
of keeping the United States from attacking Japan or keeping her from 
entering the European conflict was now causing the opposite to happen. 
The "pact" was creating in the American government a "firmer stance" 
against the Japanese. Alternative plans were discussed in Washington in 
thought of restraining American trade and exports to the Japanese. The 
use of armed force within the southwest Pacific was contemplated. The 
final result of the Alliance on Japanese-American relations was the 
United States drew closer to her.Anglo-Saxon brother, Great Britain.79 
In the latter part of the month of January, Japan was in a quandary 
concerning the nation's next moves. At a Liaison Conference on January 30, 
1941 it was decided to move to the south and enforce mediation upon both 
Indo-China and Thailand. Japan wanted payment from both of them. She 
wanted the use of airbases, ports, the right to station troops, and the 
right to move troops throughout their land. If these countries failed 
to comply to Japan's demands, seizure would be the next step.80 
In the Tripartite pact, Germany and Italy recognized Japan's sphere 
of influence. Matsuoka did not believe this to be enough. He desired 
more time to get an understanding with Germany and the Soviet Union about 
Japan's move to the south. Japan needed to free herself from the con-
flict in China and most important, do away with the ill-feelings between 
the Soviet Union and Japan. This would in turn make Japan feel secure 
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enough about her northern axieties that she could take after her 
desires to the south~81 The problem was a common one between Japan and 
the Soviet Union. This was China. China was receiving aid from Russia 
while Japan was in conflict with Chiang Kai-shek. Russia felt it 
necessary to keep the fire kindled between China and Japan with her 
financial aid so that Japan, her traditional enemy, would be kept busy. 
Japan was prepared to make things right with the Soviet Union so that 
the aid to China would be cut off, forcing Chiang Kai-shek to accept the 
Japanese terms ending the "China Incident." 
Two methods were available to Japan to quiet the antagonism between 
her and Russia. One was a non-aggression pact, the other alternative 
was to get the Soviets to adhere to the Tripartite Pact and divide the 
spheres of influence into four parts rather than three.82 The alter-
native of Soviet adherance to the "Pact" was attempted as early as 
October, 1940 in Moscow with very little success. The relations with 
the Russians remained the same.
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It was determined in the Liaison Conference of January 30, that 
Matsuoka would visit both Berlin and Moscow.84 Several questions needed 
answers before the Foreign Minister could be sent on his way. What 
guidelines was Matsuoka to have? What should be his objectives? A 
conference was called for February 3, to answer these questions. 
War Minister Tojo, later Prime Minister, through interrogations 
after the war said that the purpose of Japan sending Matsuoka was to 
bring harmonious feelings between the Axis powers and the Soviet Union. 
He said that it was intended to foster better relations with the United 
States because of the magnanimous power which would be created by the 
four major countries.85 
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In actuality, Matsuoka did not receive a set of rigid instructions 
informing him of what was expected in bringing about "harmony." The 
discussion of his trip centered around four problem areas with which the 
members of the conference wanted Matsuoka to deal. The first was whether 
the Soviet Union could be drawn into the Tripartite pact. Little did 
the conferees know about Germany's future plans for the Soviets at this 
point. All Japan knew and was basing opinions on was what was conveyed 
when the Tripartite Pact was signed in the fall of 1940. The second was 
to secure recognition of Japan's supremacy in the area called "Greater 
East Asia." The third dealt with the price for harmony between the Axis 
powers and the Soviets. The fourth problem discussed, probably the big-
gest, was the man they were sending on this voyage, Matsuoka, who seemed 
to have a special allegiance to Berlin. The army and navy were con-
cerned that· Matsuoka might commit Japan to obligations that would be too 
binding. Because of this fear, Matsuoka was forbidden to make binding 
promises about Japanese participation or possible participation in the 
war already in progress in Europe.86 
The Japanese ambassador to England believed that Matsuoka was the 
''brains" of the cabinet and that his extreme allegiance to Germany made 
some very distrustful of what he might do on this trip. 
The moment seemed oportune for Matsuoka to visit Germany and 
Italy, to establish close relations with their leaders, to 
study for himself how far the Axis had already gone on the 
road to victory and to gather data for a decision as to the 
next steps to be taken by Japan. The Army urged him to make 
the trip and Matsuoka himself thought it would afford an 
extremely favourable opportunity for him to consolidate his 
future political standing. 
One further means of ensuring the Axis victory was closer 
relations with Russia. • • • At the same time, for various 
reasons, there was some considerable opposition to Matsuoka's 
trip. In particular the Navy was anxious that, having absorbed 
military ideas, he should not go out of his way to promise an 
attack on Singapore, which Gennany ardently desiredo He was 
particularly requested, therefore, to make no commitments of 
a military nature. For that matter both the Army and Navy 
absolutely refused to allow an~one else to discuss questions 
affecting the Supreme Command. 8 
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The distrust held for Matsuoka stemmed from his "voluble and un-
conventional nature" and his German-fed idea that Japan should attack 
Singapore throwing herself into the war against Great Britain. This 
. was a move that had implications which appeared to the military above 
and beyond Matsuoka's ability to comprehend.88 
Matsuoka was able to avoid purposefully any explicit instructions. 
General Tojo revealed in his post-war trials that "he did not trust 
Matsuoka's traits and personality and feared he might commit Japan to 
.military operations."89 
Matsuoka was elated about the trip and went directly to German 
Ambassador Ott in Tokyo, to convey that the mission had been approved. 
He told Ott of his plans to talk to Hitler about the attitude of the 
Tripartite Pact toward the United States. He wanted to prevent the 
United States entry into the European war if possible by diplomatic 
pressure, but if this failed, he told Ott, then Japan would agree to 
attacking Singapore.90 This, of course, was a forbidden commitment 
according to what had just been told Matsuoka in the conference. 
The German Ambassador to Japan, Oshima met with the Foreign 
Minister of Germany, Ribbentrop on February 23, where he was told by the 
Minister, that it would be to the Japanese interest to enter the war 
immediately, without warning. "The decisive blow would be an attack on 
on Singapore • • • it must be carried out with lightning speed and if at 
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all possible without a declaration of war •••• " The Foreign Minister 
gave Oshima no indication that problems had developed between the Soviet 
Union and Germany. In fact, Ribbentrop told Oshima that Russia had 
indicated a readiness to adhere to the Tripartite Pact.91 
On March 5, a military directive was sent out by Hitler to his 
top officials that shows how useful Japan was in the "total picture." 
It also proves that Germany chose not to trust any "secrets" to Japan. 
It must be the aim of the collaboration based on the 
Three Power Pact to induce Japan as soon as possible to 
take active measures in the Far East. • • • The Barba-
rossa operation will create most favorable political and 
military prerequisites for this. 
The seizure of Singapore as the key British position in 
the Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire 
conduct of war of the Three Powers. In addition attacks on 
other systems of British Naval power--extending to those of 
American naval power only if entry of the United States into 
the war cannot be prevented-~will result in weakening the 
enemy's system of power in that region •••• 92 
The "Barbarossa Operation" was the code for Germany's_ plan to 
attack Russia. Hitler was advised to tell Japan of his intentions, but 
refused on the grounds that he could not trust Japan. He believed 
Japan would misuse the information in dealing with the Soviet Union and 
try to strike a bargain with her. As Feis puts it, "Japan was not to be 
regarded as a reliable partner.
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When Matsuoka was being given a well-attended send-off on March 12, 
from the Tokyo railroad station, the train ready to leave, he attempted 
to find the answer once more from General Sugiyama when the army was 
going to take Singapore. The General replied, "I cannot tell you now." 
Colonel Yatsuji Nagai was sent along by the army as a "watch-dog" to 
see that Matsuoka made no rash promises about Singapore.94 
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Matsuoka, staff, and Ambassador Ott arrived in Moscow after an 
eleven day railroad journey to a "correct but reserved" reception.95 
One of the first tasks Matsuoka set out to accomplish was a discussion 
with the United States Ambassador in Moscow, Steinhardt. A portion of 
this discussion shows Matsuoka's ability to talk out of both sides of 
his mouth. · His discussion was a positive one with the American 
ambassador. 
Matsuoka was emphatic in stating that under no circumstances 
would Japan attack Singapore or any of the American, British, 
or Dutch possessions, and he was insistent that Japan has no 
territorial ambitions. Japan, he said, was ready at any moment 
to join the United States in a guarantee of the territorial 
integrity or independence of the Philippine Islands. • • • He 
said that Japan would not go to war with the United States, and 
added that from his reading of American history it appeared 
that it was the United States which went to war with other 
countries; if a conflict should take place, it would come about 
only as the result of affirmative action by the United States. 
• • • Matsuoka said that now was the time when statesmen 
should take decisive action and that it is the "big things, not 
' the little things" that matter; in his opinion the President is 
afforded a splendid opportunity "to clear up the entire Far 
Eastern situation" by discussing with Nomura the terms on which 
the war in China could be brought to a close. He added that he 
wished the President and theSecretary of State would trust him; 
on his record over the past few years, he said, he did not 
blame them for not having confidence in him, but that if they 
would give him the opportunity he would prove to them that 
Japan had no territorial or economic ambition, and that if an 
understanding were reached regarded by us all as reasonable he 
would fight to put it through should any elements in Japan 
oppose it •••• 96 
No records were kept for history during the Molotov-Matsuoka 
meeting. The importance of the meeting was accented by the presence of 
Stalin who had not involved himself with a Japanese diplomat since 
1928.97 Matsuoka later related to the Germans his version of the 
meetings. He said that he had proposed a treaty of friendship and non-
aggression. Talk of terms for settlement followed with Matsuoka 
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proposing the Soviets sell the northern part of Sakhalin to the Japa-
nese. This caused Molotov to ask whether he was joking or not.98 
Ambassador Shigemitsu writes of this time and explains the ground 
work already accomplished by the Japanese ambassador in Moscow. 
• • • when Matsuoka arrived in Moscow, the New Ambassador 
Tatekawa had taken up his new post. He had already been 
working on the suggestion of a non-aggression treaty to 
guard Japan's rear but Russia had demanded various compen-
sating rewards and no progress had been made. Matsuoka 
again broached the subject of a treaty but he got the same 
answer.99 
As so little was being accomplished in this talk, Matsuoka suggested 
that the talk on a settlement be resumed when he returned from Berlin. 
The problems were postponed and Matsuoka left "for Germany empty-
handed. "100 
He was received in Berlin with much clamor and diplomatic decoro 
This "welcome" was just the beginning. It appears that Germany was 
quite interested in the outcome of these meetings for Matsuoka was given 
considerable amounts of time with Hitler and his Foreign Minister during 
his stay between March 27 and April 4. 
In these meetings, Hitler and Ribbentrop tried to convince 
Matsuoka how Great Britain was nearly defeated. He was told that Japan 
should grab hold of this "unique" opportunity to make war on Britain 
and assault Singapore. A quick move, he was informed, would eliminate 
any interference on the part of the United States.101 "Japan was now 
in a position to make a decisive stroke," Feis paraphrases the Germans' 
speech, "one that would hasten Britains collapse and prevent United 
States' aid from being effective."102 This move on Singapore, Matsuoka 
was instructed, would help Japan secure her "needed positions" for the 
/ 
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New Order in Greater East Asia.103 "• •• Such a moment would never 
return • • • now was the most favorable time •• 
•• "104 
Matsuoka also 
told Ribbentrop and Hitler that in connection with his efforts to bring 
about the Tripartite Pact he had often intentionally given "the impres-
sion of having a pro-American or pro-British attitude in order to de-
ceive his opponents.
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Hitler told Matsuoka that " ••• if Japan got into a conflict with 
the United States, Germany on her part would take the necessary steps at 
once."106 He also told Matsuoka that Germany " ••• would be more than 
a match for America, entirely apart from the fact that the Germany 
soldiers were, obviou~ly, far superior to the American.
11
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Matsuoka could not pledge the Japanese to an attack on Singapore. 
He told the Germans the reasons for this were "problems" at home from 
the "intellectual circles" which seemed to have a definite influence 
upon "His lmperial Majesty" and the cabinet. 
The Germans essentially got a promise from Matsuoka which said 
that he would do everything in his power to bring about an attack on 
Singapore and make Japan a part of the war. But it was obvious that 
Matsuoka had come to Berlin without the authority to tell Hitler Japan 
would attack Singapore or enter the war.108 Yet, even so Matsuoka was 
an influence upon the outcome of policy in Japan because of his posi-
tion as Foreign Minister. No doubt, these meetings with the Germans 
kindled the flame of pro-German attitudes all the more, leaving little 
room for successful negotiations with the United States. 
In these meetings, the Germans discussed the Soviet Union with 
Matsuoka. It appears that Matsuoka was not hearing what was being said 
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to him. Hitler was evasive on the Soviet topic for fear of Matsuoka 
using the information as a lever to obtain Japan's desired treaty with 
the Soviet Union. Ribbentrop had told Matsuoka that a non-aggression 
pact with the Soviet Union "probably would not altogether fit into the 
framework of the present situation.
11
109 
When the Tripartite Pact has been signed, Pravda, a key Soviet 
newspaper, had called it a "further aggravation of the war and an 
expansion of its realm.
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Ribbentrop had immediately assured Molotov, 
the Soviet Union's Foreign Minister, that it was directed entirely to-
ward the United States. "The treaty of course, does not pursue any 
aggressive aims against America. Its exclusive purpose is rather to 
bring the elements pressing for American entry into the war to their 
senses •••• " It was also to make them see" •• ·• that if they enter 
the present struggle, they will automatically have to deal with the 
three great powers as adversaries.
11
111 Ribbentrop had even written a 
long letter to Stalin suggesting thatthe Soviet Union join in the Pact. 
The historical mission of the four great powers--the Soviet Union 
included with the Tripartite Pact members was to administer and direct 
future developments on a world-wide scale.112 
Even though German policy had changed concerning their relation-
ship with the Soviet Union, Matsuoka could not see the "glaring in-
consistencies" between what he was trying to accomplish in the Soviet 
Union and what the Germans had been telling him in these meetings.113 
Ribbentrop had conveyed to him the opinion that "in view of the general 
situation it might be best not to go into things too deeply with the 
Russians." He had told Matsuoka that he was not sure how relations 
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would develop in the near future with the Soviet Union and that a 
conflict with Russia was always a possibility. Yet Matsuoka did not 
comprehend the information. Two possible reasons for Matsuoka's blind-
ness to the facts are given. One was that he was so set on his own 
political ambitions in Japan that he would not allow the Germans to 
take away his diplomatic success with the Soviet Union. The second 
reason was that his mind was in disorder by this time and he was mentally 
incapable of comprehending the facts.114 
Matsuoka returned to the Soviet Union on April 7. He was immedi-
ately engaged in a three-hour discussion with Molotov. Again there were 
no official records made of the conversation except for what Matsuoka 
told the United States Ambassador. In essence, he had been told that 
Moscow's demands were so high, the Soviet Union really must not have 
been interested in an agreement.115 What actually transpired is mere 
conjecture over the next few.days. Feis proposes that Matsuoka did 
what Hitler feared. He used the information gained by his talks with 
Hitler and Ribbentrop to sway Stalin.116 The matter was brought to a 
surprising end when on Sunday April 13, a disappointed Matsuoka went 
for a last visit to see Stalin. The non-aggression treaty was brought 
up again and this tine by Stalin. Stalin suggested a compromise and 
Matsuoka immediately wired Konoye for approval from the Emperor. With 
great haste in Tokyo approval was given. The Neutrality Pact was drawn 
up to say that both nations would respect each others' "territorial 
integrity"; that neither would join in a conflict against the other; 
and that they would remain neutral throughout conflict.117 
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In addition to the Pact an added portion was signed called the 
"Frontier Declaration" which agreed to respect reciprocally the terri-
tory between Manchukuo and the Mongolian Republic. 
A first hand account of the wild celebration that followed the 
signing is given by Kase. 
After the pact was solemnly signed in the Kremlin we were 
treated to a sumptuous buffet. Wine flowed liberally and 
the conversation grew animated as toast after toast was pro-
posed: to Emperor Hirohito, to Kalinin, to Stalin, to 
Matsuoka, to Molotov. • • • Both Stalin and Matsuoka were 
quite drunk by the time the latter took his leave. In the 
midst of the drinking bout I consulted my watch and found 
that it was almost time for the international train on which 
we were to leave to start. Stalin smiled and walked briskly 
to Molotov's desk, took up the telephone receiver and spoke 
a few words. Then he told us, "Gentlemen, the train will 
wait for you as long as necessary." The drinking was re-
sumed with vigor. This was the Slav dictatorship in action!118 
Kase also describes the farewells at the train station. Stalin 
makes an unprecedented appearance with a lavish display of fondness for 
the Japanese. 
In those days Stalin never took the trouble to see off 
foreign guests. Therefore when the dictator appeared on 
the platfonn with us everybody rubbed their eyes. But 
most surprised of all were the Axis ambassadors! Stalin 
wannly embraced Matsuoka and even allowed photographs to 
be taken of the scene. In fact, he kissed rather promis-
cuously. Try as I could, even I could not escape his bear 
hug. Clearly the neturality pact was as much a gift of 
providence for the Soviet Union as it was for Japan.119 
Not everyone felt as Kase, some estimated that neither nation 
trusted the otherto uphold the neutrality pact. As lond as there were 
no conflicts there would be no problems remaining neutral.120 
The effect the signing of the non-aggression pact had on the United 
States was summed up by the Secretary of State on April 14, as over-
estimated. It was an event that was of little surprise to American 
diplomatic circles. 
It therefore comes as no surprise, although there has 
existed doubt whether the two Governments would or would 
not agree to say it in writing. The lolicy of this Gov-
ernment, of course remains unchanged. 21 
Grew interpreted the Soviet-Japanese Pact to be multi-purposed. 
It "represented a great personal success for Matsuoka." It was "con-
eluded chiefly for the effect ••• ·it would exert ••• on Gennany, 
from the Soviet point of view, and on the United States and Great 
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Britain, from the Japanese point of view." Finally, the pact gave Japan 
and her extremist elements, "those who advocate a vigorous prosecution of 
the southward advance," a "free hand" to do what they wanted with the 
nations to the south of Japan. What the pact did not do, wrote Grew, 
was to define "the policies and obligations" Japan and the Soviet Union 
were to have to each other.122 
It appears that Matsuoka believed he had made strides toward 
universal peace, for he believed that the neutrality pact would make 
Chiang Kai-shek sit up and take notice of Japan's new power arrangement 
and as a result, speed up his negotiations with Japan. He also thought 
it would strengthen Japan's position in keeping the United States and 
Great Britain from intervening in her Asian actions.
123 
He was a proud conqueror returning with the spoils to his home. 
As the then Japanese Ambassador to England saw it, Matsuoka came home 
unaware of the inconsistencies he had been a part of. He had been too 
"wrapped in dreams of what he was going to do next. He always came 
back to the same conclusion that the mainspring of Japan's policy was 
the Alliance.
11
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This conclusion that the Alliance was the mainspring of Japan's 
policy by Matsuoka had an obvious effect on United States-Japanese 
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relations. He had allied himself personally to Hitler and the Gennans 
in such a fashion that he was unable to think in terms other than those 
that would aid the cause of the Alliance. These pro-Axis feelings, no 
doubt, had an effect on his attitude toward the negotiations between 
Secretary of State Hull and Japan's.Ambassador to Washington, Nomura. 
While on his Moscow-Berlin tour, Matsuoka had not been aware of these 
meetings and what was being discussed. His desire to be in one accord 
with German desires would soon play a key part in the failure of the 
Hull-Nomura talks. This desire to be in one accord with Germany was 
emphasized so heavily by Matsuoka in the months of May and June that the 
Japanese cabinet, especially those that represented the Supreme Command, 
believed he was usurping their power to determine the policy of Japan. 
This became a power struggle with Matsuoka who was hardly a match for 
the powerful Supreme Command. 
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CHAPTER III 
HULL-NOMURA TALKS 
Matsuoka did not play a direct role in the original Hull-Nomura 
Talks, yet overtones of his influence were felt in an indirect manner. 
By the end of these discussions, Matsuoka's desires were fulfilled, by 
poor selection of Japanese representation in America and his tactic of 
evasive stalling. 
The Hull-Nomura Conversations of Spring, 1941 were basically an 
offshoot of the work of several non-entities in Japanese-American 
circles who had desired solution of troubles between the two countries 
which would avoid a very possible conflict which was apparent to the 
casual observer by this time. 
There was, since the signing of the Tripartite Pact, a budding 
opposition to the Konoye Cabinet and mainly Foreign Minister Matsuoka. 
There was the fear that the Tripartite Pact would lead the two countries 
to war. From this fear, Ambassador Grew assessed the situation to be 
"rotten" within the Konoye Cabinet. 
• • • something is getting rottener in the state of 
Denmark. The new structure is not sitting well, and a 
growing dissatisfaction is brewing. Even the War Mini-
ster himself ·announced the other day that the new 
structure need not be interpreted as taking all the joy 
out of life; he apparently sees the way things are going. 
There is much bickering and divided counsels and much 
talk that Konoye, who is hardly more than a figurehead, 
cannot last. The pendulum in Japan is always swinging; 
the moderates say that it will soon swing back toward 
normal, but I fear not. I fear that it must swing still 
farther toward the extreme, and that if Konoye falls, 
either through resignation or through a coup d'etat, he 
is likely to be succeeded by a military dictatorship, 
even by a sort of revival of the shogunate.I 
One can only surmise that Matsuoka had strong backing in anny 
circles and that the military extremists were in total commitment to 
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the binding Pact. This Pact played an intricate part in Japan's future 
plans of moving south and military extremists were not about to lose 
the Cabinet which seemed to be bending to their wishes and every whim. 
There was no reason at this point to'believe the "optimism" projected 
by the moderates in Japanese circles. 
Sides were pretty well chosen in the winter months of late 1940 
-. 
and early 1941. It was quite evident to those taking an interest in 
Japanese affairs that both militarily and diplomatically Japan was 
preparing for an expansion of their influence over Southeast Asia. This 
"provoked" a "counteraction" which created a finning of relations be-
tween "the United States, Britain and the Pacific Dominions, the 
Netherlands and China. • 
•• "2 
The Japanese must have been aware of 
the course the relations of these countries were taking in response to 
the Pact. 
One attempt to improve relations with the United States by Japan 
was their selection of a new Ambassador. The Japanese government, it 
appears, chose to be represented by a retired admiral rather than one 
of their own professional diplomats. A point shown to be extremely 
important by Robert Butow.3 Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura had met the 
President of the United States when the President had been the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy. He had also been part of the Abe Cabinet in 
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1939-40 which had made efforts to improve the relations between the 
United States and Japan. As a retired Admiral he was also conscious of 
the naval attitude about the war and its fleet. It was believed in 
Japan that he would not do anything hasty that would endanger the navy, 
his country and the United States.4 Grew charged that the United 
States got a second-string diplomat, one that Matsuoka had been trying 
to obtain for some time. Matsuoka attempted and finally succeeded in 
convincing Normura of Japan's need of him. 
Matsuoka telephoned me that he had been successful with 
Admiral Nomura last night and that the Emperor had approved 
the appointment. • • • I cabled Washington that Nomura, as 
a man of high personal character who through long associa-
tion had my esteem and respect and as a former Foreign 
Minister was believed to be fundamentally friendly to the 
United States, should be personally acceptable to the 
American Government. Incidentally, Matsuoka has on more 
than one occasion said to me that of course he himself was 
the ideal man to go to Washington but that he couldn't be 
spared from Tokyo. So Nomura is clearly second-string!S 
The United States seems to have been pleased to have this man come, 
he was believed to be honest and sincere in his relations with the 
United States and it was known that he had opposed the Pact.6 Yet Nomura 
would prove to be less than expected because of his inexperience as a 
diplomat. 
In an American-Japan Society luncheon honoring the newly appointed 
Nomura, soon to leave for the states, Matsuoka spoke at length about 
Nomura's selection and United States-Japanese relations. 
The appointment of Admiral Nomura, I may say, is an elo-
quent indication of what my Government have in mind in 
regard to Japan's relations with the United States of Amer-
ica. I owe it to candor to admit that the relations 
between our two countries are severely strained at this 
moment. Now, the causes that have brought about the present 
unfortunate deterioration are, of course, many and manifold, 
but the fundamental cause, let me be fran~, is American 
misapprehension of Japan's aims and aspirations. I shall 
forego to explain at length our viewpoint, lest I should 
spoil your appetite. • • • Contrary to impressions current 
in America and elsewhere, Japan is not waging an imperialist 
war of greed and aggression in China. It is not a war of 
conquest or covetous ambitions. We are engaged in a moral 
crusade. • • • We are fighting not for destruction but for 
construction. We are endeavouring to initiate an era of 
enduring peace and unlimited prosperity based on justice 
equity and mutuality, in Greater East Asia where we firmly 
believe we have a great mission as the civilizing and 
stabilizing force. We stand for peace and order •••• 
Any nation that desires to take a hand in this great task 
is welcome. But mind you, there shall be, "no conquest, no 
oppression, no exploitation under the New Order which we 
conceive."7 
Matsuoka had told the audience that the United States had completely 
misunderstood the intentions of Japan coupled with Japan's intentions 
on what she was going to do for the world cultures. Yet in the same 
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speech a change of heart which strikes a discord with the first part of 
his speech on better relations between the two countries is clear: 
We only desire, on one hand, to be left alone, so that we 
may carry on our constructive work unhindered, and on the 
other hand, to see the trouble in China and the war in Europe 
brought speedily to an end, without adding more participants, 
particularly such a powerful one as America. Imagine just for 
a moment that America joined the European war or came to a 
clash with Japan in the Pacific. What then? If any bit of 
human feeling or an atom of instinct for self-preservation is 
left in you, ladies and gentlemen, wouldn't you shudder at the 
very thought? Would not a kind of ice-water shoot down your 
spine? 
There would loom up every chance of facing at last the 
Armageddon that would end in a total destruction of our cul-
ture and civilization. I do beseech my American friends to 
think twice, thrice, nay ten, hundred or thousand times before 
they take a leap that may prove fatal to all Humanity. In 
this connection, I wish to leave no doubt whatever in the mind 
of any American citizen of the fact that Japan is, and will 
remain, loyal to her Allies; that Japan's foreign policy will 
resolve in the future around the Three Power Pact as its pivot, 
as it did around the pivot of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 
the past when that Alliance was in force. This of course, 
implies no threat. It is a simple statement of truism, made 
in order to prevent possible misapprehension. For an illusion 
on an issue like this will buy no good to anyone. 
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Yet if one reads on into the conclusion of this lengthy speech, 
there is confusion over the "rosy-pictured aspirations" that are the 
objectives of what Nomura is to do for the relations between his country 
and the United States • 
• • • I pray most fervently, that he may successfully 
fulfill his mission which is to usher in a happier period 
of mutual trust and better understanding between our two 
great nations. • • • Let us keep our heads clear and cool. 
Let us go slow and make sure. • • • Is it too much for 
Japan to ask for so much of a minute, just half a century 
or even less, in which to prove herself to the world? Time 
is the great curer of human travail. Let us all have a bit 
of patience. This is my appeal.a 
The new Ambassador spoke that he and the Foreign Minister "• •• 
were agreed to one thing from the first: the necessity of improving 
drastically the relations between Japan and America which have deteri-
orated so much of late~"9 
In giving theUnited States, as Matsuoka put it, a "drastic 
improvement," Japan did not give up one portion, one little bit of its 
program nor did she retreat in any way from her membership in the Axis. 
At the same time this speech was made it was announced that General 
Hiroshi Oshima, "notorious advocate of military cooperation with 
Germany," would go back to Germany taking the place of the "professional 
diplomat," Saburo Kurusu.10 
The uncertainty of Nomura wanting to take the ambassadorship in 
America and his own attitudes toward the real chances for success in 
those negotiations, show that he mistrusted Matsuoka and his talk of 
the possibility of working out smooth relations between the two nations. 
Feis shows evidence of Nomura's feelings about Matsuoka when he records 
comments by Nomura to one of his fonner naval colleagues that definitely 
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show the mistrust to be true. Nomura speaking of Matsuoka, said, 
" 
• • 
• he only observes the external appearance of matters" and "while 
the Japanese Army continued to insist on military power, the relations 
between Japan and the United States will never be amicable."11 
Feis claims that Nomura arrived in Washington D.C. as an ambas-
sador without instructions. His only task, writes Feis, was to persuade 
the United States to accept and agree wholly to what Japan was doing.12 
Yet Shigemitsu gives an entirely different picture which he obtained 
from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives. Matsuoka had 
given Nomura a complete set of instructions. In these he told Nomura 
that "unless our policy is drastically changed, it would be a pure waste 
of time to seek an understanding with the U.S." over peace in the Pacific. 
Matsuoka wanted Nomura to operate all discussions with the United States' 
diplomats from the position that the Alliance was the center of all 
Japanese policy. An understanding with the United States was to be 
obtained that would prevent her "from making war on Japan or from taking 
part in the European War." If this could not be obtained and the United 
States were to become involved in a conflict with Germany, Japan would 
be loyal to Germany and "there must not be the slightest cause for doubt 
on this point." A new ideal was to be portrayed by Nomura. Japan's 
attacks on areas of the Far East were to be events of the past. The 
new motto and ideals were "no conquest, no oppression, no exploita-
tion •••• " A practical problem needed to be dealt with, when Nomura 
met with representatives from the United States, which pertained to 
"self supply" and "self sufficiency" for the nation of Japan in the 
region of "Greater Asiao" This question and rationale was to be ad-
dressed to the United States. 
Japan is in the grip of a need to work out means of self-
supply and self-sufficiency in Greater East Asia. Is it 
for the u.s;, which rules over the Western Hemisphere and 
is expanding over the Atlantic and the Pacific, to say that 
these ideals, these ambitions, of Japan are wrong? Cannot 
Japan be allowed even this? There is no idea of exclusion 
in our minds. Let the u.s. come to the Greater East Asia 
Co-prosperity Sphere and help us to develop it. Any mis-
giving that we might shut off the supply of rubber and tin 
that she requires is laughable.13 
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It seems that Feis was correct in his interpretation of the Ambassador's 
objective. In reality, the instructions were sparse in umeaty-sub-
stance" and of little negotiable value. 
During the months of April,. May, and June, 1941, there were 
numerous talks between the Ambassador from Japan and the Secretary of 
State of the United States. How did these talks between Hull and Nomura 
come about? Were they sponsored by Japan? By America? Were they 
accurately reported to each man's higher superior? 
In December, 1940 the Bishop James E. Walsh, Superior General of 
the Catholic Mission Society at Maryknoll, New York and the Father 
James M. Drought were in Tokyo investigating the state of their mis-
sions. During their inspections they came in contact with a member of 
the Co-operative Bank of Japan whose name was Paul Ikawa. 
In informal 
talks the Catholic priests impressed upon Mr. Ikawa how they felt about 
the relations of the two countries. He was so impressed with what the 
Catholic fathers had to say that he arranged a meeting with Foreign 
Minister Matsuoka. After a lengthy discussion with Matsuoka, the 
priests were asked to carry an unofficial communication to Washington. 
They were instructed that it could not go through normal channels for 
fear of Japanese extremists.14 
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The message they were to take to America, Matsuoka informed them, 
. 
was made up by leaders and important men other than himself. The 
message suggested that Japan would withdraw from the Tripartite Pact, 
and remove her troops from China, restoring China's political and ter-
ritorial integrity.1
5 
Another point mentioned for them to take with 
them was exploration of the chief economic problems between the United 
States and Japan.16 Bishop Walsh had met with Prince Konoye and the 
Prince had confirmed the allegation that this proposal originated with 
him.
1
7 
Whether Matsuoka was sold on the possibility of success for such 
an "unofficial-communique" it is difficult to determine. There is 
nothing that even suggests that Matsuoka considered Konoye's secret 
proposal "feasible or desirableo" Possibly Konoye used some pressure 
on Matsuoka to at least hear these men out. Grew in a telegram to 
Washington, dated December 24, 1940, pointed out that Konoye was never 
in favor of the Tripartite Pact or was he overly enthusiastic about 
what it was doing to the relations with America.18 
It seems that the Japanese Cabinet was somewhat supportive of 
establishing better relations with the United States.· The communique 
was not only Konoye's wish but Admiral Nomura's, Baron Hiranuma's, 
General Tojo's, the Navy Minister's, and General Muto's. The army 
through General Muto had conferred with Father Drought and had assured 
him that it would support the proposals.19 The Japanese Diet had 
influential politicians who were privately criticizing Matsuoka
1
s 
policy and what it was doing to American-Japanese relations.20 
102 
Grew described the reactions of a fonner foreign minister and 
premier to Matsuoka's policies and how dangerous these men though the 
Tripartite Pact was to Japan. 
Former Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita played a le~ding part 
in heckling his successor, while former Prime Minister Koki 
Hirota went so far as to charge that the policy of the Tri-
partite Pact was ill-considered and might prove fatal to 
Japan.21 
There was a great concern then by members of the Diet and Cabinet in 
Japan that much needed to be done about relations with America. There 
was a growing, festering, risk of war. Words were being exchanged in 
the early months of 1941 that were created a general attitude between 
Japan and the United States that said something like " ••• if that is 
how you feel about it, we have no other alternative but to prepare for 
a physical conflict with you." Secretary of State Hull accented this 
in his message of January 15, 1941, when he spoke to a conunittee in 
Congress in reply to Matsuoka's defiant messages given to the Diet. 
It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated 
from the start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing 
herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the 
Western Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their 
determination.to achieve and maintain that position by force 
of anns. • • • As a consequence, they would have arbitrary 
control of the sea and trade routes in that region. • • • It 
should be manifest to every person that such a program for 
the subjugation and ruthless exploitation by one country of 
nearly one half of the population of the world is amatter of 
inunense significance, im~ortance, and concern to every other 
nation wherever located. 2 
The response to Hull's speech of January 15, in Japan was a stonn 
of indignation especially on the part of Matsuoka. Grew believed that 
Matsuoka had been suppressed from giving his "true feelings" about the 
matter when on January 21 he addressed the Diet. He reviewed the facts 
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that Japan would adhere to the Tripartite Pact, that there would be no 
change in the status of Manchukuo and China, that Japan was detennined 
to realize her program in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere and 
that he regretted America's misinterpretation of Japan's intentions.23 
Matsuoka unleashed his suppressed fury on January 26 to the Budget 
Committee on his interpretation of the relations between America and 
Japan. He said that Hull had a "superficial point of view," that the 
point of arguing had passed. 
Since -the United States has no correct understanding of Japan's 
thoughts and actions we have no recourse but to proceed toward 
our goal. We cannot change our convictions to acconunodate the 
American viewpoint. There is nothing left but to face America, 
though we shall continue without disappointment or despair to 
try to correct the fundamental misconceptions held by that 
nation. • • • The United States seems to consider all of Asia 
and the South Seas as first line of defense. Japan's domination 
of the Western Pacific is absolutely necessary to accomplish her 
national ideals. My use of ~he word dominate may seem extreme 
and while we have no such designs, still in a sense we do wish 
to dominate and there is no need to hide the fact. Has America 
any right to object if Japan does dominate the Western Pacific? 
As Minister of Foreign Affairs, I hate to make such an asser-
tion but I wish to declare that if America does not understand 
Japan's rightful claims and actions, then there is not the 
slightest hope for improvement of Japanese-American relations. 
Japan will still not give up the small hope remaining that a 
change in American attitude can be brought about.24 
Matsuoka had stated that there was "small hope" in negotiating for 
a peace with the United States as he was sending Nomura off. Approxi-
mately at the same time he had been involved in the Walsh-Drought 
conversations. What belief, what amount of faith did he have in future 
relations with the United States, official or unofficial? Did he 
really believe that these talks would have any affect upon relations? 
Did he really believe that a man such as Nomura could change the atti-
tudes of the two countries toward each other? Or was he so conunitted 
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to the ''Matsuoka Plan" of September 4, 1940 which had as its objectives 
and alliance with Gennany and relations with the United States just 
short of war so that Japan could attain her goals of a Greater East 
Asia Co-prosperity sphere? Were there ever any possibilities for 
negotiations? 
The American attitude at this time about the Far East was not to 
appease the Japanese in any way, yet at the same time, not to provoke 
them. It was to hold up the status quo by rejecting Japanese claims to 
her leader·ship position in East Asia. The status quo was supported in 
the guise of aid to China, embarg~es on certain war resources.25 While 
the American government observed Japan taking over Indo-China, the 
attitudes concerning Japan worsened. 
Frank c. Walker, Postmaster General, early in 1941 had been 
contacted by Walsh a_nd Drought on their return to the United States 
about the "unofficial" communication. Walker established a meeting for 
these men with the President and Secretary of State.26 
On January 23, the group met and _Bishop Walsh handed a memorandum 
to President Roosevelt which stated that it could not be admitted 
officially American was having success in pressuring Japan with economic 
barriers and defense preparations. Unofficially, America was successful, 
and Japan was prepared to alter her position on China and the inter-
national scene to a more moderate stance. The memorandum reviewed the 
effect the "Extremists" had on Japan and how the conservative element 
of leaders, "Prince Konoye, Mr. Matsuoka, Count Arima, General Muto, 
etc. and the Emperor. " would rather "lose the war in China than 
lose the domestic war to their own Extremists." It was pointed out in 
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the memorandum that a loss of the China War with the very real possi-
bility of a conflict between the United States and Japan, the "radical 
nationalists, civil and military" would be put in complete control of 
Japan. If through diplomacy the economic and international position of 
Japan could be adjusted to please most Japanese," public opinion in 
Japan would restore the Conservatives to complete control." In order 
to bring about a reversal in the Japanese political structure, Japan 
needed the assistance of the United States. Cooperation between the two 
nations was a must. The Axis alliance was to be nullified and a new 
one, similar in structure, was to be created including the United States 
and Japan. This alliance would threaten Germany with Japanese and 
United States involvement if Gennany extended her actions any further 
in the confines of the European war in action. The United States was 
to also help Japan settle the "China War" and remove China from the 
position of being a "military menace or a political menace" to Japan. 
A Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine was to be recognized by the United States 
making Japan the leader of the nations of this area. In turn, Japan 
would "grant a complete Open Door" to the United States. Representa-
tives were to be selected inunediately by the President to begin 
negotiation on this if the power of government in Japan was to be 
placed again in the hands of the moderates.27 
The discussion took two hours and then it was decided that Walsh 
and Drought should continue their informal contacts with the Japanese 
Embassy on a private basis and that these two men should "reduce to 
writing what the Japanese had in mind."28 The strictly confidential 
memo brought by these men did not appear promising to the President and 
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Hull.
29 
The priests were to work in the future through Walker and 
Hull. 
In sending the memorandum to Hull on January 26, the President 
attached this question, ''What do you think we should do? F .D.R. u30 
The State Department suggested to the President that the talks be post-
paned until the arrival of the new Ambassador Nomura. In a memo to the 
President dated February 5, 1941, Secretary Hull advised: 
I doubt the practicability of proceeding on any such line 
at this time. It seems to me that there is little or no 
likelihood that the Japanese Government and the Japanese 
people would in good faith accept any such arrangement--at 
this stage. It also seems to me that, if through the good 
of fices of this Government an arrangement were worked out 
which would extricate Japan from its present involvement in 
China, the likelihood would be that Japan would extend and 
accelerate her aggressions to the southward rather than that 
Japan would change her present course of aggression to one 
of peaceful procedures. At the same time, I feel that we 
should not discourage those Japanese who may be working to-
wards bringing about a change in the course which their 
country is following. Admiral Nomura, Japanese Ambassador-
designate to the United States, is expected here soon •••• 
We should not, I think, resort to other agents and channels 
before we have even talked with the Ambassador •••• 31 
Approximately two months after the original meeting with Drought 
and Walsh, Secretary Hull was given a "Draft Understanding" by way of 
Postmaster General Walker.
32 
Although the "fathers" were part of the 
group supposedly assigned to put "to writing," the basic author of the 
text was one Imperial Army Colonel Hideo Iwakuro.33 
Exactly why the Army chose to send a representative is explained 
by Robert Butow. It seems that Nomura believed the key issue between 
Japan and the United States was the China problem. On his journey to 
the American capital where he was to take his post, Nomura toured the 
continent in the Far East, visiting with numerous military personnel of 
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high positions in Korea, Manchuria, and China. He discussed with the 
staffs his new position and attempted to get a feeling or "understand-
ing" of the continental army's position concerning the formulation of 
foreign policy with the United States. Butow continues, this is "a 
revealing indication of the role of field commanders in the formulation 
of Japan's foreign policy in the period in ques~ion." With the under-
standing in mind that successful negotiations should be attempted with 
army support, Nomura returned to Tokyo and spoke with the Army Chief of 
Staff and the Vice-Minister of War asking them for the army's top 
leadership or the "center's" cooperation. In addition, Nomura asked 
for an officer with "a thorough knowledge of the China Incident, and 
of problems pertaining thereto, be sent to Washington to assist him." 
At this point in history, writes Butow, the Army had no reason not to 
want successful negotiations to go on with the United States. The 
Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau recommended to Tojo, the War 
Minister, that he order Colonel Iwakuro "to proceed to the American 
capital to help the ambassador in his difficult mission." So, at 
Nomura's request the colonel was sent along.34 
The question can naturally follow, why this man? While Bishop 
Walsh was in Japan, he had been sought out by a Tadao Ikawa, who was 
known to him as "friend and unofficial representative" of Prince Konoye. 
Ikawa, the director of the Central Agricultural and Forestry Bank, had 
revealed to Drought and Walsh peace proposals between their countries 
had come upon certain difficulties, but there was still some hope. He 
wanted these two to lend assistance "particularly in the matter of 
helping to get messages to and from the State Department in Washington 
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and to and from the American Embassy in Tokyo."35 Ambassador Grew had 
been consulted and the message given to Bishop Walsh was that his help 
"might prove useful." He got the distinct impression that he was "more 
or less encouraged to perform this little function of helping to trans-
mit information when need arose.
11
36 Prior to this Walsh and Drought 
persuaded Ikawa, 
that men of good will in both Japan and America could help 
bring about a peaceful settlement and showed Ikawa a memo-
randum calling for a Japanese "Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine" 
and a stand against Communism "which is not a political 
fonn of governmenti but a corroding social disease that 
becomes epidemic_.".j7 . 
It appears that Ikawa believed what these men told him for he was fired 
up with enough enthusiasm about the idea of negotiations that he made 
arrangements for them to see Konoye and Matsuoka. It is quite apparent 
that Ikawa believed these men to be "official-unofficial" diplomats to 
Japan. 
The talk of Drought and Walsh with other "amateurs in diplomatic 
affairs'' contained a looseness on both sides because of an interest to 
create "an atmosphere favorable to negotiations."
38 
It seems that 
Ikawa assumed that the proposal had the backing of President Roosevelt. 
This assumption was probably because of Father Drought mentioning that 
he was acting with the approval of "top personnel" from the American 
government.39 The concessions made by these "amateurs" probably were 
"too extreme." 
There is no doubt that Walsh and Drought had come away 
with a rather misleading view of the extent to which the 
Japanese government was prepared to compromise. They 
steadfastly remained hopeful despite the skepticism later 
expressed in Washington. At times their enthusiasm be-
trayed them into reporting, at third hand, trivial items 
which would have been of no significance even if they 
could have been verified.40 
On one such occasion, the Secretary of State records in his Memoirs, 
some trivia told in seriousness that "Prince Konoye has hung on the 
wall of his private bedroom a photograph of President Roosevelt."41 
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The question asked about the Colonel can now be answered. Where 
does he fit into the puzzle? Colonel Iwakuro had been kept informed by 
Ikawa on all of the transactions he had with Walsh and Drought. He 
had been aware of what was happening ever since the first meetings. 
Colonel Iwakuro, it was believed, was very influential in the war 
ministry. He had a background of intrigue and idealism, a necessary 
ingredient to solidify these discussions and p~t them into action. He 
believed that peace with America was Japan's salvation. Prince Konoye 
had recommended to Ikawa that he be in contact with "one of the most 
agile brains in the Army," Colonel Iwakuro.42 
The importance that needs to be stressed about Iwakuro and Ikawa 
was that they both believed the words of Walker, Walsh, and Drought to 
be "presidential-opinion." Everything that transpired in the discussions 
was accepted by the Japanese as being Roosevelt's ideas and if not his 
ideas at least he was aware of what was being said. In this atmosphere 
of "unrealism," Colonel Iwakuro took charge of writing the "Draft 
Understanding" which was presented to Hull on April 9. 
Basically the document stated that Japan would pledge to use only 
peaceful measures in the southwest Pacific and that she would only go 
to the aid of Germany if that country were aggressively attacked. In 
exchange for this pledge America was to restore normal trade with Japan, 
help Japan obtain her needed raw materials from the southwest region of 
Aisa, influence Chiang to make peace with Japan on, naturally, Japanese 
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tenns, and to give friendly diplomatic assistance to the removal of the 
"British-influence" in the Far East.43 
Hull and the State Department advisors were disappointed for the 
document did not present what they had been led to believe it would. 
''Most of its provisions were all that the ardent Japanese imperialists 
could want."44 
Herbert Feis makes the point that the State Department 
was extremely skeptical for they found the text to be "poor." 
It was 
not rich enough to even use as a bribe for protection against a Japanese 
move to the south. 
The "experts" from the State Department saw that it 
forced the United States to give up American aid to China and at the 
same time forced the United States to accept the Japanese tenns. The 
United States would have to reverse her "embargo" tactics and see to it 
that Japan's growing military was supplied with needed materials. The 
main concern of the State Department was the Tripartite obligation Japan 
had and this was not even mentioned.45 
Why, if they were so disappointed, did they pursue the talks? 
In the first place, Hull saw no purpose in rejecting the text without 
at least talking about it • 
• • • However objectionable some of the points might be, 
there were others that could be accepted as they stood and 
still others that could be agreed to if modified. The state 
of our relationship with Japan was such, and the requirements 
of our policy of extensive aid to Britain were such that I 
felt no opportunity should be overlooked that might lead to 
broad-scale conversations with Japan.46 
Hull obviously believed that there were more ways to deal with differ-
ences than war. Talk always had the possibility of settling differences. 
Because of this attitude of "talk could make the difference, if we but 
try," the Secretary of State asked Nomura to come to his apartment on 
April 14. 
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It is necessary to take an in depth look at these infonnal meetings 
of April 14 and April 16. .One can find much that explains the failure 
and misunderstandings that appeared later from these first two encounters. 
One of the first items on Hull's agenda was to emphasize the fact that 
the "Iwakuro-Draft Understanding" was an "unofficial" proposal for a 
settlement between Japan and the United States. 
I had been told that the Ambassador himself had participated 
in and associated himself with these plans. I repeated ••• 
that we could deal only with the Ambassador in considering the 
problems outstanding between our Governments, and I wanted to 
clear up the question of the extent of his knowledge of the 
document containing the proposals and whether it was his de-
sire to present it officially as a first step in negotiations. 
Nomura promptly replied he knew all about the document, he 
had collaborated to some degree with the various Japanese and 
American individuals who drew it up, and he would be disposed 
to present it as a basis for negotiations. He had not yet 
forwarded it to his Goverrunent, however, but he thought his 
Goverrunent would be favorably disposed toward it. 
I said there were certain points my Government would desire 
to· raise prior to negotiations, such as the integrity and 
sovereignty of China and the principle of equality of oppor-
tunity in China, and he could then communicate these to his 
Goverrunent and ascertain whether it agreed that there was a 
basis for negotiations.47 
On April 16, Hull asserts that he handed Nomura a "statement of four 
basic principles" which would have to be the foundation work that would 
have to be completed and accepted prior to any agreements made between 
the two countries. Hull added: 
The one paramount preliminary question about which my Gov-
ernment is concerned is a definite assurance in advance that 
your Goverrunent has the willingness and ability to go forward 
with a plan for settlement. Is it willing to abandon its 
present doctrine of military conquest by force and of taking 
title to all propoerty and territories seized? Is it ready to 
give up the use of force as an instrument of policy and adopt 
the principles that my Government has been proclaiming as the 
foundation on which all relations between nations rest?48 
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The "four basic principles" were seen by Hull and members of the 
American government to be the foundation that all of the nations of the 
world were to establish their relations on. 'Ihey were 1) respect for 
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; 
2) support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs 
of other countries; 3) support of the principle of equality, including 
equality of commercial opportunity; and 4) non-disturbance of the status 
quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful 
means.49 
Hull had said to Nomura in this ·second meeting, "You understand 
that we both agree that we have in no sense reached the stage of nego-
tiations; that we are only exploring in a purely preliminary and unof-
ficial way what action might pave the way for negotiations later.
11
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Not until Japan had adopted these four principles would the United States 
even consider thinking about the "Draft Understanding." Then if the 
Ambassador to Japan submitted the "Draft Understanding," the "infonnal 
docmnent" prepared by individuals outside of the State Department, and 
" ••• his Government approved it and instructed him to propose it to us, 
it would afford a basis for starting conversations." From that point 
then the United States "• •• would thereupon offer counter proposals 
and independent proposals," discussing them with Nomura, "along with the 
Japanese proposals, and talk them out to a conclusion one way or the 
other in the friendly spirit that unquestionably should and would 
characterize the conversations."51 
Nomura did not respond with an "I understand what you want me to 
do with the four principles." Instead he responded on several of the 
points of the "Draft Understanding." 
Despite Hull's pointed talk of the four principles, he was not 
certain Nomura had understood him. 
I was not sure whether the Ambassador fully understood each 
statement I made in regard to the four points laid before 
him, and I sought to illustrate by saying to him that the 
principles underlying a good portion of the proposals in his 
doctrine were similar to the principles contained in the four 
points I had handed to him. • • • I added that, if his Gov-
ernment should make up its mind to abandon its present poli-
cies of force and invasion, et cetera, and to adopt a peaceful 
course with worthwhile international relationships, it could 
find no objection to these four points reasonably applied ••• 
he could judge the United States attitude toward a Far Eastern 
settlement in the light of these practices and principles.52 
Nomura wanted Hull "to indicate" whether he would to a "fairly-
113 
full extent" approve the proposals contained in the "Draft-Understanding." 
I again replied that there would be ready approval of 
several of them while others would have to be modified or 
eliminated and this Government would offer some independent 
proposals, but that if his Government is in real earnest 
about changing its course, I could see no good reason why 
ways could not be found to reach a fairly mutually satis-
factory settlement of all of the essential questions and 
problems presented.53 
Nomura could hardly handle the English language and Secretary Hull, 
"frequently doubted whether he understood the points" he was attempting 
to make. "I took care to speak slowly and often to repeat and reempha-
size some of my sentences.
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The end of the conversation of April 16, left Secretary Hull some-
what frustrated with Nomura's ability to hear and comprehend. 
The Ambassador seemed not to understand why I could not now 
agree to some of these proposals in his document. I sought 
repeatedly to make clear to him, in the first place, that we 
have not reached the stage of negotiations, he himself agreeing 
that he thus far has no authority from his Goverrunent to nego-
tiate; and in the second place, that if I should thus out of 
turn agree to a number of important proposals in the document 
and these proposals should be sent to Japan and the military or 
extremist groups should ignore them, I and my Goverrunent would 
be very much embarrassed. The Ambassador finally said he 
fully understood the situation and made clear, I thought, 
that he would proceed in his own way to consult his Govern-
ment regarding the four points in the form of a question 
which I laid before him inferentially with respect to the 
approval by the Government of his document, by which is 
meant the document prepared by the group of Americans and 
Japanese here with the admitted knowledge and more or less 
cooperation of the Ambassador himself. 
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Hull assumed after the meetings of April 14 and 16 that Nomura had 
sent the "Draft Understanding" along with Hull's "four basic principles" 
and comments to Tokyo. The next step was to await the Japanese reply.
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What Nomura did with the information Hull gave him in these dis-
cussions is a mystery. "Not one matter of substance," writes Butow, 
"out of all that he had said, with care and purpose, was transmitted 
to the Japanese Governrnent."57 Nomura simply took the proposal and sent 
it to the Japanese Foreign Ministry with a reques·t: for instructions and 
favorable responses. In a very lengthy and rather ambiguous sentence, 
Nomura explained that "behind-the-scenes maneuvers" concerning the 
"Draft Understanding's" parents and upbringing had been going on for 
some time; that the "approval" of the American government had been 
"sounded out"; that after his own "private participation" with Hull, 
he was able to see that the Secretary of State had "on the whole, no 
objections" to the draft; and that as a result of Hull directing 
negotiations, the proposal had been "agreed upon.
11
58 What a misinter-
pretation! 
The reader is reminded that Hull's intent was to have the Japanese 
deal with the four principles, then, if these could be accepted, the 
Draft-Understanding should be presented to the Japanese Government to 
see if they would want to present the proposal to the United States as 
a basis for starting conversations. Hull made it clear, at least in 
his writings, the reason he could not agree to points in the proposal 
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of April 9 was because if he did and the "military or extremists" should 
ignore them, "I and my Goverrunent would be very much embarrassed.
11
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'Ihe way Nomura reported this was to imply that the Americans were 
eager to push ahead on the tenets of the proposal he was sending to 
Japan. "The Secretary had advised him, Nomura cabled, that the United 
States government would be placed in a difficult position if Tokyo 
should convey its disavowal after the conversations had been in progress 
in Washington." The implication made by Nomura that the "proposals" 
were an American product, that Hull had a hand in preparing them, and 
that the United States was taking the initiative to make the proposal 
was in the cable of April 17, 1941. From this cable came the assumption 
that the "Draft Understanding" was American made.60 
The total background of the proposal's "behind-the-scene maneuvers" 
came as quite a surprise to the Foreign Ministry in Japan. Konoye had 
known through Ikawa what was transpiring in America, but Nomura had 
neglected to send word either to Matsuoka or to anyone in the Foreign 
Ministry.61 But the greatest error was made when the Ambassador failed 
to mention that the "foundation for future negotiations," was Hull's 
four points. The "proposal" would no doubt receive favor from Nomura's 
"associates" since the proposal was written mainly by Colonel Iwakuro. 
But the reception for Hull's four points would be something entirely 
different. The possibility of Konoye carrying the cabinet's and the 
army's acceptance of the proposal was still only a possibility. 
Matsuoka was about to arrive home from his "triumphal tour of Europe," 
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and would probably have a lot to talk about. There would, no doubt, 
be a real debate over the Hull-Nomura discussions upon Matsuoka's return.62 
So why should Nomura confuse the issue or create an even greater barrier 
to the negotiations by mentioning Hull's four points? 
Konoye was elated that Washington was reacting so favorably to 
"his and his colleagues' proposals." Later Matsuoka would call these 
men "Anglophiles." Needless to say at this point, Konoye and his col-
leagues were impressed with the progress and believed a small ray of 
hope was still glimmering for an agreement with the United States that 
would insure peace for the two nations·~ 63 
In the 19th Liaison Conference of April 18, 1941, it was decided 
after Konoye presented a synopsis of Nomura's cable that before any 
decisions were made about the "American proposal," they should wire the 
Foreign Minister and urge him to return immediately_ and wait to hear 
what he would have to say. 
It is not known to what extent Foreign Minister Matsuoka has 
been informed of this matter. • • • We should study it further 
until the Foreign Minister returns, and then decide what posi-
tion to take. It was agreed, therefore, to wire the Foreign 
Minister, urging him to return as soon as possible.64 
It had been the intent of Konoye to send immediate instructions to 
Nomura, but Vice Foreign Minister Ohashi insisted until Matsuoka returned 
they must wait and get his agreement. 
The Foreign Minister was informed of the conversations over the 
phone by Konoye and was thoroughly elated. Kase, who had been present 
when the phone call was received, reported: 
On April 21, Matsuoka arrived at Dairen where he intended to 
stay for one or two days. As he was resting at the residence 
of the president of the South Manchurian Railway the telephone 
rang. Konoye was at the other end, asking for him. An important 
proposal from Washington had been received a few days 
previously, and the cabinet was anxiously awaiting the 
return of the foreign minister. Would he fly home immed-
iately? As he put down the receiver Matsuoka was beaming. 
The conversation with Steinhardt had borne fruit! After 
his return to Tokyo Matsuoka elatedly told me he would 
soon fly to the United States to complete his peace 
program.65 
The Foreign Minister arrived home on April 22. He discovered 
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that the "proposals" were not due to his efforts but rather to informal 
talks. 
To his amazement he discovered, on reaching Tokyo, that 
the American proposal mentioned by Konoye had originated in 
a series of 'informal' conversations between two American 
Catholic priests and an ex-official of the Japanese Treasury 
Department whose integrity was rather dubious. The fact that 
such conversations had been inaugurated without the knowledge 
of the foreign minister added to the mystery. Matsuoka be-
came skeptical and requested time for mature consideration.66 
Upon his return he attended a Liaison Conference where generally 
speaking, the cabinet showed him signs that they were willing to. nego-
tiate on the basis of the document, especially the army because it was 
anxious to end the war in China.67 
The summary report of the 20th Liaison Conference shows that 
Matsuoka was lengthy on his reporting of his trip, but was somewhat 
succinct in his discussion of the "Adjustment of Diplomatic Relations 
with the United States." The proposal sent by Nomura was not what 
Matsuoka had in mind when he had "beamed" with happiness. He needed 
time to think, he told the other members of the Liaison Conference. 
• • • the proposal differed considerably from what he had 
in mind, and that he would like to think about it at his 
leisure after he had taken care of some business matters 
during the next few days. • • • The Foreign Minister left 
the Conference early to go home, saying that he was tired 
because he hadn't had much sleep since the day before 
yesterday.68 
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Matsuoka requested two weeks to think over the "Draft Under-
standing" before sending further instructions to Nomura.69 The fact 
that he needed this extra time, which was from "two weeks to two 
months," to decide what position to take toward the United States upset 
the majority of the participants in the Conference. The majority felt 
that it would be a mistake to take too long in determining policy toward 
either the United States or Germany. Inspite of Matsuoka's opinion 
that time was needed before a decision could be made, "the majority felt 
that negotiations should be resmned as soon as possible since it was 
necessary to work on American psychology."70 
In the next few days repeated efforts by army and navy ministers, 
as well as by others, were made to attempt to change Matsuoka's delay-
tactics. At this point there was even the suggestion of dismissal of 
the foreign minister, but he maintained his position and "evidently had 
sufficient support to defy the wishes of his colleagues.
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In the Liaison Meeting of May 3, the Cabinet was upset that no 
information or instructions had been sent to Nomura since his message 
of April 17. Most of the leaders felt it absolutely necessary to send 
an immediate reply to Nomura. Matsuoka was not in the mood to cooperate. 
Instead he pressed for action that would attempt to gain a neutrality 
pact with the United States. The summary notes of this Liaison Con-
ference showed that most members were in disagreement to such an idea. 
"Almost all the members expressed their disagreement," yet Matsuoka 
pressed on and would not give in. ''All we will do is suggest the idea. 
If the United States goes along with us, that's fine; if not, that's 
all r.ight, too. If she agrees with us, we are that much ahead." The 
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minutes of the Conference reveal that, "The majority clearly opposed 
the pact, and there was silence for a while." Prime Minister Konoye 
broke the silence with this question to Matsuoka. "Since everyone is 
opposed to a neutrality pact, how about withdrawing your proposal?" 
Matsuoka replied: "Let me thirik about it. One thing we might do would 
be to treat it lightly, by proposing it to them as if Nomura had just 
happened to think of it. Anyway let me think about it." The entire 
matter of the pact_, it seems, was left up to him. 
Apparently Matsuoka took it upon himself without approval, for he 
instructed Nomura to present the idea of a neturality pact and submit 
to Secretary Hull a "tentative reply" which in so many words, said that 
the Axis leaders were confident of victory and that if America played a 
part in the war it wou.ld bring about the fall of ·civilization. Japan 
would be on the side of the Axis and in no way would she injure her 
partner of the Tripartite Pact.72 
It is obvious to the student of this era of diplomatic history 
that Matsuoka was causing the great ship Japan to steer a German-bound 
course. Langer and Gleason claim that Matsuoka "far from pressing on 
with the original proposals from Washington, was doing his utmost to 
confuse the issue and sabotage the projected negotiations.
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Kase 
disagrees with Konoye's interpretation that the Foreign Minister's 
actions were a piece of willful sabotage.74 In a telegram to Germany, 
the Gennan Ambassador to Japan tells of a conversation with Matsuoka 
in which the latter explained the opposition with which he was coming 
into contacto He believed that he could steer the cabinet in such a 
way as to destroy any chances of understanding between Japan and the 
United States.75 
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Regardless of Matsuoka's destructive tendencies and his pro-
German steerings, it cannot be forgotten or emphasized enough that 
Admiral Nomura did such a faulty job of reporting what had taken place 
in his meetings with Hull in mid-April that there was very little 
opportunity for success in the.Hull-Nomura conversations. As Butow 
asserts: 
• • • from the very beginning of the Hull-Nomura conver-
sations, the opportunity for peace inherent therein was 
impaired by a fundamental misconception on the part of 
Japan's leaders. The generally poor conununication existing 
among them by virtue of the indirection and vagueness tra-
ditional in Japanese thought and speech was now rivaled by 
an equally serious problem of conununication between Japan 
and the United States. The officials in the American capital 
never realized the nature of the Japanese error, nor, for 
that matter, did the leaders in Tokyo. The army conference 
in question produced a decision in favor of going ahead on 
the basis of the "American plan." The Navy was consulted and 
found to be in general agreement. Konoye, who believed im-
plicitly that he was dealing with an American proposal, was 
also of the same view. Following his return from Europe, 
Matsuoka proved to be a major stumbling block and, conse-
quently, a continuing source of difficulty for his colleagues. 
In view of what is now known about Iwakuro's role in formu-
lating that proposal, the Foreign Minister's assessment of the 
''Draft Understanding" as representing 30 per cent good will 
and 70 per cent evil intent provides perhaps the ultimate 
irony. In the end, Matsuoka's objectives were overcome •••• 76 
On May 7, Hull was "tested" on a non-aggression pact by Nomura and 
the Secretary inunediately "brushed it aside" as an "entirely different 
matter." The Government was not considering anything except ''broad 
principles~u77 A Matsuoka-authored "oral statement" was to have been 
given to Hull but Nomura found it to be so inflammatory that he chose 
only to read portions of it to Hull. Some of the "oral statement" was 
to inform Hull that the G·erman and Italian leaders considered the war 
as good as won, that American intervention would only prolong the war 
and cause misery and hmnan suffering. The President of the United 
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States held the key to whether this would occur and that Japan would 
not do anything to jeopardize the Tripartite Pact.78 Nomura chose only 
to read parts of it to Hull and told Hull that many.things in the text 
11
were wrong," but offered to give it to Hull who declined to accept it.79 
Matsuoka's return to Japan could not be said to have brightened 
the situation between the United States and Japan but rather as it has 
been feared in Washington, he "cast a long shadow over the future."80 
Bowing and bending to pressure from the Germans, Matsuoka stalled off 
any instructions concerning the "Draft Understanding" until May 12 so 
that the Axis powers would have time to respond to the American-Japanese 
negotiations~
8
1 At this time, Japan finally submitted her "answer" to 
the "American proposal" of April 17. 
What Japan was proposing to the United States was that America 
should take "no aggressive measures as to assist any one nation.against 
another;" that the United _States join with Japan in a "joint over lord-
ship" of the Pacific area with Japan in control of nine-tenths of the 
population and wealth;82 and that the United States was to cut off aid 
to Chiang Kai-shek if he refused to negotiate with Japan. The wording 
was changed from Iwakuro's draft of mid-April, to eliminate Japan's 
pledge to refrain from force in the Southwest Pacific.83 
Hull maintained that very little was offered in this document 
that was acceptable to "basic principles," yet to give an absolute "no" 
to Japan would be throwing away one of the few opportunities the United 
States would have to talk over differences. America decided to move on 
with the talks and attempt to arrive at a consensus that both countries 
could agree on. 
Very few rays of hope shone from this document. What 
Japan was proposing was mostly to her own advantage ••• 
it offered little basis for an agreement, unless we were 
willing to sacrifice some of our most basic principles, 
which we were not. 
The basic question was, "should we talk about it even though we 
cannot buy the goods?" 
To have rejected it outright would have meant throwing away 
the only real chance we had had in many months to enter with 
Japan into a fundamental discussion of all the questions out-
standing between us. 
The President and I figured that if there were the slightest 
possibility of. inducing Japan to withdraw from the Axis alli-
ance, we should pursue it, for this would be a sharp blow to 
Hitler and a fillip to the Allies. Even a gradual withdrawal 
of Japan would have its worth. 
Consequently we decided to forward on the basis of the 
Japanese proposals and seek to argue Japan here, eliminating 
there, and inserting elsewhere, until we reach an accord we 
both could sign with mutual good will.84 
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Between May 12 a~d July 23 there were some ·twenty-five to thirty 
talks in Washington alone trying to reach "an accord" until Hull sus-
pended the talks after the Japanese attack on South Indo-China.85 
The Japanese "proposal" of May 12, was argued back and forth 
during the next ten weeks. The discussions and arguments always were 
in Hull's apartment at night where Hull was able to utilize his 
speciality. His speciality, or "cup of tea," was prolonged endurance 
to listening for the meaning or intent of diplomatic language and hidden 
meanings. Hull's speacial ability was a prerequisite to "understanding 
the Japanese intent." "No leaf turned over outside the room, no look 
traveled within the room o·f which he was not aware. n86 Actually Nomura 
need never have appeared in Hull's apartment. Hull always knew the 
full-scale word-for-word texts the Japanese Foreign Ministry was sending 
Nomura. The British and American governments through "Magic" were 
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intercepting and decoding all Japanese cables sent to the mainland of 
America. Yet, "never by a single phrase or hint during the many hours 
of talk, did Hull give any token of knowing more than he was supposed 
to know.rr87 
During these sessions with Nomura there was hope from the 
Department of State that possibly these talks could open the door to 
peace between the United States and Japan. Every,effort was made by 
Hull to see if Japan's course might be changed. Offers.were given to 
the Japanese that contained "nothing extra or guaranteed; only a chance 
to live at peace, and by hard and patient work earn the means of living 
on their crowded islands~
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The State Department was asking Japan in 
these "infonnal talks" to make these three decisions: 
The first point was that Japan should stop all acts of force in 
the Southwest Pacific. The second was Japan should concede the fact 
that the aid the United States was giving Great Britain was an act of 
self-defense. A result of this concession on the part of Japan would 
be that in the event of war between Gennany and the United States, she 
should not join forces with Germany against the United States. The third 
point was that Japan should begin scheduled troop withdrawals from 
China~89 
On the second and third points there was little success. For 
example, on May 20, with a meeting of not only Nomura but also Colonel 
Iwakuro and Ikawa, Hull observed there were two points concerning the 
proposal and what it had to say about China. One was in regard to the 
joint defense against communism and the other was in regard to the 
stationing of Japanese troops in certain parts of Chinese territory. It 
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was necessary said Hull, to deal with these issues since, "he would have 
to tell Chiang the basis on which Japan would propose to negotiate." 
Colonel Iwakuro was surprised that this was even brought up "as it was 
his conception that the central objective of the proposal which we were 
discussing was the peace of the Pacific between Japan and the United 
States and that the settlement of the China affair was incidental and 
concerned China and Japan.
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Hull assessed the value of Iwakuro's 
views. 
From time to time Nomura varied in his opinions on evacu-
ation of Japanese troops from China; but Iwakuro never changed 
his view that the stationing of Japanese troops in northern 
China was an absolute condition of any settlement with China. 
And it was likely that Iwakuro's views on this point would 
prevail since he was the representative of the Japanese Anny, 
which was detennined to remain in China.91 
The second point. the United States would have liked the Japanese 
to accept was almost single-handedly destroyed by Matsuoka's attitude 
toward the United States. This attitude was conveyed in press state-
ments, talks with Ambassador Grew, and his influence upon the Cabinet 
in Tokyo. 
It was believed by the President and Hull that Japan would side 
with Germany in the event of a conflict between Gennany and the United 
States if the Foreign Minister had his way about it. Yet, there was 
still a chance that Matsuoka might fall from his position. Father 
Drought had reported that Ma,tsuoka might be overthrown. Ikawa had 
gotten this information from Konoye and passed it on to Father Drought.
92 
There was a group of "moderates" that gave Grew some hope. Grew 
had telegraphed the State Department on May 13, that the majority of 
the members of the cabinet were against having a war with the United 
125 
States and that they were trying to find an interpretation within the 
Tripartite Pact that would free them, without losing face or honor from 
having to assist Germany in the case of a conflict.93 
There was never a better chance for solving the American-Japanese 
issue than during mid-May through July since opposition to Matsuoka was 
very evident on a widespread and influential basis.94 But even with 
all of this hope of "a change of staff and heart," the talks were of 
very little value,. except that possibly they bought time for both 
countries. Matsuoka stood his ground and literally refused to allow 
the talks any chance of success. 
The position that "the Americans were changing their attitude 
about negotiations" was becoming evident to the Tokyo decision-makers. 
The only problem was that Tokyo was using as her "yardstick" the "Draft 
Understanding" prepared in Washington by Colonel Iwakuro of the Japanese 
Army and not the State Department. Tokyo had presumed America's atti-
tude in April more favorable than it actually had been. When Hull 
issued the Draft plan of June 21, this was the first proposal on which 
the United States was willing to base its position on negotiations with 
Japan. Japan, it seemed, became more inflexible as she felt the 
American position was also. Those in Japan who had never really trusted 
the United States and these "talks" found it very easy to create bar-
riers of interference in negotiations by pointing out the change in 
attitude between the "first" proposal of mid-April, which Nomura had so 
incorrectly presented, and the "second" proposal of June 21. 
One should remember before "casting the first stone" at Nomura for 
his inaccurate reporting, that he never really wanted the post, nor did 
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he feel adequately prepared to play the part of ambassador. The fact 
is very obvious, Matsuoka chose to send a man who had only limited 
experience in foreign affairs, one who for one reason or another did 
not hear and respond to what Secretary of State ·Hull was saying in the 
meetings of mid-April and later. Matsuoka definitely chose a man who 
was not a professional diplomat; instead of sending the best, he sent 
the "second-string." 
Yet one must take a hard look at the influence of Matsuoka and the 
reasons behind his attitudes toward the "conversations." Even though 
there was little hope for success, why was he so negative toward the 
discussions? Why did he on May 14 try to infuriate Ambassador Grew 
with his statements that America was taking war actions against Germany? 
The ·role Yosuke ~tsuoka took throughout these conversations was 
that of the "devil's-advocate." Matsuoka was showing men that he would 
do pretty much what he pleased. This attitude and deed were the 
reasons for his downfall. 
Matsuoka in the Liaison Conference of May 15, conveyed the pressure 
that Germany was placing upon Japan to remain removed from any agreement 
with the United States. Ribbentrop cabled Matsuoka to let him know how 
worried and upset Germany was over these discussions. 
We think Japan is well aware that the American proposal is 
going to hinder her efforts to build the Greater East Asia 
Co-prosperity Sphere. With this proposal, the United States 
will obtain security in the Pacific, mitigate the antiwar 
sentiment among her people, and be able to turn in any dir-
ection she chooses. If the United States enters the war, so 
will Japan. Therefore, the United States wants to manipulate 
the situation so as to prevent war between the United States 
and Japan, so that she can play an active part in the Atlantic 
theater. The United States is also expected to aggravate the 
situation and provoke Germany to take reprisals against her--
thus shifting the responsibility for initiating war onto the 
Axis countries--and then enter the war herself. Accordingly, 
Germany hopes that Japan will make it clear that she is 
prepared to consider the.American proposal only if the 
United States agrees to ~efrain from these activities. 
We ask that Japan inform both Germany and Italy before 
sending a final answer to the United States, since this 
proposal greatly affects the Tripartite Pact.95 
Matsuoka, it appears, took on a hostile attitude, one in great 
sympathy with Germany towards the United States. He reported to the 
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Conference of May 15, that he had attempted to convey his views to Hull 
through Nomura. Nomura had on receiving the document wired back and 
told Matsuoka that to give Hull this type of material "would make the 
negotiations very difficult and obstruct our reaching an understanding.
11
96 
Nomura refused to give the document to Hull. Matsuoka wanted this mes-
sage presented but realized that Nomura would not obey. He chose to 
make sure the message was given and spoke to Grew. He told Grew in 
terms "bellicose both ;i.n tone and substance" thathe was afraid the 
United States might convoy ships to Britain; that "the manly, decent, 
and resonable thing for the United States to do would be to declare war 
openly on Germany since our attitude toward Germany is provocative" in 
the face of our supplying war materials to Great Britain; and that Hitler 
had been as patient about this as possible and had not called America to 
war: 
The Minister thereupon makes perfectly clear his interpretation 
of the Tripartite Pact to the effect that if the United States 
should convoy its ships to England and if Germany should sink 
such ships, and if war with Germany should result, he, Mr. 
Matsuoka, would regard the United States as an aggressor in the 
sense of Article 3 of the pact, and it is his belief that war 
would thereupon ensue between Japan and the United States.97 
Matsuoka had estimated the success of the Hull-Nomura conversations 
ending in an agreement to be only three out of ten.98 
128 
In a meeting between Hull and Nomura on May 28, Hull told Nomura 
of a major problem confronting the success of the "talks," namely this 
was Matsuoka's public declarations of Japanese support of Germany if 
America entered the war. 
Mr. Matsuoka since his return from Europe, according to 
reports widely published in the press, has been making dec-
larations on every occasion in regard to Japan's obligations 
under the Tripartite Alliance in the matter of supporting 
Germany in the event of American entry into the war. He said 
that, if we went into an agreement with Japan, critics would 
assert, unless the Japanese Government could clarify its 
attitude toward its obligations under the Tripartite Alliance 
in the event that the United States should be drawn into the 
European war through action in the line of self-defense, that 
there was no assurance as to Japan's position. • • • The 
Ambassador replied that he had known for many years, that 
Matsuoka was given to talking a great deal for domestic con-
sumption in Japan, but that the Ambassador was convinced that 
Matsuoka desired only friendly relations with the United 
States.99 
In the New York Journal American, Matsuoka was quoted as saying in 
response to an American correspondent's question, 
Japan's attitude and policy regarding the obligations of 
the Tripartite Pact are, as I have repeatedly affirmed, 
crystal clear, and there is no question that we will faith-
fully observe them. 
Japan will also pursue the course and in East Asia which 
she has been following unwaveringly in the past, namely, 
establishment of a new order throughout the region of Greater 
East Asia. 
Nothing will alter or influence ·that course or policy.100 
The members of the Japanese "proposal" team would swear that Tokyo's 
readiness to yield on any point was given, yet at another place in the 
world, newspapers would be recording words that were quite to the 
contrary. Konoye records in his Memoirs, translated by Langer and Gleason, 
that Matsuoka refused to retreat, even as much as an inch, in discussions 
concerning negotiations with the Americans.101 
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In a telegram to Berlin dated June 21, the German Ambassador to 
Japan, ott tells Ribbentrop of his discussion with Matsuoka. Matsuoka 
had informed Ott that regardless of the discussions with America, Japan 
was moving into Indo-Chinao He had been informed by Nomura that Hull 
wanted to attach a speech, in which the Secretary of State had attacked 
Germany's practices, as a part of "their proposal." Matsuoka declared 
to Ott that this "Draft" was "a nonsensical proposal" which only proved 
that the United States wanted the negotiations to fail--laying the blame 
on Japan. He had also told Ott that he would handle the proposal busi-
ness in such a way that the blame for the failure of the discussions 
would fall completely on the United States.102 
The sulkiness and uncooperativeness toward the American-Japanese 
negotiations by Matsuo~a was noticed. Matsuoka on May 8, had told the 
Emperor that he would resign his position if Japan's handling of the 
American situation would result in a policy that would cross her 
promises and obligations already made to Germany and Italy. A secret 
meeting came out of this where Konoye, Tojo and the Navy Minister 
Oikawa discussed ways of dealing with Matsuoka's attitude toward the 
United States. It was decided that they would have to watch the Foreign 
Minister very carefully and keep each other informed of his methods and 
manners.
103 
On June 22, Germany attacked Russia. Matsuoka immediately wanted 
the cabinet to decide to go to war with Germany and break of£ relations 
with the Soviet Union. So adamant was Matsuoka about this that Konoye 
did not understand the intentions of the foreign minister, nor did many 
of the members of the cabinet.104 
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A move was made by Hull on June 21 that created quite a reaction. 
He had sent by way of Nomura a "rewrite" of the proposals the Japanese 
had given the United States on May 12. Attached was also an oral 
statement. The document was quite lengthy, accompanied by annexes and 
drafts to be exchanged. In so ~any words, Hull told Nomura the aggres-
sions of Hitler could not be ignored, as was suggested in the May 12 
proposal; that the only kind of understanding Japan wanted was one in 
which the United States would endorse Japanese attacks against the 
United States if the United States became involved in the "European 
War" as a result of her policy of self-defense.105 
The oral statement was interpreted as meaning that the American 
goverrunent could not trust Japan's foreign minister.106 It was diplo-
matic in tone yet, Matsuoka was stomping mad. He· called the Hull 
message a national humiliation. 
In the 39th, 40th, and 41st Liaison Conferences of the Japanese 
Goverrunent, Matsuoka urged Japan to break off negotiations with the 
United States {July 10-24). He demanded that the "oral statement" be 
returned to Washington immediately. More secret meetings followed 
without the presence of Matsuoka. In the· days shortly after his demands, 
the conference ignored Matsuoka. The army and navy jointly asked that 
negotiations with the United States be continued and not broken off. 
A counter-proposal was agreed to by all members, including a reluctant 
Matsuoka, and was drawn up. The members of the conference agreed to 
send the "counter-proposal" as soon as possible, immediately, to the 
United States. Matsuoka used his delay tactics of feigning sickness so 
as not to be able to check over the "final draft." But during his sick 
stay, he was able to inform the German ambassador of the contents of the 
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counter-proposal and the latest communications from the United States. 
The cabinet was "burning" with anger at Matsuoka's defiance. He finally 
agreed to read the "counter-proposal" by July 14, at which time he made 
several revisions. It was now ready to be sent to Washington, but still 
Matsuoka balked. He did not warit to send the "counter-proposal" until 
Japan had returned the "oral statement" of Hull's. His intent seei_ningly 
meant that unless the United States withdrew the "oral statement," nego-
·tiations would have to cease. The Conference determined to disregard 
Matsuoka's wishes and.send both at the same time. Matsuoka brazenly 
took matters into his own hands and cabled Nomura and told him the "Oral 
Statement" was rejected. He told Nomura nothing about the "counter-
proposal. "107 
On July 16, Konoye met privately with his cabinet members who had 
participated in the liaison conferences to deal with the "home, sick in 
bed," Matsuoka. An immediate resignation was agreed upon, with the 
formation of a new cabinet following the next day, with the same line-
up, minus one Yosuke Matsuoka. 
The leaders of Japan had believed that as long as Matsuoka was 
foreign minister it was highly unlikely a diplomatic settlement with 
the United States could be obtained. In addition to his being a 
stumbling block in those negotiation processes, his determination to 
go against the wishes of the Supreme Command caused his fall from power. 
It is notable that Matsuoka seemed to believe that the foreign minister 
had the right of dictating the foreign policy regardless of the desires 
of other ministers and other powers. The Supreme Connnand may have 
wanted the same outcome as Matsuoka, yet it was not prepared to relinquish 
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its power and bow to his every wish. Matsuoka had attempted to tell 
the army how to deal with Singapore, with Indo-China and Thailand, and 
with the German-Russian war. He had become a pest, trying to push the 
Supreme Command around as if they were his to order. He had locked 
horns with the "real power" of ~apan. It was no contest. Matsuoka was 
defeated. 
The effect of Matsuoka upon the relations of Japan to the United 
States was immense. He had steered a course that was not different 
from what the Supreme·Comrnand had wanted, a course that was "German-
bound." His presence as Foreign Minister to Japan, made it almost 
virtually impossible for the United States to even begin to gain a 
"foothold" on the mountain of "peaceful settlement." No individual man, 
it can be·said, had such an effect on the failure of the United States 
and Japan to communicate as did Matsuoka. 
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CHAPTER IV 
KONOYE'S CHANCE 
With Matsuoka now removed from office, what efforts, what documents, 
what signs were given that would reveal the intent of the two countries 
to stay out of war? How were the negotiations looked upon? The new 
Japanese cabinet was an indication of the strength the military had in 
the affairs of state. Matsuoka, a civilian, was replaced by Vice-
Admiral Teijiro Toyoda. Seven of the fourteen ministers in the new 
line-up were military men, including four generals and three admirals.1 
This cabinet was definitely a military cabinet, even though one might 
believe that with the shedding of Matsuoka a "change of heart" or a 
reversal in the "swing of _the pendulum" should have occured. This was 
not the case, thanks to ''Magic," the United States learned through the 
"new" foreign minister that the agreement Japan made with Gennany and 
Italy was still "the keystone of Japanese national policy," and in no 
way would there be "departure" from the Pact.
2 
The misconception that Nomura created in sending the "Draft 
Understanding" of April to Tokyo with the thought that it was an 
American proposal, had created b'y June 21 the belief that America was 
"bearing down" and changing her attitude and policy to a much stiffer 
and more inflexible position. What effect would this interpretation 
have, even if incorrect, on the possibility of a successful settlement? 
Many members of the cabinet were turning to the thought of war as the 
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proper tool for settiement of issues between the two countries. 
In early July the United States received an indication of what was 
to come which was not exactly positive in nature. Japan moved into the 
southern portion of French Indo-China. This did not appear to the 
United States as meaning Japan was curtailing her expansionism and 
deciding to honor the sovereignty of other nations. American intelli-
gence received more news of the Japanese intentions. A message was 
intercepted and decoded by "Magic" and was given to the State Department 
of the United States by July 8. It stated in part, "Although every 
means available shall be resorted to in order to prevent the United 
States from joining the war, if need be, Japan shall act in accordance 
with the Three-Power Pact and shall decide when and how force will be 
employed."3 The United States attempted to help the French by inviting 
Japan to take part in a multilateral guarantee that would declare Indo-
China a neutral nation.4 This failed. 
/ 
In the past sanctions had already cut off various supplies and 
materials from the United States and other countries to Japan. It 
appeared at this point to the President and his advisors, that this 
"economic sanction" was hardly effective and that it was time to 
"restructure" the economic barriers against Japan. The physical-cue 
given Japan that would hopefully end her policy of expansionism in Aisa, 
was an executive order freezing all Japanese funds and assets in the 
United States, dated July 26, 1941. 
The reaction in America was one of general agreement. It had been 
believed by many in America that the Japanese were being allowed use of 
America's goods and supplies only to turn around and use them in a 
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manner t at went aga1ns asic princip es. 
The Japanese must be 
stopped was the feeling. 
The order of July 26, created just the opposite reaction. It 
brought about somewhat of a "threat" from the "new" foreign minister, 
Toyoda. He warned.Ambassador Grew that if "any provocative attitude or 
any concrete step" was made by the Americans to interfere with what 
measures Japan and French Indo-China "were compelled to take for the 
sake of their self-defense," on the shaky ground that they had acted 
in contradition to "general doctrinarian principles," the government of 
Japan could not promise to hold back the great ·upsurge of national 
indignation to this and to the already-maddening fact that the United 
States was aiding the enemy, Chiang Kai-shek. Counter measures would 
be taken, 'Toyoda wrote to Grew • 
• • • In such a case, there is a danger that Japan would be 
forced to take some countermeasures, to the destruction of 
all the hopes of myself as well as the present Cabinet to 
prevent by all poss~ble efforts the coming about of such a 
situation. · This would be much to be dreaded, indeed, for 
the maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the 
United States and thepeace of the Pacific.6 
That same evening after he had received the Foreign Minister, 
Ambassador Grew forecasted war, unless there were some "radical 
surprises." 
The vicious circle of reprisals and counter-reprisals is 
on. • • • Unless radical surprises occur in the world, it 
is difficult to see how the momentum of this downgrade 
movement in our relations can be arrested, nor how far it 
will go. The obvious conclusion is eventual war.7 
On July 28, the Japanese froze American assets and funds. The 
American embargo in turn was enlarged by an order on August 1, which 
prohibited the export to Japan of certain materials (wood pulp, metals 
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and metal products, machinery and vehicles, rubber and rubber products, 
chemicals and related products) and petroleum products that were of high 
enough grade to be used as aviation gasoline.a The economic squeeze-
play was on and Japan unintentionally was being forced to find another 
source for with the rest of the sanctions came the one worst feared, 
oil. Japan was to receive no more oil from the United States. 
More indications of what the United States was attempting to do 
to the Japanese were given. The Panama Canal was shut down for repairs. 
The United States nationalized the Philippine Army making it a part of 
the United States Army forces in the Far East. The President had re-
called MacArthur from inactive duty to go to the Philippines to lead 
this force.9 
The'give-and-take reprisals were causing Konoye a considerable 
amount of uneasiness. On August 2, he told Kido about his concern that 
the navy was even thinking more in tenns of force as the solution for 
' 
dealing with the United States. This was a new element in the game. 
The navy had wanted to avoid taking on Great Britain and the United 
States in a war where the responsibility of defeat or victory would 
fall in their laps. At least this was true until June, 1941. But with 
the denial of fuel which was all important to the navy, and the nego-
tiations not making any progress, they would rather have sought a 
decision at sea than die in the harbor.10 Konoye was finding the 
argument in favor of using force gaining more and more momentum. The 
more "hawkish" element in Japan was becoming more and more concerned 
about Japan's diminishing fuel supplies. 
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The whole problem facing Japan had been reduced to oil. Many of 
the members of the Roosevelt Cabinet, especially Hull, had been aware 
that the embargo on oil would bring about a real strain on the relations 
between the two countries. The reason for the strain on Japan was that 
the navy had only enough oil to last for eighteen months, while the army 
had barely enough to last one year. This was hardly enough oil to win 
a war of any length with the United States, let alone a two-front war 
against the United States and Russia. 
Japan had several choices: create synthetic petroleum, take the 
Netherlands East Indies which had vast amounts of oil resources or 
avoid a "gradual impoverishment of military supplies and resources" 
through an expansion of Japan's domestic facilities and an increase in 
production.11 She opted for the first and last choices over taking the 
Netherlands East Indies for fear of immediate military reprisals on the 
part of the United States. The one very important option not considered 
by Japan was that of abandoning her military policy which would eliminate 
the need for oil. 
As it became quite clear that Ambassador Nomura was not doing the 
job successfully nor making any headway, the army and navy staffs grew 
less interested in continuing the negotiations. A "now or never" 
psychology had been gaining headway. Rather than die by the wayside 
with negotiations, force, it was believed, should be used before it was 
too late.
12 
The Japanese who were unsure of American intentions in her military 
preparations in the Pacific, gave the United States many indications by 
August that Japan was aiming towards military solutions for Japanese-
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American differences.and not negotiations. Konoye was stumbling feebly 
against the momentum, attempting not to move with the current of opinion 
in favor of war. This would be a commitment he was not willing to take 
Japan towards. That K~noye would not commit himself to taking his country 
to war was one of the basic reasons he would lose his post. The sane-
tions placed on Japan during late July certainly played a part in moving 
Konoye to the end. 
The messages decoded by "Magic" and what Nomura would say were 
not always the same. ·America's compromising ability certainly was 
hampered by the truth which came through "Magic." On July 31, the code 
breakers caught this message from Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador 
Hiroshi Oshima in Germany. 
Commercial and economic relations between Japan and other 
countries, led by England and the United States, are grad-
ually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure 
it much longer. Consequently, the Japanese Empire, to save 
its very life must take measures to secure the raw materials 
of the South Seas. It must take immediate steps to break 
asunder this ever strengthening chain of encirclement which 
is being woven under the guidance of and with the partici-
pation of England and the United States, acting like a 
cunning dragon seemingly asleep.13 
Yet on August 6, Japan offered the United States a "new" proposal 
which was in part a response to President Roosevelt's proposal to 
neturalize Thailand and Indo-China. The Japanese promised not to 
station troops in Southwest Pacific areas aside from Indo-China and 
would withdraw from Indo-China after the settlement of war in China. In 
exchange the United States was to suspend all military preparations in 
the southwestern Pacific area, restore normal trade relations with 
Japan, cooperate with Japan in getting the raw materials she needed 
from the southwestern Pacific area, urge Chiang Kai-shek to make peace 
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with Japan and recognize Japan's special role in Indo-China, even after 
she removed her forces. It can be said that with the decoding of July 31, 
any belief the Roosevelt administration had in Konoye's power to settle 
Japanese policies had ended.14 
Two avenues of thought and hope for settling matters with the 
United States emerged. There was a segment including Konoye who sup-
ported the "Konoye-Roosevelt talks" as a road to solutions. Another 
segment, heavily military and including the Supreme Command's spokesman, 
Hideki Tojo, was determined to begin laying plans for a solution by 
military means. 
The development of war plans was the avenue selected while the 
avenue of talking with Roosevelt was left up to Konoye. The oil-guage 
reading was causing not only a decisio~ for war, but it was also 
creating a need for plans. The army in the past had always made the 
plans and the navy and the. cabinet would okay them in that order. But 
now, War Minister Tojo urged the navy to come up with a plan that would 
be so well laid that it would create a spontaneous belief in navy and 
anny circles in its ability to bring about success.15 Planning took 
in points such as the resources the anny and navy would need and also 
the time hostilities would begin. It was decided by the Imperial 
Military Headquarters that to be sure of enough oil, rubber, rice, 
bauxite, and iron ore it was necessary to get swift control of Java, 
Sumatra, Borneo and Malaya. The United States would have to be expelled 
from Wake, Guam and the Philippines, and the British from Singapore in 
order to protect transport lines from the above locations. The weather 
in this part of the world played an important part in determining the 
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time for war. The military felt that the best time for action was the 
months of October and November. December was possible but difficult. 
January or later would be impossible because of the monsoons.16 
The army made plans to capture Malaya, Java, Borneo, the Bismark 
Archipelago, the Indies and the Philippines. They were to be fully 
ready by the end of October. The navy finished its war games which 
included a mock-up of the surprise attack on the American fleet in 
Pearl Harbor. At the end of these games the army and navy staffs con-
ferred and found their plans satisfactory.17 According to Butow, as 
early as August, war preparations were to be made ''on the basis of a 
determination not to run away from a war" with Great Britain, the 
Netherlands and the United States.18 Also in August, the military had 
recommended that diplomatic efforts go hand in hand with war pre-
parations. 
Konoye had noted in his diary the true emphasis was on force. 
He wrote that ~fter the freezing of Japan's assets, the Army General 
Staff began to advocate war on the grounds that further negotiation was 
useless.19 The war preparations, no doubt, blinded many of the military 
officers and those of the "center" in looking for other solutions to 
the Japanese-American differences. 
The outcome of the embargoes, the concern of the United States for 
Great Britain and her threatened colonial possessions in Southeast Asia, 
the interpretation by the Japanese that the attitude of the United 
States toward Japan was becoming more rigid, the fact that the Americans 
and the British were able to decode the Japanese messages and know 
exactly what they were sending throughout the world, and the failure of 
146 
th.e negotiations between the United States and Japan to bring about 
immediate solutions to the problems were reasons for there being little 
hope by either nation at this point for peaceful settlement. Both 
countries had their goals and were not capable of changing them to 
compromise for the other's views or needs. There were no concessions 
offered by the two countries. 
War versus peace became the debate question in the Liaison Confer-
enceso Those conferences of early September were in almost constant 
session working on an "Outline for the Execution of the National Policy.
112
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Konoye was beside himself because as General Suzuki, Head of the Plan-
ning Board told it after the war from the Far East Military Tribunal 
stand, "the Supreme Command was in favor of making a decision then and 
there for.war; calling off negotiations with the United States; but 
Konoye opposed, suggesting that no time be set when war was to be com-
mended, only war preparations.
1121 
Konoye received a short postponement 
of about six w~eks. He did yield to the argument that if Japan did not 
fight for what she wanted soon, she would not have a fair opportunity 
for victory. This was because it was the general belief in military 
circles that American defenses were steadily getting stronger and 
Japan's oil supply steadily lower.
22 
Prince Konoye went to the Emperor to present the following adopted 
outline which was to be used in the next day's Emperor's Conference. 
The outline was in three parts. The first part dealt with securing 
Japan's national existence. To accomplish that war preparations should 
"proceed ••• so that they be completed approximately toward the end 
of October." The second part stated that "At the same time, we will 
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endeavor by every possible diplomatic means to have our demands agreed 
to by America and England." The third part is dependent upon the failure 
of the second: 
If by the early part of October there is no reasonable 
hope of having our· demands agreed to in the diplomatic 
negotiations with America to mentioned above, we will 
immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against 
·America.23 
The emperor upon seeing the outline was upset and inquisitive 
about the fact that this document appeared to put military preparations 
before diplomatic negotiations. He was so upset that he called the 
Chiefs of Staff of the army and navy to learn of their intentions.24 
Konoye records the meeting between the Chiefs of Staff, the Emperor 
and himself. Konoye points out that the Emperor's questions show his 
keen logic on September 5, 1941. He asked the Ariny Chief of Staff to 
estimate the length of the war if one should come about with the United 
States. Sugiyama thought it.could be disposed of in approximately three 
months. The Emperor reminded Sugiyama that he had been the Minister of 
War when the "China Incident" broke out and at that time the same 
question was asked of him and the Emperor reminded him, he had estimated 
one month but fighting had now moved into its fourth yearo Sugiyama 
"in trepidation," explained that the "extensive hinterland of China 
prevented the consummation of operations according to the schedule." 
At this remark the voice of the Emperor became louder and more intense 
as he pointed out that "if the Chinese hinterland was extensive, the 
Pacific was boundless." He wanted to know how Sugiyama could be 
positive that this calculation of three months was correct. Sugiyama 
could not answer, he had been silenced by the logic of the Emperor. The 
Navy Chief of Staff tried to aid Sugiyama by this analogy: 
• o • to his mind Japan was like a patient suffering from a 
serious illness ••• the patient's case was so critical that 
the question of whether or not to operate had to be determined 
without delay. Should he be let alone without an operation, 
there was danger of a gradual decline. An operation, while 
it might be extrem.ely dangerous, would still offer some hope 
of saving his life. The stage n-ow was reached ••• where a 
quick decision had to be made one way or the other.25 
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The Navy Minister felt that Sugiyama was in favor of putting hope in the 
negotiations to the end, but that if they failed a decisive action 
militarily would have to be taken. He told the Emperor that to this 
extent he was in favor of negotia.tions. The Emperor wanting a firm com-
mitment from the two "chiefs" asked them if it was not true then that 
they were in favor of diplomacy as being first on Japan's priority list. 
They both answered with a "yes".26 
From September 5.on, every debate which was held on questions of 
war or peace always ended on the same note. Strike while Japan had the 
power. This decision expanding hostilities into the Pacific was made 
sometime between August 16 and September 5, by the army and navy. From 
this point on, for all practical purposes, the "arrow of war had left 
the string and was flying toward its target," the only possibility of 
stopping this flight would be if the United States. accepted the terms 
of Japan or the Supreme Command lost its monopoly of decision-making 
powers.27 
Still the pseudo-priority of diplomacy-first was carried on. Had 
any offers by Japan or the United States been made that would make this 
priority effective? The "Iwakuro-Draft" was still the main crux of 
Japanese diplomacy which had originally been a "keen disappointment" to 
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Hull and Roosevelt. Even though Matsuoka was removed, his belief that 
"taking a firm stand" was necessary to deal with America properly was a 
continuing carry-over of policy. This "firm stand" had in the past 
worked in the dealings of Japan with her Asian neighbors, but not so 
with the United States which seemed to be gaining strength in her con-
vict'ion that there were basic principles that all nations should agree 
to and abide by. China could hardly be left alone by the United States 
which would bolt the open door closed to them, and more important, 
Japan could not be allowed to combine with Germany to conquer Russia 
and Britain. If these were hard and fast positions taken by the United 
States, which they were, what was left for compromise? A Japanese-
American compromise or settlement restricted by these many facets on 
both sides of the Pacific had little chance for success. 
American diplomatic efforts strained at not appearing "too rigid," 
lest an immediate conflict be created. The United States diplomatic 
efforts were not going to give in on the Hull "principles" but instead 
they were trying to postpone a conflict in hope for some settlement 
other than war. Hull had written that upon the arrival of Nomura he 
had estimated the chances to be very slim that success in negotiations 
were possible. 
Japan's past and present record, her unconcealed ambitions, 
the opportunity for aggrandizement lying before her while 
embroiled Europe demanded a large part of our attention, 
and the basic divergence between our outlooks on interna-
tional relations, were all against the possibility of such 
an accord. The President and I agreed that the existing 
treaties relating to the Far East were sufficient, provided 
the signatories, meaning especially Japan, lived up to 
them • • • but if new agreements would contribute to peace 
in the Pacific, we believed we should not throw the chance 
28 
away •••• 
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Hull cites the reasons for postponement and patience on the part 
of the United States as being basically defensively unprepared and the 
fear of starting a war in the Pacific which would make the British and 
Dutch colonial possessions even more vulnerable to the spreading 
expansionism of the Japanese. Hull wrote that everything possible 
would be done "to bring about a peaceful, fair, and stabilizing settle-
ment of the whole Pacific question. We knew we would have to be patient, 
because the Japanese government could not, even if it wished, abruptly 
put into reverse Japan's march of aggression •• 
. . 
But ••• while 
carrying no chip on our shoulders • • • we could not sacrifice basic 
principles without which peace would be illusory.
112
9 
By the sununer of 1941, the stalemate between the two countries 
had been pretty firmly set. Sterner measures were being taken by the 
Americans to brace themselves defensively against the threat of what 
was happening in Asia. While in Japan, an attitude of preparation for 
inunediate acti0n was being evidenced. 
Inspite of assurances made by Konoye and the military to the 
Emperor that they would place diplomacy first before war preparations 
were put in action, these were off-set by the deadline placed on 
determining whether Japan would choose a route of war or peace. In 
considering the possibility of war with the United States, the members 
of the Japanese liaison conference naturally had to give some thought 
to the chances of winning or losing. It was openly stated that great 
risks were involved and that no sure victory was in view. Yet still 
the "now or never" psychology prevailed.
30 
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In September there had been little evidence that the negotiations 
would bring about the needed changes the "Iwakuro Draft" had suggested. 
On September 18, the chiefs of the army and navy staffs called for a 
final attempt at diplomatic negotiations with the United States. If 
this final attempt failed then Japan was to move on to the second phase 
of the outline of September 5, which was "war preparation" for troop 
movement and fleet disposition necessary for launching hostilities.31 
The phase one and two program was accepted by Konoye on September 20, 
but much to his amazement and shock, the Supreme Command was demanding 
as part of the two-step outline, a deadline for either war or peace. 
It was determined that this decision for either would be made, at the 
latest, by October 15~32 
Konoye retreated from his duties to think on the Supreme Command's 
demand that a decision for war or peace be made by October 15. He 
determined to resign as Pr.emier and told this to the "Lord Keeper of the 
Privy Seal," Kido. Kido would not accept this decision and instead 
urged Konoye to take the initiative in calling for a reconsideration of 
the entire question of war or peace. Konoye accepted this advice and 
contacted what he thought to be the weak link in the cabinet, Navy 
Minister Koshiro Oikawa. The Navy Minister was questioned by Konoye 
concerning the attitudes of the navy about the deadline for war or 
peace. The navy minister wanted the negotiations continued between 
the United States and Japan. His opinion was the same as Foreign 
Minister Toyoda. This group of three men, Oikawa, Toyoda, and Konoye 
were those who opposed such a deadline calling an end to the negotiations. 
Konoye had been told by the chief of the navy general staff that he 
agreed with the demand of the army for an immediate policy of action. 
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Konoye had believed that if the navy balked at the deadline set for war 
or peace the anny could be held in check.33 But with the stand tne 
chief of the navy general staff had taken, there was little hope that 
the anny demand could be changed. To make matters worse for Konoye and 
his hope in the negotiations, he received word from Washington. 
Konoye had all along kept up hope and faith in the possibilities 
of the proposed "Konoye-Roosevelt Talks." He had received permission 
from the Supreme Command to meet with Roosevelt. He was to stick to 
the already defined position Japan had given in her previous negotia-
tions, which were the Emperor's "true intentio~s." If he had no 
success in these meetings he was told that he must be willing to return 
to Tokyo and lead the Japanese into war.34 There was actually little 
faith in the talks by the Supreme Command.35 The "true intentions" of 
course were those that had been prevalent in the discussions of Hull 
and Nomura. To accept them America would have had to remove herself 
from the China, situation with Japan, have nothing more to say about 
the Alliance with Gennany, and restore normal economic relations with 
Japan. The fact that on October 2, Konoye received word that the 
United States did not consent to the request of the "Roosevelt-Konoyeu 
talks gives evidence that America realized the talks were not going to 
be anything different or new.36 An immediate post-war comment by 
Konoye reveals his feelings on the rejection. of such talks. The 
government "was unable to control the Japanese militarists in the field, 
or often didn't know what the militarists were doing. It was that way 
when I was trying to see Roosevelt. • • • The government was considered 
a liar, because no matter what we promised regarding China, final 
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decision on the removal of our troops from China depended upon the 
military. That was one reason why the meeting was never held.
11
37 
Konoye's "ace in the hole" was dropped. He received word from 
Hull that a conference between the two leaders could serve no useful 
purpose without establishing a common ground of agreement, a theme 
mentioned several times before by Hull. The members of the group that 
wanted direct action for war could now say to Konoye who had faith and 
hope in diplomacy, ''We told you so." 
The Army felt that there was no point in continuing the 
negotiations and that Japan should decide for war. How-
ever, some Navy Leaders--particularly the Navy Minister--
were reluctant to see the negotiations broken off. Their 
reluctance stemmed from their lack of confidence in Japan's 
ability to win a prolonged war with the United States.38 
Some authors assign a great deal of importance to this note of 
October 2 from the United States. It would seem from Konoye's own 
testimony that little would have been accomplished at these proposed 
meetings. The Konoye Cabinet's fate was sealed. It was time for the 
~ 
Cabinet to "make up its mind" whether or not definitely to prepare for 
war with the United States.39 
Hull in his note of October 2, had suggested that Japan, as an 
"earnest of good faith," should withdraw its troop_s from China and Indo-
China, and then possibly a compromise could be drawn up. Konoye, with-
out delay, attempted to do this by arguing for a partial evacuation of 
China.
40 
Even though Konoye resisted the death of the talks-idea, his last-
minute stand for concessions was not productive. For three days he 
retreated with the navy and foreign minister, to talk about "methods of 
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avoiding a crisis."41 But Konoye was held in place by the decision of 
September. The Cabinet was deadlocked. 
The navy wanted the whole responsibility of going to war placed 
on Konoye's shoulders. The army did not agree with this. On October 12, 
Tojo said that each member of the cabinet bore the responsibility of 
"tendering his advice" and "assisting the throne." This meeting of 
five major ministers failed to alter the balance between continuing 
negotiations or going to war. With the failure of this conference to 
solve the issue of whether to go to war or not, Konoye was faced with 
either leading the nation of Japan into war or stepping aside for another 
person who would take Japan to war if it were necessary.4
2 
The Cabinet attempted once more on October 14, to settle the 
matter, but failed. Konoye made plans to resign and collected resigna-
tions from his cabinet members. On October 16, he and his cabinet 
resigned making room for a new man with a new approach, one with an 
ability to draw the navy and army together and, above all, one who could 
fulfill the wishes of the Emperor. 
After some discussion with the Emperor and the Cabinet, the man 
selected for the job was General Hideki Tojo. He was given a clean 
slate, a new· start. He was the one who was to break the deadlock and 
not necessarily lead Japan into war. 
The Konoye Cabinet, it can be said, resigned because of a deadlock 
over whether to go to war or not. One can view this deadlock as a 
gradual growing process that had its roots in the summer of 1941 and 
was now in full bloom in mid-October. A hardening on both the United 
States and Japanese sides took place during this time to the point where 
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neither could bend an inch. The fall of the third Konoye Cabinet can be 
attributed to a development of "war fever" brought about by the economic 
sanctions of the United States and her statements of policy according to 
"Hull's· basic principles." These were interpreted somewhat incorrectly 
as meaning "the United States is getting tougher rather than more len-
ient" in her policy toward Japan. As a result of these American actions, 
a "now or never" psychology developed which Konoye and some of his 
cabinet would not accept. 
For Konoye and some of his cabinet members, the decision for 
going to war was beyond their grasp. They were not prepared to plunge 
Japan into a war which they were not sure Japan could win. Instead, 
Konoye stepped aside to let someone else take that particular burden of 
responsibility. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE QUESTION AND ANSWER 
Hideki Tojo the newly appointed Prime Minister described his 
cabinet as that of one with a "clean slate." But the "chalk was placed 
in the hands of those who made the earlier mark."
1 
Whether a "war" 
cabinet or not, the ave~age person in Japan agreed that it was. In 
America, the talk of a clean slate was regarded as sheer "trickery," an 
attempt to hide the war preparations.2 In reality, Tojo had not been 
given this job to lead Japan down the road to war, but rather to break 
the deadlock or stalemate created by the Konoye Cabinet. In order to 
do this, Tojo and his cabinet began meeting almost daily for two weeks 
following his appointment to· establish a "nationa~ policy."3 
After more than a year of negotiations that were stalemated be-
tween the United States and Japan, one wonders how clean the slate 
really was that Tojo received. Were there any attempts to negotiate 
with the United States at this point? And if there were, what in 
actuality was ·new or different abouthernegotiations from the two pre-
vious Cabinets' diplomatic gestures? 
On November 20, 1941, the United States received a diplomatic 
message that shall be called "the question" and on November 26, Japan 
received from the United States a message that shall be called "the 
answer." 
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The background of the diplomatic representation of November 20, 
began in the 65th Liaison Conference of October 30, when the Cabinet was 
under tremendous pressure for an oil supply and time. Prime Minister 
Tojo told the Liaison members that a decision would have to be reached 
on November 1, even if they had to meet all night. They would concern 
themselves with three proposals. The first was to avoid war and undergo 
great hardships. The second was to decide on war and immediately settle 
matters by war. The third and final proposal was to decide on war but 
carry on war preparations and diplomacy side by side.
4 
In the 66th Liaison Conference on November 1, the line-up for the 
various proposals fell with either the second or the third. The War 
Ministry supported heavily the third proposal. General Tojo, Navy 
Minister Shimada, Finance Minister Kaya, and Director of the Planning 
Board Suzuki were also in favor of the third proposal. The Army Staff 
supported the second proposal. There was only one member, Foreign 
Minister Togo, w~o was uncertain about which was the correct proposal. 
It was not uncommon for the members of the Cabinet to know prior to 
these meetings how each person felt, or what would be said. Tojo had 
attempted to smooth over the feelings of the Anny Staff concerning 
Proposal Two with little success, prior to the Conference.5 
The 66th Liaison Conference was a long one, lasting some seventeen 
hours, extending to 1:30 a.m. November 2. The group went along with a 
demand from the navy for a larg~ allocation of steel which appeared to 
be the price it demanded for a war decision. 
Proposal One was quickly discarded because Japan presently had a 
foundation for war; the members of the conference were not sure Japan 
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could win a war in three years; and the philosophy seemed prevalent that 
it would be easier for Japan to engage in a war at this time rather than 
at a later date. 
The Supreme Command, it seems, was the author of Proposal Two. A 
possible reason for the creation of Proposal Two was a belief that Japan 
could not gain what she wanted through negotiations and that any further 
efforts to talk by the Japanese would only aide the United States.6 In 
reading the translations of the original records of the_66th Conference, 
one is impressed with the discussion of Proposal Two and the fact that 
the cabinet would not even consider peace by making concessions to the 
United States of any kind. Most of the cabinet members and the military 
leaders had virtually accepted the fact that Japan had to take a route 
which would give her control over much of southeast Asia. Japan, at 
this point was unwilling to readjust her objectives so that a peaceful 
settlement might be obtained. 
It seems tijat the only members of the cabinet troubled over the 
thought of immediate war were Togo and Kaya. They eventually succumbed 
to the argument of Nagano and Suzuki that it was presently the right 
time for war since the operational conditions for conflict would not 
last much longer with the coming of the monsoon seas.on and also the 
availability of materials for a war were lessening. During the discus-
sion of Proposal Two, the army chief of staff had presented a proposed 
attachment to Proposal Two which Togo and Kaya could not accept. The 
attached proposal read, 
Japan gives up hope of success in negotiations, and is deter-
mined to begin war against the United States, Britain, and the 
Netherlands at the beginning of December. Negotiations with 
the United States will be continued until then in order to 
gain an advantage in war. An attempt will be made immediately 
to strengthen ties with Germany and Italy.7 
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Kaya and Togo responded to this inserted portion by letting the 
Cabinet members know that they desired somehow to make a last try at 
diplomatic negotiations. "It's outrageous to ask us to resort to 
diplomatic trickery. We can't.do it."
8 
The Army Vice-Chief of Staff, 
Tsukado, responded with the argument that they should deal with the 
central issues first, which were "to decide immediately to open hos-
tilities," and that "war will begin on the first of December," then study 
the possibilities of dipl.omacy. Tsukado was the product of many months 
of waiting for diplomacy with little or almost nothing to show for it. 
The Navy Vice-Chief of Staff, Ito, said that the n~vy was prepared to 
allow Japan to negotiate until November 20 and Tsukado said that this 
was too long for the army. The army would not allow negotiations to 
continue beyond November 13. Foreign Minister Togo responded to the 
deadlines given by the army and navy by giving his objective for diplo-
macy which was successful negotiations. 
You say there must be a deadline for diplomacy. As Foreign 
Minister, I cannot engage in diplomacy unless there is a 
prospect that it will be successful. I cannot accept dead-
lines or conditions if they make it unlikely that diplomacy 
will succeed. You must obviously give up the idea of going 
to war.9 
From this reply of Togo's, it was quite obvious that clarification 
on the deadline and conditions for diplomacy needed to be made. With 
this in mind, Tojo suggested that the discussion also include Proposal 
Three. Tsukado repeated what was attached to Proposal Two and demanded 
that "diplomacy must not obstruct military operations," and that 
November 13 had to be the deadline. 
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This emphasis on war over diplomacy worried Tojo and Togo enough 
that they demanded from the Supreme Corrnnand their word that they would 
not go to war if diplomacy were successful. Tsukado told them that this 
would be entirely impossible if success were achieved after November 13. 
The reason it could not be accepted after this date was that it would 
throw the Supreme Corrnnand into confusion in its plans and strategies. 
This reply ignited several corrnnents that were of a volatile nature. In 
fact words were flying so heatedly that Tojo declared a twenty-minute 
break to cool the men down. It was also an opportunity for Tojo to 
attempt to regroup his cabinet.lo 
The outcome of the break and discussion was that the leaders of 
the Supreme Conunand finally gave in to accept midnight, November 30, 
as the deadline for halting diplomatic discussions with the United 
States. 
Was this to be considered a "change of hear:t" on the part of the 
Supreme Corrnnand?, .Proposal Three was accepted. A decision for war was 
made; the time for the beginning of the war was set; and the negotiations 
were allowed to continue until one second before December 1, with the 
stipulation that if successful, war would be called off.
11 
Now that a deadline for diplomacy had been set,_ what would be 
negotiated? Would it be a new approach, or the same as the "Iwakuro-
Draft?" How would Japan go about obtaining a peaceful victory? 
In the same seventeen hou~ long conference these questions were 
dealt with. The reply to the questions came in the form of two pro-
posals. Proposal "A" and Proposal "B" were the titles given by the 
cabinet. 
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Proposal "A" was a somewhat reduced version of the past proposals 
presented in the negotiations with the United States through Nomura.12 
Proposal "B" was an "extraordinary diplomatic document." In short, it 
allowed Japan to concentrate on a new military offensive which would 
give them complete control over the people of China for their with-
drawing of troops from Southern Indo-China.13 
Proposal "B" was selected by the members after a "thorough" 
discussion. It is quite evident that at this point the Supreme Command 
and a number of the cabinet members believed war to be inevitable which 
made Proposal "B" even harder to swallow. Over the selection of "A" or 
"B" the members of this lengthy meeting had their second "battle." The 
Supreme Corrunand was again arguing with the Foreign Minister. The main 
point of contention for the Supreme Corrunand, seemed to be withdrawal of 
Japanese Troops from Southern Indo-China. This was incredulous to them 
and thus, they wanted to use. Proposal "A". Tog~ became adamant, and 
from this arose the fear that he might resign. If he did this it might 
cause the "war" cabinet to fall.14 A ten-minute recess was called to 
regroup and cool down. Sugiyama, Tojo, Tsukada, and Muto conferred and 
decided on three points. The first was that the discussion could not 
be allowed to last any longer. It would be final that the deadline for 
war was to be set within the first ten days of December. The Supreme 
Conunand demanded fixing this time span for war. The second point was 
that the Cabinet could not be p~rmitted to fall. If it happened, it 
would precipitate a selection of an anti-war cabinet. The third and 
last point decided upon during the ten-minute break was an "unenthusi-
astic" agreement to use Proposal "B". The army had given careful 
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consideration to whether it would give in and agree to a softening of 
conditions, the withdrawal of troops from Southern Inda-China as bait 
for Proposal "B".15 
Proposal "B" was to be used in spite of the Supreme Conunand's 
complaints, doubts, and belief in an inevitable war. It was decided 
that the withdrawal of ·troops from Inda-China was to be used only "if 
necessary" in the talks with Hull. None of the members of the conference 
were overly enthusiastic about the possibility of success of Proposal 
"B". This final attempt at diplomacy allowed little chance for success-
ful negotiations and was defeated even before it was cabled to America. 
Although there were some who voiced some optimism in the Proposal, 
they were few in number. Tojo when returning from. the conference he had 
with the Emperor to explain what had transpired in the 66th Liaison 
Conference had said, "Proposal B is not an excuse for war. I am praying 
to the Gods that somehow we will be able to get an agreement with the 
United States wit;h this proposal.
11
16 
What was the reaction to the diplomatic negotiations that had 
taken place so far? Public opinion in the United States had worsened 
steadily with the pro-German statements made by Matsuoka, and the troop 
movements of Japan into Inda-China. Japan was still seen as the 
"aggressor." She was still seen as "unjust" in her activities in China. 
The American was not completely aware of the intricacy of the discussions 
but knew that they were not ent~rely successful. Chiang Kai-shek did not 
like the soft way the United States was handling the Japanese.17 Grew 
was convinced that war was inevitable unless the United States relaxed 
her economic restraints.18 Grew had called for these same economic 
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restraints earlier in 1941 to curb the Japanese actions of expansionism 
in southeast Asia. The only accomplishment the embargoes had made, in 
Grew's estimation at this point, was in leading the United States and 
Japan on a collision course for war. This estimation caused him to 
reverse his previous call for economic restraints against Japan. Little 
had been accomplished in the negotiations with Japan. The State De-
partment was seeking backing from the military and naval forces con-
cerning their demands on Japan.19 B-17's and B-24's were in place on 
some of the islands in the southwest Pacific. The United States was 
aware that they had no way of intercepting "enemy" planes or warning 
the airfields of an attack. The United States was desperately hurrying 
to establish a string of air-fields across the southwest Pacific for 
more of these bombers. 
20 
The military was trying to work with the State Department of 
stall any break with the Japanese for as long as it was necessary. 
General Marshall,commented that he and Admiral Stark were doing every-
thing within their power to delay a crisis occuring with Japan until 
the last moment " ••• because of our state of unpreparedness and because 
of our involvements in other parts of the world. 
112
.l 
The American Navy was weak to say the least, for a two-ocean 
navy. It was presently committed to an undeclared naval war in the 
Atlantic with Germany and was hardly capable of a naval war with Japan 
in the Pacific. Time was neede~ by the United States to prepare for 
a conflict. On November 5, the same day Japan had originally decided 
to go to war if both proposals were rejected, Stark and Marshall made 
these recommendations to the President. 
That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the 
needs of Russia, -Great Britain, and our own forces. That 
aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accel-
erated to the maximum ~racticable extent. That no ultimatmn 
be delivered to Japan. 2 
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The United States was unprepared defensively to fight with Japan and at 
the same time unable to.obtain a peaceful compromise or settlement with 
her. The United States had taken an uncompromising stand diplomatically 
through the leadership of Hull and Roosevelt with Japan.23 Militarily 
the United States had taken on an undeclared naval war with Gennany. 
At the same time the United States wanted to maintain peace in the Far 
East with Japan even though Britain and the United States were not happy 
with the position Japan held in China and Inda-China. The thought of 
forcefully taking on Japan had to be set aside as a secondary priority 
to that of the European war and the likelihood the United States would 
soon be drawn into it officially. Physical action could not be taken 
by the United States against Japan. Instead, words were to be used as 
a temporary method of holding off any conflict the United States might 
have with Japan. But the opportunity for words being used was lessened 
by factual infonnation. "Magic" had given the Americans a more realistic, 
knowledgeable insight of Japan's intentions diplomatically. With the 
decoding, the United States learned that the negot.iations coming after 
November 5, were to be "their last chance." Secretary of State Hull 
put his office to work, attempting to come up with a solution to the 
"magic" interceptions. An atte111pt was made by the department to prove 
to Japan that she could gain more through peaceful means in the areas 
of trading and financial arrangements than she could through the use of 
force. Yet the United States had certain principles, stated by Hull, 
which hardly left room for the type of concession Japan would require 
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to stop her war machinery from being put into action.24 
It can safely be deduced that at this juncture of history, prior 
to the negotiations offered and replied to on November 20, and 26, 
respectively, the American government felt a desperation about the turn 
of events and a necessity to seek more time to strengthen her own hand. 
In Washington the Proposals were delivered by Nomura. It had 
been aggreed on by the Japanese Cabinet to attempt, first of all, 
Proposal "A", realizing that the chances of America accepting it slim, 
since it only restated.the negotiation demands of Japan thatha:l been in 
American hands since April, 1941. If this was rejected, then Proposal 
"B" would be offered. Nomura, because of his own insecurities at not 
being able to "get any where" with the Americans, and possibly his own 
feelings of inadequacy and incompetency, requested that he be.allowed 
to resign his post or if not that, at least be allowed a "professional 
diplomat" to help him in the dealings with the Americans. Saburo Kurusu 
was sent. His arrival was marked by Proposal "A" being rejected by the 
Americans.25 
It seems that Admiral Nomura took off on a self-initiated idea 
which suggested the two nations return to the situation of diplomacy 
prior to July. This would mean that Japan would have to evacuate her 
troops from southern Indo-China and that in return the United States 
would have to remove her economical barriers and pressures to the posi-
tion they had been prior to July. Was this too large of a price to pay 
for peace? Nomura seemed to think it not. When the "non-professional" 
Nomura cabled his action to Tokyo, Tojo upon receiving it inunediately 
returned this cable. 
Postpone meeting with Hull until we send instructions •••• 
There will be trouble later if we proceed in a piecemeal 
fashion to settle problems. This method is not satisfactory. 
Indicate clearly to the United States that when you sent your 
personal suggestion to Tokyo, Tokyo instructed you that Pro-
posal B must be agreed upon in its entirety. Hereafter proceed 
with negotiations on the basis of Proposal B.26 
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Nomura had his hands slapped and was further reminded that these propo-
sals had been his final orders. Nomura's main problem was that he was 
used to being his own man to a certain degree and did not understand 
the implications of being a diplomat nor in some cases did he want to 
understand. 
Nomura and Kurusu placed Proposal "B" before Hull on November 20. 
The text, of course, had already been intercepted and read by Hull. He 
knew that this was the "last bargain." One senses the frustration and 
anxiety the Secretary of State suffered in knowing this was the last 
offer and that it was not acceptableo 
The commitments we should make were virtually, a sur-
render •••• --The President and I could only conclude that 
agreeing to these proposals would mean condonement by the 
United States of Japan's past aggressions, assent to future 
courses of conquest by Japan, abandorunent of the most essen-
tial principles of our foreign policy, betrayal of China and 
Russia, and acceptance of the role of silent partner siding 
and abetting Japan in her effort to create a Japanese hegemony 
over the western Pacific and eastern Asia.27 
On the 22nd of November the 7lst Liaison Conference members 
reinforced a decision made earlier by saying rejection by the United 
28 
States of Proposal "B" would mean war. 
What would have happened if the United States had agreed to the 
tenents of this proposal? China having been deserted by the United 
States would have had little confidence in the United States. Other 
colonial nations would have had little hope that the United States would 
169 
have been able to help if needed. If the United States had accepted 
this Japanese proposal, the proposal probably would not have had a very 
long life •. It would.have probably fallen apart with war breaking out 
in the Pacific. Neither side would have slowed down preparations for 
war in the Pacific causing arguments over "arms," and if that were not 
enough, then the subject of oil and the need for more of it by Japan 
would have ended the truce. This proposal would have only opened the 
door for more Japanese demands and would have created more problems 
between the two nations.29 
On November 22, the Japanes·e Ambassador and Kurusu called at the 
Secretary's apartment where they always met for these "talks." During 
this session, even though Hull had been working all day to make up an 
offer to counter Proposal "B", he checked to see if the Japanese govern-
ment had given them any more concessions to deal with. They had not 
been given any~
3
0 
During that same day Hull with the help of the members of the 
State Department, had come up with a counter proposal for a modus 
vivendi--a temporary arrangement of affairs pending final settlements. 
Along with the temporary arrangement a list was made up of principles 
the Japanese and Americans would have to both subscribe to in order to 
live peacefully. He inquired of the emissaries of China, the Nether-
lands, Great Britain and Australia two different times to see how they 
felt about the modus vivendi and list of principles. Great Britain and 
China reacted violently to the proposal modus vivendi. China believed 
that an adoption of such a modus vivendi would cause a collapse of the 
Chinese resistance to the Japanese. Churchill cabled Hull suggesting 
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that this project be abandoned.31 The modus vivendi idea was discarded 
after careful study. It was decided though, to try through a response 
to the negotiations of November 20 to arrive at a truce. The State 
Department did this with an agreement " ••• that the American offer 
would only be for the record~
11
32 This offer would do nothing, it was 
felt, to stop the coming invasion to the south which "magic" had 
reported. The only thing that mattered to the pessimistic staff in 
Washington was that in the line of tradition, the United States was not 
to be the one to fire the first shot.33 
The "answer" was given to the Japanese "question" at 5:00 p.m. 
(Washington D.C. time) November 26. The "answer" basically told the 
Japanese that all she had wanted was to be denied. The "answer" did 
not stop there, but offered instead of acceptance of Proposal "B", 
certain alternatives. Even though the Japanese had determined this was 
"the last chance," :the United States attempted to keep _the negotiations 
alive on these points. It was suggested that a mutual cooperation on 
the grounds prior to July, 1941 be established. It suggested that 
Japan sponsor a meeting similar to the Nine-Power Treaty of the 1920's 
where a non-aggression pact among all the countries of the Far East 
could be presented and hopefully accepted. The mere fact that the pro-
posal had not been accepted was enough to kell negotiations. The 
suggestion that the Japanese remove all her troops from China and 
Indo-China, would create quite a response in Tokyo.34 
The Japanese Cabinet had been informed by the "dumbfounded" Kurusu 
and Nomura that instead of a "yes" to Proposal "B", two hard proposals 
were given which they believed Japan would find impossible to accept. 
We were both dumbfounded and said that we could not even 
cooperate to the·extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We 
argued back furiously, but Hull remained solid as a rock. 
Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms 
as these? Well, England, the Netherlands, and China 
doubtless ·put her up to it. Then, too, we have been 
urging them to quit helping Chiang, and lately a number 
of important Japanese have been urging in speeches that 
we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, 
there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that 
she give us complete control over her national defense. 
All this is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we 
think so. • • • Unfortunately, there are no hopes of 
acceptance of our demands within the time limits you set.35 
171 
Along with the statements from Japan's diplomats the Cabinet recieved a 
copy of the American reply which was regarded as an ultimatum.36 The 
Cabinet felt that if this were accepted it would lower her to a third-
rate power. All the Japanese needed now for war was the Emperor's 
approval. The Cabinet assumed that the end of the road had been reached 
as far as negotiations were concerned. All attention now was to be 
focused on the war.37 
But the quest1on must be asked, why did Japan look upon this 
"answer" as an ultimatum? The Japanese were the ones who had created an 
"ultimatum." The fact that they had limited negotiations to a mere 
fonnality without hope of success was evidence that their proposal was 
an ultimatum. The knowledge now that the Imperial Fleet heading for 
Pearl Harbor with a scheduled attack for December 7, had left at six 
o'clock on November 26 is evidence that shows they placed little value 
on Proposal "B".38 The value they had assigned to Proposal "B" was 
acceptance or there would be war. This definitely falls into the 
category of ultimatums. The fact, also, that Japan refused to reply to 
the American "answer" of November 26 showed that they were holding to their 
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original decision which meant war. Japan upon receiving the American 
reply called it an ultimatum, leaving Japan no choice except war. 
Japan had been left with four choices, which removes the November 26 
"answer" from the category of ultimatums. The Japanese could choose to 
agree to the American "answer" and reverse her policy. She could choose 
to abstain from any further advances to the north or south and continue 
her war with China. She could choose to begin a retreat from China and 
see what the United States, China and Great Britain would return for her 
withdrawal. Or, final.ly, she could choose to "draw her guns" and make 
a bid for all of Asia.39 Hardly an ultimatum, Japan chose the last 
alternative. 
Grew, upon reading the "answer" to the Japanese "ultimatum" found 
it met all the Japanese were fighting for. 
It is a broad-gage, objective, and statesmanlike document, 
offering to Japan practically everything she had ostensibly 
been fighting ~or if she will simply stop her aggressive 
policy. • • • ·Japanese public opinion can always be molded, 
in a comparatively short time, and the clever move of the 
Government now would be to persuade the public that the 
Government in the Washington conversations, had won a great 
diplomatic victory by achieving, without further force of 
arms, the securities or "freedoms" for which she had been 
fighting.40 
The fact that the Japanese did not study this document sent by 
Nomura and Kurusu was more evidence that the course was established and 
the "discussions" had ended. 
War would break out on December 7, 1941 with Japan striking at the 
Naval Fleet of the United States in Pearl Harbor. The stalemated 
negotiations had been unable to deter war. Neither nation had been 
willing to offer concessions which might have purchased peace. 
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